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Abstract 
The overarching discipline of the study is the sociolinguistics of law in which the 
analytical methods of discourse, genre and narrative analysis are brought together in 
the enterprise of describing language in its social context. The issues addressed in this 
study relate to communication processes in a court of law in Gaborone, Botswana. 
These have been identified as issues relating to the various stages of the trial process 
that some writers have labelled sub-genres of the courtroom genre and some have 
simply labelled discourses. The processes typical to the Botswana courtroom are the 
administrative processes of Mentions Reading of Charge Sheets and Readings of 
Facts and the substantive processes of Direct and Cross Examinations, Submissions 
and Judgements. 
The study also includes the description of the bilingual nature of the Botswana 
courtroom including code switching and courtroom interpreting. The views and 
awareness of the legal practitioners - police prosecutors and lawyers- on and of the 
uses of language in the courtroom were sought and tested by a short questionnaire. 
These are cross-referred with observations and recordings of the court's proceedings 
with the aim of revealing the nature of bilingualsim in this court 
Many studies have described and critiqued different aspects of the trial such as 
courtroom questioning and jury summations, but few have attempted to describe the 
trial as a whole as this study has done. This broad focus has enabled the perception of 
the trial as a site for interlocking discourses, which together bring about the outcomes 
of trials. It has found out, for example, that while some processes are, ordinarily, 
unacceptably coercive of witness, like cross examinations, some are empowering, for 
instance, direct examinations. In which witnesses are allowed longer turns at talk 
where they give narrative accounts. The data comprises forty hour of recordings 
transcribed into texts comprising several examples of each of the stages of the trial. 
INTRODUCTION 
The motivation 
Two factors motivated the pursuit of this study. The first factor is two 
pronged - my interest in the study of the functions of language in society 
and the interrelationships of language and society (sociolinguistics) and the 
functions of law in society ( sociological jurisprudence). The former I have 
training in and the latter interest has developed over the years since I left 
my first degree in English Literature and Sociology. The topic of the 
language of the law and courtroom discourse thus allows a perfect meeting 
place between sociolinguistics and sociological jurisprudence in the study 
of 'how language relates to the function of law in society' (Danet 1971 
p. 447). The second factor is the logistics of studying the discourse of some 
institution or other. The area of courtroom discourse is particularly 
accessible as courts are public places and anyone, researcher or casual 
observer, can visit any court. However an even better reason for easy access 
to the courts in Botswana is the legislation passed, since I embarked on this 
study, that courtroom proceedings could be tape-recorded, which provided 
me a very good possibility of collecting authentic and complete natural 
language data. The initial hunch that there could be a topic worthy of study 
in the language of the Botswana courtroom developed out of a number of 
casual visits to the courts. One thing that came out powerfully from these 
casual observations was the complexity of communication in the courtroom. 
The Botswana context, where bilingualism in English and Setswana is the 
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normfor most educated people i. e. those who have gone through the 
Botswana education system, is one that still needs to be described. There is 
an observable neglect of issues of language in Botswana when in fact the 
situation is very rich in language data. It was this consciousness of the 
theoretical possibilities of the language situation of Botswana that led me to 
the decision to study at least one of the many domains of languages in 
Botswana. Hence the focus on communication processes, whether they 
involve the use of English only or the use of different languages, mainly 
Setswana and English. 
Court Discourse: Establishing the niche 
Court discourse is a very broad discourse type (Harris 1988). In western 
countries court discourse takes place in physical contexts that include 
special buildings and very conventionalised modes of dress as well as 
conventionalised modes of behaviour. The social relations in courtrooms 
involve highly asymmetrical distribution of power where power is 'invested 
in certain individuals who ... represent the 
force of law' (Harris 1988 p. 96). 
The Botswana court is similar to many other courts around the world, both 
in its physical layout and in its overall purpose and the statuses and roles of 
participants within the courtroom. This study of courtroom discourse in a 
Botswana magistrate's court aims to study the part language plays in these 
interpersonal encounters. 
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There is a wide range of types of court around the world with different 
functions and different personnel with a basic distinction between civil and 
criminal courts. This study of communication processes in a court of law is 
based in a magistrate's court, and the focus is on its criminal proceedings. 
The aim of the study is to explicate the communication processes of this 
court using methods of analysis selected for their power to give insight into 
these processes. 
One distinguishing characteristic of this study is to be found both in the type 
and level of court chosen as the type most common to the Botswana context 
- the magistrate's court. O'Barr (1982) and associates studied 'the language 
of litigants and judges in Small Claims Courts focussing on 14 courtrooms 
in six cities, where, 'by expanding their sample beyond two judges or 
communities, they are able to give a feeling for broader patterns that emerge 
in different settings' (Mertz 1992, p. 428). My study differs in being 
concentrated in the proceedings of a single courtroom for comprehensive, 
qualitative analysis of the genre in a specified context. 
The literature on language and the law 
The study of the relationship between language and the law and of legal 
language has its beginnings in the 1970s in the USA with the launching by 
the Law and Social Science Program of National Science Foundation, of the 
'empirical study of language in American legal settings. ' This Organisation 
'funded four interdisciplinary studies; two on questioning in American 
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courtrooms conducted by O'Baff, Conley and Lind, and two on 
comprehensibility of pattern jury instructions, led by Sales, Elwork and 
Alfini. ' (Danet 1990 p. 94 1). 
Danet (1990) makes an observation, which echoes my own observations 
about the foci of studies of communication processes in the courtroom. She 
says that in the last fifteen years of studies after these studies were funded, 
'research has continued to focus on the nature and consequences of 
communication processes in dispute processing and on the 
comprehensibility of legal language to lay persons. ' It is my observation 
that focus on 'problems' of communication (consequences and 
comprehensibility to lay persons), has produced very highly critical stances 
on the part of researchers who continue to focus on selected aspects of the 
trial rather than on communication processes in the whole trial process. My 
study attempts to bring caution to the enterprise of describing 
communication processes in law courts and to show how the whole trial is 
made up of discourses that interconnect to bring about the outcomes of 
trials. I do not only focus on certain kinds of communication such as 
questioning in court orjury summations, which are patently problematic, 
but on all communication processes. 
This broader focus reflects a position that is not entirely unique in the study 
of the discourses of the adversarial system ofjustice. Other studies such as 
those Carlen (1976) and Atkinson and Drew (1979) and Harris (1980) have 
discussed the whole trial process albeit from a different perspectives. 
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Carlen's is probably a precursor to the critical school that focuses on the 
problematic relationship between 'professional procedures and 
commonsense, everyday ones' (Atkinson and Drew 1979). Atkinson and 
Drew's study looks at courtroom interaction from an ethno methodological 
approach they describe several courtroom processes such as examinations, 
and openings of hearings and compare them with similar processes in 
everyday discourses such as those of conversation. Harris's study focuses 
on the formal discourse of the courtroom from a discourse analytic 
perspective and describes the processes of the courtroom using Sinclair and 
Coulthard's (1975) model of classroom discourse. My broader focus 
(involving study of all courtroom processes) means that my methodology is 
as eclectic as there are diverse courtroom discourses. 
Analytical models 
In her discussion of types of representation of the structures of particular 
genres, Harris (1988 p. 99) lists four types as linear, networks and flow 
diagrams, and hierarchical types of representation. She argues the merits 
and limitations Of each type. For example the linear t)rpes are 'criticised on 
the grounds that they do not allow one to take count of enough similarities 
and differences' between genres and 'a dynamic interactive component is 
difficult to build into such models. ' On the other hand, 'the length and 
complexity of a court case is such that any flow diagram would be 
extremely inelegant and unwieldy. ' It seems to me that courtroom discourse 
will be better described by a combination of models, each making up for the 
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inadequacy of the other. This seems possible with applying the linear - 
'staged' model of Martin and Rothery (1987) for monologic discourse and 
Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) hierarchical model for dialogic discourse. 
In argument for this choice, I quote Harris (1988) who argues that 'linear 
descriptive models do not easily allow for the interactive dimension, ' and 
suggests that 'we need a separate layer of structure to account for the 
interactive dimension in most complex generic types which involve dialogic 
discourse' (p. 108). She says in conclusion to her discussion of models of 
discourse description that, 'monologic and dialogic discourse appear to 
require somewhat different types of treatment. ' A further reason for 
choosing different models of analysis of monologues and dialogues is that 
genre analysis, the model selected for analysis of monologues, operates at a 
different level from that of exchange structure. So Sinclair and Coulthard's 
(1975) is chosen over Martin (1973) for analysing Exchanges for the 
reasons that (a) it is more detailed while Martin conflates acts and moves 
and (b) the exchanges are proscribed - like classroom talk. Therefore 
Martin is better for analysis of casual conversation. The closing speeches of 
counsel and judgements by magistrate make necessary yet another model of 
discourse analysis, that of narratives as ways of organising arguments. It is 
the nature of 'fact oriented disputing' (Danet 1979) to involve advocacy and 
argument and the importance of persuasion in the trial processes cannot be 
overlooked. 
This study focuses on the courtroom genre, which is realised in the trial 
process as a whole. Bhatia (1993) and Harris (1988) refer to the stages of 
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the trial as sub-genres and Jackson (1988) calls them simply, discourses. He 
speaks of a multiplicity of discourses within the trial and says that the trial 
is a site for a set of discourses - counsel/witness, counsel/counsel, 
counsel/judge, andjudge/defendant etc (p. 35). In this study these 
discourses are called communication processes and they are introduced and 
discussed, in their order of appearance in the trial, in Section C Chapter 4. 
The prosecutor/magistrate communication processes are those of Mentions 
and the counsel/witness communication happens in the Examinations; the 
counsel/counsel and counsel/magistrate communication processes are those 
of Submissions; thejudge/defendant as well asjudge/counsel 
communication processes are those of the reading of Judgements and the 
passing of sentences. The nature of these discourses or communication 
processes will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
An important characteristic of the communication processes in this 
courtroom is its bilinguality. So the methodology expands to include 
analysis of bilingual discourse. This is done in chapter 8 of the thesis, after 
all the discussion of the monolingual discourses. Chapter 10 consolidates all 
these methodologies and the themes that have been revealed in the data 
using these methods. 
The database 
The data is made up of texts collected by tape-recording of proceedings of a 
magistrate's court in Gaborone, Botswana. This data was collected in a 
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period of four months between July to September 1999 and January to 
February of 2000. It must be made clear, however, that the data does not 
come from one complete trial and does not necessarily need to be so. 
Instead various stages of the trial are compounded from recordings of 
different trails at their various stages. The data was transcribed and divided 
up into texts instantiating each courtroom communication process or each 
type of courtroom discourse. We therefore have data relating to Mentions, 
Examinations, Submissions and Judgements as well as Charge Sheets and 
Facts of Cases. The data is analysed to reveal answers to three research 
questions, which will be discussed in Section B. the methodology section. 
Arrangement of the thesis 
The thesis is arranged in five sections and eleven chapters. The substantive 
chapters of the thesis, those of administrative and substantive monologues 
and dialogues and bilingualism and courtroom interpreting are each 
preceeded by a brief discussion of previous writing on the element in the 
chapter. Section I is dedicated to the description of the context of the study 
presented in two chapters, Chapter I focuses on the context of Botswana 
and 2 on the theoretical context. In Section B, I present the methodology of 
the study where in chapter 31 describe the methods of data collection and 
the description of the data. Section C enters into the main body of the thesis 
presenting the courtroom processes and analysing the data that represents 
these processes. It contains four chapters being, Chapter 4, The Courtroom 
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processes; Chapter 5, Administrative Processes; Chapters 6 and 7 
Substantive Processes including monologues and dialogues respectively. 
The overall linguistic context of the courtroom of this study is bilingual. So 
Section D addresses this aspect of language use and analYses and describes 
the bilingual nature of the courtroom, which is also part of the main body of 
the thesis. Here again the section is broken down into two chapters. Chapter 
8 discusses the alternation of languages in the courtroom including code 
switching and chapter 9 focuses on courtroom interpreting. Here again the 
interesting thing that this section reveals is the social dynamics that 
underpin language choices. This bilingualism is contained in the same texts 
that have been used to study discourse and genre. The data of this study is, 
therefore, very rich in linguistic meaning. 
The final section, Section E, presents the discussion of themes and 
interrelationships of the methodologies of the study in chapter 10 and the 
conclusions of the study in Chapter 11. The conclusion includes a final 
summary of the answers to the research questions and suggests some 
applications of the findings of the study and the need for further research. 
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SECTION A: THE LOCAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXTS OF THE 
STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 
11 
CIUPTER 1: The Botswana Context 
1.1 The legal system of Botswana 
This study of communication processes in a court of law is situated in a 
magistrate's court in Gaborone in Botswana. The laws of Botswana as read 
from the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act and the Magistrates' Courts 
Act recognise two levels of court in Botswana. These are the magistrates' 
Courts and The High Court. Part 11, Section I of the Magistrates' Courts Act 
Chapter 04: 04, establishing the Magistrates Courts, briefly states that: 'There 
shall be courts subordinate to the High Court to be known as magistrates' 
courts presided over by magistrates appointed for the purposes of this Act. ' 
(04: 233) The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, relating these courts to 
each other stipulates in Part 11 Sections 4,5, and 6 that 'The High Court as 
constituted by the Constitution of Botswana shall have jurisdiction in respect 
of the trial of all persons charged on indictment with committing any offence 
within Botswana' and 'Magistrates' courts shall, subject to provisions of this 
Act, have jurisdiction in all cases of offences committed within their several 
areas ofjurisdiction being as described in the laws relating to such 
jurisdiction of such courts. ' Section 6 (3) stipulates that, 'the Superior court 
is the High Court. ' These cryptic laws do not then distinguish exactly what 
cases go to the High Court but in reality it is partly a court of appeal. The 
areas ofjurisdiction of magistrates' courts are called magisterial districts 
established under the Administrative Districts Acts. 
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There is another type of court whose level is vaguer. These courts are called 
customary courts. They are presided over by Chiefs in all the villages of 
Botswana. 
The magistrates' courts are modem courts in the sense of operating with a 
western type legal system inherited from the British as the former authority 
over the then Bechuanaland Protectorate. The legal system of Botswana has a 
rather mixed history. Interviewing a law professor at the University of 
Botswana about the nature of the Botswana legal system, I first noted that 
there are at least two labels commonly used in reference to the legal system 
of Botswana. These are 'Roman-Dutch and 'Common Law. ' I asked for 
clarification on the use of these ternis. 
Respondent: First of all, Botswana really runs a mixed legal system... At 
worst there are four legal systems, at best there are two. First there are the 
customary courts. The other element is that Botswana being a member of the 
community of nations, some of the declarations, treaties and conventions that 
are passed by the international community, either the OAU or the UN are 
binding to Botswana. The other side, especially in cases of criminal law, the 
bulk of the laws are inherited from the British code. (Interview 2, January 
2000) 
So we can see here that there is the customary law and international law. But 
the crux, for the purposes of distinguishing the legal system under which the 
magistrates' court operate is the Common Law and the Roman-Dutch law 
whose history I shall now outline. As the law lecturer respondent outlined i 
history, the penal code of Botswana was introduced in 1964, a year before 
the declaration of independence. Before that the country used the Roman- 
Dutch law. The Roman-Dutch law has a long history. It originated under the 
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Roman Empire. When the empire collapsed, some parts of the world that 
were under the empire continued to operate that law. Part of that empire was 
what is today called Holland. The legal system of Holland merged with the 
law of the former imperial power and this marriage is what is now called 
Roman-Dutch. In the 1660s to the 1700s, the Dutch East India Company 
travelled round the south coast of Africa and established a base for trade 
there. When Botswana became part of the British Empire, in 1891, the 
British Empire did not want to make it a colony as such, so they made it a 
protectorate to be administered by the British High Commission that was 
based in South Africa and because they had no intention to rule it, they did 
not bother to extend their legal system. They simply told the High 
Commissioner in Cape Town to look after the protectorate and apply the 
same legal system that is used in South Africa That system was the Roman- 
Dutch brought to the Cape by the Dutch East India Company. So whatever 
laws passed in the Botswana parliament now has the background of Roman- 
Dutch. It is also Common Law in the sense that it is common to the people 
and it is a mixture of Roman-Dutch with customary laws which are laws 
indigenous to Botswana. 
The legal system that has influenced courtroom practice in magistrates' 
," ýwv%xr 
courts is the adversary system of adjudication inherited from R6man-Dutch 
and British Common Law. Maley (1994 p. 320) quotes ajudge comparing 
the common law adversarial system and the European inquisitorial system as 
saying: 
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The essential difference between the two systems - there are many incidental 
ones- is apparent from their names: the one is a trial by strength and the other 
is inquiry. The question of the first is: Are the shoulders of the party on 
whom the burden of proof rests strong enough to carry and discharge it? In 
the second the question is: What is the truth of the matter? In the first, the 
judge and thejury do not pose the questions or seek answers, they use such 
material as put before them, but they have no responsibility to see that it is 
complete. In the second, the judge is in control of the inquiry from the start; 
he will, of course, permit the parties to make their cases and rely on them to 
do so, but it is for him to say what he wants to know. 
In explanation of the modes of discourse within these two systems, Danet 
(1979 p. 514) has this to say: 
Whereas the modem inquisitorial model combines questioning by the judge 
with relative freedom of the witnesses to tell their stories in open ended 
narrative style, the adversary model requires tight control of questioning so 
that claims are generally only expressed as answers to very specific 
questions. Lawyers may try to persuade the jury or the judge only in opening 
and closing statements. 
These two quotations serve to indicate the type of discourses we shall find 
described in the rest of this thesis. These are discourses possible only in a 
particular legal system with its characteristic rules of evidence i. e. the 
common law adversary system. 
1.2 The language policy of Botswana 
We start again by reference to the laws of Botswana. The Magistrates' 
Courts Act Chapter 04: 04 Part I section 5 (1) stipulates that: 
4. -A 
Ile language to be employed in a court shall be English and the evidence 
and all records of proceedings in the court shall be in that language. 
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(2) If any of the parties or witnesses in a proceeding before the court does not 
understand the English language, then the proceedings shall be interpreted 
from English into the language understood by the parties or the witnesses 
concerned, as the case may be and vice versa. 
This language rule is as it is because of the general language policy of 
Botswana. Botswana is a multilingual country. Nyati-Ramohobo (1991 p. 1) 
quotes the Botswana Language Project as identifying at least twenty-two 
languages but she identifies eleven languages. And states that 'the number 
of languages varies from linguist to linguist depending on what is regarded as 
a language and what as a dialect' (p. 2). But Botswana is generally regarded 
as a monolingual country because the majority of the population, about 80%, 
speak Setswana while other languages are spoken by small populations. The 
Botswana government has promoted bilingualism in Setswana and English 
since independence in 1965. English is promoted as an Official language and 
Setswana as a National language. This means that English is the language of 
education, business and the media. As the media develop and with the 
introduction of a national television, the existence of other languages 
becomes more visible, for example some newspapers now also write in 
lkalanga, the language of the largest minority, and part of the Bible has now 
been translated in to Ikalanga. Although speakers are free to use their 
languages at any time, even at work in offices, English is the language of 
official, written communication. English is, therefore, the language of 
modem law making in parliament and in the High Court and Magistrates' 
Courts. The indigenous courts, called customary courts, however, operate in 
indigenous languages. 
16 
An important element in this language context is the language knowledge of 
the principal participants in the courtroom, that is lawyers, police prosecutors 
and magistrates. In the early years of independence, professionals in most 
institutions, including higher education and the law courts were expatriates 
who could only function in Botswana in English. It is not difficult, therefore, 
to understand why the constitution of the magistrates' courts has the 
language clause it has. But today, some thirty-five years after independence, 
there are hundreds (Botswana has a very small population, not exceeding a 
million in the last census) of Setswana speaking lawyers and magistrates. 
These are people with a high level of education and who, being products of 
the English-using higher education, arc proficient speakers of English. But 
these bilinguals now share mother tongues with the many people who appear 
in court. 
Preliminary observation of one magistrate's court revealed that this language 
knowledge has some implications for the operation of the courts. For 
example, although the constitution stipulates that the language of the 
magistrates' court is English, the language situation in this court is seen to 
be, naturally, more complex. There is an interesting alternation of languages 
in the courtroom, which will be described in Section D. 
1.3 The ethnography of the courtroom 
Four months of data collection by tape recording of the proceedings of the 
court under study enabled me to both record the language data that is the 
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subject of this sociolinguistic analysis of communication processes in a court 
of law and to do some observation of the courtroom in its day-to-day 
business. I was allowed to sit with the court clerk at the front of the 
courtroom, from which vantage point I was able to make observations of an 
ethnographic type, that is, of the total context of the data I was collecting. 
This context includes the physical layout of the courtroom, the statuses and 
roles of various participants in the courtroom and other important contextual 
elements like the behaviour and atmosphere of the courtroom. I recorded 
these in my field notes. 
1.3.1The physical context 
The courtroom as a work place is an important aspect of the setting. It is 
quite modem in its architecture and building plan. There are four chambers 
abreast of each other. Inside the walls are panelled with solid brown wood 
and the furnishings are solid brown wood. At the head of the courtroom is 
the magistrate's chair with its surrounding of wood. It is placed higher than 
the rest of the main hall of the courtroom. On one side of the magistrate's 
chair, to the right and placed slightly lower, is the dock in a wooden 
enclosure and on the other side is the witness box. The court clerk-cum- 
interpreter sits at a table in front of and below the magistrate's seat. And the 
prosecutors and counsel sit at a table directly facing the magistrate. The 
audience and litigants sit in the main body of the courtroom on solid wood 
fixed benches with backrests. I suspect this is the standard plan of 
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courtrooms the world round. The courtroom is a very modem business room 
and inspires respect. 
1.3.2 Status and role 
A distinguishing characteristic of the courtroom environment is the mode of 
dress of the participants. Prosecutors are formally dressed in their police 
uniforms. Counsel and magistrates are also always formally dressed. In fact 
this standard of presentability seems very important as I heard one of the 
magistrates, a woman, several times enjoining the prosecutors to make sure 
that their witnesses are properly dressed and at one session she asked the 
witness in the box to button up his shirt. This formal dress is an element of 
the statuses and roles of the courtroom participants. 
The physical set up of the room just described suggests that participants are 
not of equal status. The raised position of the magistrate singles him or her 
out as the most important presence. His or her status is further reinforced by 
the attitudes of deference that are revealed in the forms of address such as 
'Your Worship' and reference to the court as 'honoumble. ' This respect for 
the magistrate seems to be generally accepted by everybody in the 
courtroom. This characteristic of the courtroom verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour has been recognised by various researchers of courtroom 
discourse. For instance, Walker (1987 p. 58) discussing the basis of this 
power as socio-cultural, explains that 'as institutions for dispute resolution 
evolve, certain members of society are sanctioned by the group as authorised 
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participants whose role, if not persons, command respect. The general theory 
that sees this position of the magistrate as generally accepted by all in the 
courtroom is called 'collaborative-consensus' 'involving a situation where 
one of the participants is clearly in control of the discourse and the others do 
not apparently resist the control' (Harris 1980 p. 59). Power relations in the 
courtroom are a phenomenon that comes out very clearly in the analysis of 
linguistic data of courtrooms including this one. 
The respect for the court is also very strongly apparent in the manner of the 
participants. It was my initial impression that participants bow to the 
magistrate on leave-taking while the court in progress. This impression was 
subsequently corrected on closer observation of this phenomenon. BovAng 
seems to be a practice engaged in by all participants in the courtroom, 
including the magistrate. Therefore bowing is directed to the court not to the 
magistrate. This is a culture of the courtroom. Is also imprinted in the verbal 
behaviour of the participants who use terms of address like 'If it please that 
court, ' or 'as the court pleases. ' These imbue the courtroom and court 
processes with a certain high esteem. The explanation for this reffication of 
courtroom processes seems to me to arise from the need to emphasise that 
decisions made in the courtroom have been arrived at with due seriousness 
and through due process. 
1.4 Summary 
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The foregoing discussion of the legal system of Botswana, the language 
policy of Botswana and the ethnography of the courtroom serve to elucidate 
the context of this study of courtroom processes in a Botswana magistrate's 
court. The courtroom discourse takes place in the context of an adversary 
system ofjustice as described and the official language of the court is 
English. This study suggests that the situation of language use in the 
courtroom in Botswana is itself complex and is worthy of study. 
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CHAPTER 2: The theoretical context of the study of communication 
processes in a courtroom 
2.1 The rationale for a sociolinguistics of law 
This study of communication processes in a court of law is located in the 
broad framework of sociolinguistics on the one hand, and sociological 
jurisprudence - the study of how law functions in society - on the other hand. 
The topic straddles these two disciplines and can be termed the 
sociolinguistics of law, whose aim is, as Danet (1979 p. 447) puts it, 'to study 
how language relates to the function of law in society; ' which I see as a 
perfect merger of sociolinguistics and sociological jurisprudence. The 
narrower focus of this study is to explore the social underpinnings of legal 
discourse. The choice of the legal profession as a site for the study of 
language is seen particularly interesting, as language is indeed gennane to 
law. That words and language are central to the practice of law is an 
observation made by many studies of legal processes in different cultures. 
For example, Frake (1969 p. 108) in (O'Barr 1981 p. 3 88) makes the 
observation about the Phillipino people he studied in the Philippines, that: 
The Yakan legal system is manifest almost exclusively in one kind of 
behaviour, talk. Consequently, the ethnographer's record of observation of 
litigation is a linguistic record, and the legal system a code for talking, a 
linguistic code. 
This is as true for the Yakan as it is for any westem legal system. For 
example, Philbrick (1949 p. vi) analysing the forensic style among English 
speaking lawyers declares that, 'lawyers are students of language by 
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profession, ' (O'Barr 1981 p. 388). Crystal (1997 p. 390) points out that, 
'whether the legal domain is government legislation, the courtroom or other 
documentation like contracts, conveyances and other regulations by law, we 
are faced with one fundamental principle, that the words of the law are in 
fact the law. ' So bound up with each other are language and law that Danet 
(1979 p. 448) describes the relationship in these strong terms: 'in a most basic 
sense the law would not exist without language. ' She makes the comparison 
between language and the law and language and medical practicc that 'to 
practise medicine is primarily (though not exclusively) to work with physical 
substances, to relate to human beings as physical objects. To practise law on 
the other hand is to relate to hwnan beings as social beings, as language 
animals. ' 
Mertz (1992 p. 423) asserts that 'the legal arena affords a student of language 
an exciting locus for examining the relationship between language and 
power, ' and that 'language functioning is no small part of the way law 
achieves its results. ' The rationale of this analysis is to be seen in the light of 
a growing interest in both sociolinguistics and in the study of language in 
legal processes such as that described by Maley (1994). Writing an overview 
of the field, Maley (1994) observes that, 'the last twenty years have seen an 
efflorescence of interest in the language of law from linguists, sociolinguists, 
ethnographers, discourse analysts, ethnomethodologists and sernioticians. " 
And that, 'as a result of these analyses and critiques, a great deal of legal 
language has been described and explained. 
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This thesis is an attempt to make a contribution to the growing literature by 
presenting data from, and analysis of, yet another context, that of Botswana. 
The linguistic tools and models of analysis adopted lie within sociolinguistics 
and are those of discourse, genre narrative as well as bilingual discourse 
analysis, in which texts are described in their 'contexts of situation, ' and 
social and sociological themes are drawn and are interpretation made. 
2.2 Previous writing on the language of the law and analysis of 
courtroom 
discourse 
I have outlined the relationship between language and the law. I turn now to 
the study of the language of law and courtroom discourse. I shall first use the 
litemture to define key concepts in the study of contextualised language 
communication. Then I shall summarise relevant previous writing on the 
topic of courtroom communication, discourse or genre including the 
methodologies employed and major themes arising from these studies. 
Finally criticisms of legal language and courtroom discourse will be 
surveyed. 
There are a number of terms used in the literature on courtroom 
communication. These are the terms discourse, genre, communication 
processes and narrative. The term discourse is of course a familiar one as it is 
even used to refer to a particular discipline within linguistics, that of 
Discourse Analysis. Stubbs (1983) in his 'programmatic introduction' to his 
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booký Discourse Analysis, begins by noting that 'discourse analysis is a very 
ambiguous term. ' He uses it in his book to 'refer mainly to linguistic analysis 
of naturally occurring, connected spoken or written discourse. Roughly 
speaking it attempts to study the organisation of language above the sentence 
or above the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units such as 
conversational exchanges or written texts. ' (p. 1) As this definition serves my 
purposes in this study, I shall go no further with arguments regarding what 
discourse analysis is and what it is not. This allows me to go straight on to 
the more relevant discussion of terminology in my area of study. I wish to, 
relate three terms, which will together characterise and inform my area of 
inquiry. These are the terms discourse, genre, communication processes and 
narrative. All four are used regularly in the literature on courtroom discourse 
and form the characteristic academic genre relating to the discussion of 
language in its context of use. 
Jackson (1988) and Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996), use the term 
'discourse. ' First Sarangi and Slembrouck (1996 p. 12), maintain that 
ccentral to critical linguistics approach is the notion of discourse' and that 
'discourse can be looked at as text, as processes of text production and 
interpretation. ' (to be developed later). Another writer who uses the term 
discourse in relation to the courtroom is Jackson (1988). He says that his 
argument 'supports if it does not independently establish the existence of a 
multiplicity of discourses within the trial' (p. 35). So, courtroom discourse is 
not to be seen as one, monolithic discourse as, indeed, it is a set of 
discourses, which in my study are individually analysed and described by a 
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number of models. Courtroom discourse belongs to that type of professional 
discourse known as institutional discourse i. e. talk between expert 
representing some authority, and a layman, (Gunnarson 1997 p. 7). Some of 
these discourses are those between various counsel and witnesses and 
defendants within trials and in lawyer client consultation out of court, and, in 
my data, also the reading of charge sheets (by court clerks) and facts of the 
case (by prosecutors ) to the litigants. 
Another term 'genre' fonns one of the foci of this study. The earliest use of 
the term genre in discussing law is that of Danet (1979) who cites Hymes as 
listing genre as the last letter of his acronym SPEAKING. Here genres are 
defined as ' communicative forms recognised by a society, typically 
identified by the labels that society gives them. Categories like poem, novel, 
proverb or riddle are all genres of language use. And she also points out, like 
Jackson (1988) does of discourses, that there may be several genres in a trial: 
opening statements, testimony, closing statements, the judge's charge to the 
jury. ' Maley (1994 p. 18) suggests that there are four major situational 
contexts of the legal genre viz. judicial discourse, courtroom discourse, the 
discourse of legal documents and the discourse of lawyer/client consultation. 
There are probably more legal discourse situations than Maley recognises. 
Bhatia (1987 p. 227) shows these in his tree diagram of the genres of the 
language of the law. First he distinguishes between the spoken and the 
written medium and then further, these genres are distinguished by the 
setting in which they occur being the pedagogical, the academic and the 
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professional settings. As my interest lies within the spoken medium, I shall 
outline this branch of the tree to contextualise the courtroom genres. 











Figure 2.1 (Bhatia 1987 p. 227) Genres of legal language 
This diagram shows clearly that there are several genres of the language of 
law depending on the settings in which they occur. Both Maley (1994) and 
Bhatia (1987), however, fail to characterise all the genres of legal practice. 
For instance, Maley mentions and goes on to describe the courtroom genre 
but fails to realise that this is itself a broad category including several distinct 
genres. Bhatia on the other hand tries to expand the discussion to include 
many but still not all of the possible legal genres in the professional setting. 
Hence this study attempts to rectify this by expanding both Bhatia's 
professional setting of the legal genres and by differentiating Maley's 
courtroom genre. The professional branch of the tree diagram then looks 
something like this: 
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Reading of charge sheets Readings of facts 
Figure 2.2 Spoken professional genres of legal language in a Botswana 
courtroom. 
The third term that is in use in discourse analysis circles is 'communication 
processes. ' Gumperz (1982) uses this term in the context of inter-group 
communication in modem industrial complex society. He argues 
urbanisation and its concomitant bureaucratisation of social life has resulted 
in complex societal formations like industrial institutions, union 
organisations, social welfare or health services which impinge on the day-to- 
day lives of individuals who themselves are members of various social 
groupings such as gender, ethnic groups and class. When individual members 
of these various groups enter into interaction with each other as they are 
bound to, they bring to the encounters 'styles of speaking which, even though 
they served them well in homes and peer group situations, are likely to be 
misunderstood in inter-group settings' (Gumperz 1982 p. 3), such as those of 
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job interviews, counselling, government, committee negotiations, courtroom 
interrogation and formal hearings. It is these communication problems that 
make it necessary to study communication and its effects on people's lives. 
Gumperz argues that we cannot study communication in isolation but we 
must focus on what communication 'does: how it constrains evaluation and 
decision-making, not merely how it is structured. ' This statement is apposite 
to my study of communication processes in a court of law in which the aim is 
to evaluate professional discourse and its 'functionality and ability to 
promote optimal social and personal satisfaction to parties involved' 
(Gunnarson 1997 p. 7), and to study how 'professional and institutional 
usages enable us to illuminate issues of social concern' (Gibbons 1994 p. x). 
In the courtroom language communication is especially important as it has 
significant consequences on individuals. It is therefore necessary to observe 
the communication processes here in order to characterise courtroom 
discourse. 
The fourth and final term used in studies of courtroom discourse is narrative. 
This term was first introduced by Bennet and Fieldman (1981) who reported 
that their 'search for the underlying basis ofjustice and judgement in 
American criminal trials produced an interesting conclusion: the criminanl 
trial is organised around storytelling' (p. 93). Jackson (1988) makes a 
criticism of this theory from a semiotic approach, but the Yale Law School 
symposium entrenched the theory of the centrality of narrative to persuasion 
in the courtroom. For narrative analysis in relation to organisations see (Boje 
199 1, Mumby 1993, Clegg 1993, Witten 1993). Cortazzi (1994) is a state of 
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the art article on narrative analysis and Cortazzi (1993), uses narrative 
analysis as an analytical tool in the study of teachers' staff-room discourse. 
Georgapoulou and Goutsos (2000) in their effort to make a distinction 
between narrative and non-narrative modes, give a very good critique of the 
traditional conceptions of the primacy of the narrative genre. All these 
studies of narrative are made use of in my analysis of narrative as the 
organising principle of the trial in Chapters 5,6, and 7. 
2.3 The development of the sociolinguistics of law 
A presentation of previous writing on the topic of language and the law and 
courtroom discourse must indicate the conscientiousness of scholars in this 
field in periodically reviewing the growing literature in the field. Indeed 
there are at least six reviews carried out in the period beginning in the late 
seventies to the middle of the nineties. The first two reviews were made by 
Danet (1979) and (1980), These were followed by O'Barr (198 1) then Bhatia 
(1987b) and Danet again (1990) and finally Maley (1994). 
In 1979 when Danet made her review, the field was in its very early nascent 
state, such that one could not talk of a particular discipline in which the 
language of law was of central concern and certainly one could not talk of a 
socioilinguistics of law or courtroom discourse. So Danet (1979) could only 
say that 'in the last five years, a new field of social science research has 
emerged whose topic is the interrelation between language and law. Social 
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scientists, lawyers and linguists are attempting to hurdle disciplinary barriers 
in order to study how language relates to the function of law in society' 
(p. 447). Relating the development of this research she points out that it had 
begun in the USA and Britain mainly but that a number of researchers in 
continental European countries such as Sweden, Germany and Austria have 
also become involved. She cites Probert (1972) as being concerned, in his 
call for research in the law concerned with language behaviour, as 'not 
concerned with the written language of statues but with 'law talk. " She 
indicated that a number of legal scholars had been interested by the 
dependence of law on language but that their approach had been mainly 
philosophical while the new research aspired to be empirical. She pointed out 
that the interest in language and law was also in part a response to 
widespread public criticism in the 1970s of the uses and misuses of language 
in public life and particularly, in legal spheres by the 'Plain English' 
Movement. 
The slow, tentative development in research on legal discourse as such is 
probably explainable in terms of the hardly developed disciplines of 
sociolinguistics and discourse analysis (in the seventies), which later became 
the natural place to study language in its context of use. Just a year later 
Danet, at the Communications Institute and the Department of Sociology, 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, published another, shorter 
review of the developing research in language and the law. This time she was 
more confident in her discussion of the field as there was really something 
concrete to report. The Law and Social Science Programme of the American 
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National Science Foundation had funded four teams of researchers; two of 
which had focused on courtroom questioning and the other two on the 
comprehensibility ofjury instructions. This is the research which launched 
the now major researchers in various settings of legal discourse, notably 
O'Barr and Danet herself This research was possible mainly because of 
developments in linguistics itself 'Social scientists interested in the law 
(were) beginning to look at language and to ideas and methods of 
sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics, as a way of illuminating the legal 
process, how it works in practice' (Danet 1980 p. 367). 
Danet reported that: 
Most of the sociolinguistically oriented work on the language of disputes has 
focussed on trials as conducted under the ground rules of the Anglo 
American adversary system ofjustice. This work examines such variables as 
'powerful' versus 'powerless' speech of witnesses and its effects on 
judgements of their credibility (O'Barr and Conley 1976; Erickson, Lind, 
Johnson and O'Barr 1978), semantics and presupposition in questions 
(Loftus 1978; Loftus and Palmer 1974; Kaprzyk, Montano and Loftus 1975), 
and coerciveness of question form (Danet, Hoffman, Kirmish, Rafn and 
Stayman (1979). Atkinson and Drew's (1979) work, heavily influenced by 
ethnomethodology, follows a rather different course; it is an attempt to 
describe formal, structural and sequential properties of verbal interaction in 
courts, and to identify semantic features of sequences like those involving 
blame allocation during cross-examination. 
Danet then summarised the five papers that were presented at the symposium 
on language and law in Bristol. These were, in their order, 'speech patterns 
and the outcome of trials, ' ' linguistic and cultural interference in testimony, ' 
'lawyers' combativeness in the adversary system ofjustice, ' 'syntactic 
variation injudges' use of language in the courtroom' and 'displaying 
neutrality- the management of an interactional problem in small claims court 
hearings. ' 
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These then are the land-marking pieces of research in the study of language 
and the law if not courtroom discourse. The next review was done by Bhatia 
(1987) who organised his review around three settings in which legal genres 
occur viz. pedagogical, academic and professional settings. We note now that 
the clear term genre has come into currency, clearly indicating the 
development of a discipline based on languages of the professions, here the 
legal genre. The relevant setting for my purposes is the professional setting. 
Work within the constructs of genre analysis and discourse analysis has 
concentrated largely upon particular aspects of the trial process notably the 
question-answer sequences of courtroom examinations centring on the social 
relationships in these interactions. Bhatia notes that counsel-witness 
examination (direct and cross-examinations) is the most popular discourse 
within the professional legal contexts. A recurring theme is that of control of 
the discourse by counsel to various extents including the strongest 
domination being that of the witness by counsel whose aim is to, in the 
words of Bhatia(1987), 'destroy the credibility of the witness. ' This 
subjugation is the most strongly criticised by writers of the critical linguistics 
and critical discourse analysis school (Carlen 1976, Goodrich 1984,1990, 
Faircloughl989, Lemke, Harris 1980,1990, Thompson1984, Wodak1985) 
and more moderately by genre analysts of the more applied linguistics 
approach (Dunstan 1985). This critical approach is also commcntcd upon by 
Maley (1994) who notes that much of the comment on the language of the 
law has been critical and has been directed at its 'bizarre and inaccessible 
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forms' and that 'a related criticism is directed at the social consequences of 
the inequality of power it realises. ' (p. 14) 
Danet (1990) gives an overview of 15 years of research in the language of 
the law in which she now considers that the field has expanded considerably. 
She noted that basic and applied research on linguistic aspects of 
communication in legal settings had also blossomed in Canada, Australia and 
Israel and in continental Europe. The literature of the Australian camp has 
largely concentrated on bilingualism in the courtroom including research on 
courtroom interpreting. 
Maley's (1994) review centres on legal discourse as a genre and analyses it 
within the framework of the functional model developed by Halliday (1985). 
His recognises that the language of law is not a 'homogeneous discourse type 
but a set of related and overlapping discourse types, ' and that, 'because such 
a range of different theoretical models has been applied to each, but never to 
the whole, each analysis speaks only for itself ' Both of these statements 
echo my own sentiments. But while he applies only one approach, the 
serniotic and functional approach, to the whole of legal discourse including 
legislative discourse, courtroom discourse and judicial discourse, my own 
approach is to apply various theoretical models to the discourses or genres of 
only one of these major discourses, that is, courtroom discourse. 
The approach of the present study is one that seeks to characterise the trial as 
a site of interlocking discourses and to discuss and critique the various 
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themes that emerge from the analysis of real, natural language data. This 
approach is seen as one that is capable of bringing together themes that recur 
in studies that concentrate on only selected aspects of the trial process to 
show how, for example power asymmetries in one discourse type are 
balanced out by the sense of equality that is observable from another within 
the trial. 
2.4 Criticism of legal language and courtroom discourse 
Crystal (1997 p. 390) observes that throughout the history of English law, 
there has always been some movement or other calling for change in legal 
language to eliminate archaic or Latinate expression, simplify grammatical 
structure and include punctuation in legislative writing to make legal 
language more intelligible to consumers, saving much time, anxiety and 
money and also simplifying the job of the lawyers themselves. 
The Plain English movement in the seventies was complemented by similar 
developments in Europe. For example, Swedes call legalese 'muddled 
Swedish. ' And linguists there have studied popular comprehension of public 
language and the language ofjudges. Critiques of legal language were also 
being voiced in Gennany, France and Norway (Danet 1979 p. 520). 
Most criticism of legal language is that of written language such as the 
language of contracts, lease, conveyances, wills and other legislative writing, 
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but the 1980s saw the development of criticism of courtroom discourse in the 
work of people like O'Baff and Danet. In fact, according to Danet, the 
interest by social scientists in law and language is in part a response to public 
critique of the language of bureaucracy and the professions. She points out 
that critiques claim that the professions use language in ways that 'mystify 
the public and stultify critical thinking. ' And that critics argue that the 
language of the professions is both a symbol and a tool of power, creating 
dependence and ignorance on the part of the public, (Danet 1979 p. 525). This 
argument is echoed and developed in the 90s by CDA linguists who seek to 
emancipate the public. I subscribe to this position and point out to it in my 
thesis while not fully embracing critical linguistics and CDA in their 
particular approach to argumentation which I explain below in the discussion 
of approaches to the study of the language of the law. 
The criticism of legal language, however, is matched by its defense. In fact 
according to O'Barr (1981), 'the ongoing dialogue between traditionalists 
and reformers continues today' around the world including Botswana. 
Traditionalists are more concerned with how other professionals will 
interpret the language of the law than with the layman comprehending it. 
They argue that the importance of consistency of interpretation in courts of 
particular words, terms and even entire legal forms far outweighs the 
advantages of popularising and simplifying legal usage. For example, an 
article entitled 'lets not oversimplify legal language, ' by Aiken (1960) is 
cited as arguing that terms such as 'ipsa loquitur, caveat emptor, proximate 
cause, indenture, bequeath, etc. are entirely appropriate and acceptable forms 
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of expression, properly used. ' He also argues that they are the decided 
superior to ordinary words, which have no associated specialisation of 
meaning (O'Barr 1981 p. 362). 
As far as courtroom discourse is concerned, the most common perception 
and criticism concerns the inequalities of power, which underlie rules of 
speaking. The situation is hierarchical, extending from the judge and the 
magistrate at the top and most powerful, through counsel to the witness who 
is seen by critics as being powerless and even 'degraded. ' (Maley in 
Gibbons 1994) 'Power is exercised by those who have the most right to 
speak. In examination, for instance, the witness, the plaintiff and the 
defendant are constrained to answer questions only and not volunteer their 
opinion. Counsel control topic management: they choose and pursue and 
change topics' (O'Barr 1981 p. 34). In critical terminology, the defendants 
are variously described as 'baffled, bullied, oppressed, manipulated etc. 
(Atkinson and Drew 1979 p. 8). Such criticism of courtroom discourse will be 
discussed in line with analysis of the data of the courtroom of this study with 
an attempt to see why the criticism holds. 
2.5 Approaches to the study of language and the law 
There are two major sociological approaches to the study of language and the 
law. The first is what Goodrich (1984) terms positivism and the second is his 
own approach, which is also the approach of most writers of the critical 
school of discourse analysis, historical materialism. The positivist approach 
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is described and criticised. for viewing the law as 'an internally defined 
system of notional meanings and legal values and that it is a technical 
language which is by and large unproblematically univocal in its 
application. ' (p. 173). Goodrich argues that viewing language as 'a neutral 
instrument of purposes peculiar to the internal development of legal 
regulation and discipline, ' is problematic. 
The historical materialism approach on the other hand, views legal language 
in these terms, as: 
'The rhetoric of particular group or class and a specific exercise of power 
over meaning. In this view, legal language is seen as a social practice and its 
text as bearing the imprint of such practice and further that, as a discourse or 
genre, legal language is answerable to the political commitment of its time. 
Legal language is a unity to be understood as the social image of an elite 
with professional power. The hierarchical organisation of legal 
communication can be classified according to the schemata of lexical, 
syntactic and semantic choices regularly employed in legal language to 
control, appropriate or exclude other meanings and languages. Legal 
discourse is socially and institutionally authorised and sanctioned by a wide 
variety of highly visible organisational and sociolinguistic insignia of 
hierarchy, status, power and wealth ... the 
identification of a privileged class. ' 
(Goodrich 1984 p. 174,182,184,188 passim) 
This very lucid description of the social status of professional discourse is 
typical of the approach and is underscored by many theorists. Wickens (2001 
p. 3 1) cites scholars of the CDA approach as those who see their focus to be 
on 'the relationship between language ideology and power, ' and see 'the 
relationship as being fundamentally opaque and the role of text analysis in 
CDA is to 'reveal' the ideological loading embedded in discursive practices 
and the relations of power which lie behind them. ' Thompson (1984 p. 23) in 
rather the same vein as Goodrich above sees historical materialism as taking 
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as its object 'the very process of class struggle ... the movement of the 
working class. ' One criticism of this affective stance of historical 
materialism, and CDA as its more recent vanguard, is made by Widdowson 
(1995,2000 cited in Wickens 200 1) who argues that in CDA 'interpretation 
in support Of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory 
conviction counts far more than cogency. ' 
However, Thompson (1984) seems to rescue the situation by pointing to the 
negative connotations of the term 'ideology. ' But then he comes back with 
similar affectivity when he introduces the idea of the relationship between 
language and ideology. He says that: 
It is only in recent years that this theory (ideology) has been enriched and 
elaborated through the reflection on language. For increasingly it has been 
realised that 'ideas' do not just come floating like clouds in a summer 
sky ... rather ideas circulate in the social world as utterances, as expressions, 
as words, which are spoken and inscribed. Hence to study ideology is in 
some part and in some way to study language in the social world. It is to 
study the ways in which the multifarious uses of language interact with 
power, nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the historical materialist approach to 
discourse study will not be fully discussed here. They are fully outlined and 
discussed in Wickens (2001) who fully embraces CDA in his thesis. I must 
proceed to my own analytical approach as that of sociolinguistic pluralism, 
which recognises that there are many discourses and people involved in legal 
trials. Some or even many may be victims of an unjust social structure. So I 
argue that whether they are guilty as charged or not, the law, unless it is 
based or can be seen to be based on unjust socio-political practices, can 
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address itself to the circumstances of the defendant through the 
argumentation of the professionals involved and through judicial discretion, 
especially over sentencing. In the event with data like that which I have 
gathered, which relate to only one type of case, the traffic offences cases, one 
cannot speak of material disadvantage on the part of the defendants in the 
sense of material wealth as drivers of cars are considered privileged in the 
Botswana context. 
This approach is one that seeks to typify the trial as a site of various 
interlocking discourses and critique and discuss the various themes that 
emerge from the analysis of real, natural language data. This approach is 
seen as one capable of bringing together themes that have come up in studies 
that concentrate on only selected aspects of the trial process and show how, 
for example, power asymmetries in one discourse type within the trial are 
balanced out by the sense of equality in another within the trial. For example 
in cross-examination the relationships between counsel and witness are 
'unfriendly' if not actually hostile, but in direct examinations it is the reverse. 
This is interpreted to mean that even witnesses, who are laypersons in 
combat with professionals in cross-examinations, are aware that the cross- 
examination in an adversary system ofjustice cannot actually be friendly if 
its purpose is to be served well. Another example is that of submissions or 
closing statements by opposing counsel. Here one finds a barely concealed 
combat between professionals themselves. Clearly the outcome of the trial is 
not predicated on onlY one discourse type such as the cross-examination but 
on the cumulative effect of all the discourses in the trial. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, we can see that the context of theory for this study is a field 
which has grown steadily over at least twenty years. Therefore there exists a 
body of theory in which to couch studies such as this one. However, as I 
have pointed out it is theory that needs to continue being developed and 
refined with more data from different linguistic as well as social contexts and 
with different methodologies. 
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SECTION B: METHODOLOGY 
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CHAPTER 3: Methods of data collection 
The data for this study was collected initially by questionnaires designed in 
September 1998 and piloted in Botswana in December 1998 and January 
1999. These questionnaires were designed to elicit the perceptions and 
opinions of courtroom practitioners on the uses of languages in the 
courtroom. One set of questionnaires was designed for the police officers 
who serve as both prosecutors and witnesses. The sample population for 
these questionnaires is small comprising 10 police officers. It has occurred to 
me that the population could have been enlarged by distributing the 
questionnaire to several police stations, but I distributed them only to one. 
There were only ten prosecutors at this station. I later discovered that at the 
magistrate's court of this study there were no more than ten regularly 
appearing prosecutors. So this makes the population of police prosecutors 
and witnesses adequately representative. 
Another questionnaire was distributed to lawyers who appear in court as 
defense counsel. Again here the population is small (I I lawyers). The 
questionnaire asked basically the same questions of lawyers and the police, 
but allows in the particulars section, a differentiation of these for purposes of 
analysis and comparison of views of different sections of the court personnel. 
The questions were used to solicit the views, opinions and experiences of the 
respondents in relation to using language in the courtroom. The reason for 
using the questionnaires was to gauge the courtroom participants awareness 
of the ways languages are used in the courtroom; for example, in which 
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sections of the proceeding and to what extent are different languages used. 
This is against the background of the fact that the stipulated language of the 
magistrates' courts is English. This is of interest intellectually as we know 
that the use of natural language is very complex and stipulation is one thing 
while the actual pragmatics of language is another. 
The rest of the data for this study is the actual language of courtroom 
proceedings as audio tape-recorded in four months of data collection as shall 
be described shortly. All the recorded data is used for analysis of 
communication processes in a court of law or, technically, discourse 
analysis. 
Some member validation was attempted. Two interviews were made with 
lecturers in the law Department of the University of Botswana during the 
validation stage of this research process. One interview enabled me to get 
information on the legal system of Botswana and it was used in describing 
the context of this study. The second interview helped to validate the 
observations I made on the persuasion process in the courtroom. It is 
discussed in Section C, Chapter 6.2 on the closing speeches of opposing 
counsel and 6.4, analysis ofjudgements. 
3.1 Fieldwork 
Data collection for this study was made in three phases. The first phase was 
the early stage when I designed and administered questionnaires to police 
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prosecutors and police witnesses and lawyers. This was in December 1998 
and January 1999. The second phase was done over the two months of 
August and September 1999 and involved daily visits to the magistrates' 
court to audio-record the proceedings. The third phase was done over 
January 2000 and involved further audio recording to collect supplementary 
data. 
The quest for access to the courtroom whose proceedings were to be studied 
began with making an application to The Office of the President's Research 
and Publications Department in Botswana for a permit to conduct research in 
the country. This involved filling in a fairly detailed form requiring 
information on the aims of the research, objectives, methods and techniques, 
the budget of the research project and places in Botswana where the research 
would be undertaken. It turned out that the requirement of a permit to do 
research in Botswana was not a mere formality. It is described in the permit 
that the purpose of the requirement for a permit is both to check 
misrepresentation of the country as well as to encourage scholars to do 
research in the country. Five copies of the application form were made and I 
was informed it would take at least three weeks for the application to be 
processed as it needed a number of departments to look at it. This waiting 
period in July 1999, reduced the length of the recording period I had planned, 
but it turned out that, with tape-recording permitted, I needed less time than I 
had planned for data collection. 
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The next stage in the process of getting access was to write a letter to the 
High Court of Botswana to seek access to the particular courtroom I needed 
to study. I took this letter in person to the High Court and met and had a 
chance to discuss my research with the Master of the Court. The Master of 
the Court then wrote a letter to the Chief magistrate of the court in which this 
study was to be carried out to inform him that I had talked with him and 
requested pennission to do research in his court. I took the letter to the Chief 
Magistrate of the court and had the chance to discuss my research project 
with him. He was very interested in the research and introduced me to two 
senior magistrates who would be presiding during the period of my data 
collection. He informed me that he had discussed my request with them and 
they had agreed to allow me to record their proceedings. 
I visited the courtrooms several times whilst awaiting the research permit 
from the Office of The President, and made some observations, often very 
sorry that I could not yet record some of the (for my research) very 
interesting proceedings. During this waiting and observation period, I missed 
making recordings of two linguistically interesting closing speeches of 
opposing counsel of which I was only able to make some notes. I do use 
some of the written notes on these submissions in my data analysis of the 
submissions stage of the trial. 
On the sixth of August 1999,1 started recording the proceedings. I spent 
whole mornings in the courtroom and some afternoons when cases had been 
adjourned to the afternoon. I was allowed to sit at the front of the courtroom 
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with court clerk, a position which allowed the clear recording of the speech 
of the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel and magistrates. The recorder was 
not the most powerful one and thus some of the voices like those of 
defendants and witnesses and magistrates's readings ofjudgements (who 
were further from my table than prosecutors and counsel) were sometimes 
inaudible. But this is only a tiny proportion of the recordings and do not have 
any substantial effect on the data as a whole. 
3.2 Research ethics and consideration of person anonymity 
The conducting of qualitative research raises ethical issues in a way that 
perhaps quantitative, statistically based research can sometimes avoid. A 
good statement of the dilemmas the qualitative researcher can be faced with 
is perhaps that of Mason (1996 p. 165) She makes the observation that in 
using qualitative data which is detailed and analysing it in contextual ways, 
'the confidentiality and privacy of those who have some personal 
involvement with the research may be harder to maintain than where, for 
example, data are turned into statistical trends, patterns and correlations. ' 
(Ibid p. 165) 
She points out that the detailed and visibly contextualised data that the 
qualitative researcher generates need to be handled with sensitivity on the 
part of the researcher but also that: 
The qualitative researchers have to decide what to do with such data, in the 
knowledge that however friendly they may feel with the researched, and 
however they feel the relationship is one of mutual trust, they are 
nevertheless also a professional who is intending to use some of the products 
of the relationship for another, formal purpose. (Ibid p. 165) 
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She argues that in trying to solve such dilemmas, qualitative researchers 
'have had to think in complex and sophisticated ways about confidentiality 
and privacy ... precisely 
because they do not have the comfort of 
anonymous, statistical analyses based on depersonalised numerical data to 
'hide' behind' (ibid. p. 165). Having said this however, I have to point out that 
in this research, although the number of members of the researched 
community involved is small, the nature of the data, being linguistic texts, 
and the ways they are analysed, by the methods of a specific discipline 
(Discourse Analysis) should not be overly sensitive to person. In the legal 
context involved, one of the ways of maintaining person anonymity is to 
expunge names of people from the labels of the cases of the state against the 
defendants as I am well aware of the law that prohibits the naming of people 
in legal cases except for purposes of legal precedence itself The rest of the 
researched community involved is covered from injury or any possible 
degradation by the fact that, as professionals themselves, they are aware of 
the formal purposes of academic research. I shall therefore proceed to use 
that data in a way that I believe, apart from their possible ignorance of the 
methods the disciplines of sociolinguistics and discourse analysis, they will 
recognise as legitimate. 
3.3 Description of the data 
This section presents the data of the whole study including the questionnare 
studies and the tape-recorded courtroom proceedings. 
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3.3.1 The questionnaire study. 
As has been pointed out in the discussion of the research design above, the 
research population is, as is typical of professional communities in 
Botswana, small. The study of police prosecutors and witnesses involved ten 
members, and the lawyers study involved II members. 
Ten questionnaires were returned by the police and the following records the 
characteristics of the sample: 
Key to the table 
J. C. = Junior Certificate (a Botswana educational certificate) 
GCSE = General Certificate of Secondary Education. LLB = Bachelor of 
Laws 
Cert. and Dip. Law = Certificate and Diploma in Law LLM M= Master of 
Laws 
Age Years Education Gender First 





20-29 1-5 J. C. (7) F (2) Setswana 
(1) (7) 





40- 11-15 LLB (1) 
49 (7) 
(2) 
50- 20-25 Cert. &Dip. 
59 (2) Law (2) 
(0) 1 -I Table I Characteristics of the questionnaire study sample Prosecutors and 
Police witnesses 
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8 prosecutors and 4 Witnesses (2 of the police persons were prosecutors as 
as well as witnesses 
II Questionnaires were returned by lawyers and the sample had the 
following characteristics: 




20- 1-5 LL. B. (9) F (2) Setswana 
29 (5) LL. M. (2) (7) 
(4) 
30- 6-9 m (9) Kalanga 
39 (3) (3) 
(7) 
40- 10-15 Tonga 




(0) 1 1 
Table 2 Characteristics of the questionnaire study sample: Lawyers 
All lawyers had English and Setswana, as their other languages. 
Each set of respondents was asked six questions relating to the awareness of 
the uses of different languages in the courtrooms they have worked in. These 
appear in Appendix I and will be analysed in Section D relating to the 
bilingual nature of the courtroom. 
3.3.2 Audio recording 
The bulk of the data of this study came from audio recording of the 
courtrooms proceedings. All but two cases recorded (at various stages of the 
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trial) were traffic offences involving drunken driving, driving without due 
care and attention and driving without valid drivers' licences. Most of the 
defendants were men of various ages. Only one case involving a woman 
defendant charged with drunken driving was recorded. However this 
characteristic of the trials, their being traffic offences, may reflect the fact 
that not all cases of the particular magistrates' court were recorded during the 
data collection period as I attended only three days a week and could only 
record in one courtroom whilst other proceedings were going on in the other 
courtrooms at the same time. 
In all, forty hours of proceedings were recorded on forty one-hour-play tapes. 
Of the texts from these proceedings, there are fifteen mentions (the 
preparatory stages of trials) mostly made by police prosecutors but including 
a particularly elaborate mentioning by a lawyer prosecutor. There are four 
charge sheets, eight direct examinations, six cross-examinations, five 
submissions, five readings of facts and three judgements (most of the 
judgements were inaudible on tape). I shall tabulate these figures for a more 
holistic view of the data 
Table 3 The data 
Data Quantity 
Mentions 15 
Charge Sheets 4 
Direct Examinations 8 
Cross Examinations 6 
Submissions 5 
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Readings of Facts 5 
Judgements 3 
Table 3 The data 
Some peculiarities of the data of this study are the absence of certain trial 
processes that would be found in most courts. There are only two opening 
speeches and they are of opposing counsel in one trial. This means there is 
only one such speech from a prosecutor and one from defence counsel. This 
data is therefore not analysed as there is not enough of it to allow generic 
analysis. In the examinations data there is one prosecution cross- 
examinations and no defence direct examinations. I was told that this is so 
because most of the cases involving traffic offences are undefended so there 
are usually no defense witnesses. In the forty hours of proceedings, there 
were only seven cases defended by defense counsel. For these reasons there 
is a lot of prosecutor talk, mostly as we shall see in the data analysis, in 
mentions and readings of facts and in direct examinations. There is relatively 
little lawyer talk but we do have three defense counsel submissions and four 
cross-examinations by defense counsel. There are three prosecutor 
submissions and one prosecutor cross-examination. 
This data is considered adequate for an in-depth, qualitative analysis of the 
discourse in this courtroom context. There are more than three instances of 
each sub-genre of the trial and this allows for comparison of the texts for 
characteristics of the particular process and therefore I consider there is 
enough data on which to base analysis of generic structure. Opposing counsel 
I 
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opening speeches will not be described as they are not characteristic of 
proceedings at this level of court, being more characteristic of appellate 
courts, But all other stages of the trial observed in this courtroom are 
probably typical of the trial in any magistrate's court. 
3.3.3 Transcription of the data 
The transcription of the data from the audiotapes of the court proceedings in 
the magistrate's court has not been based on any prior theoretical model of 
transcription and most noticeably not on conversational analysis conventions, 
such as, for example, the convention of including timings of utterances like 
lengths of pauses. The transcription has also not concentrated on the 
phonological aspects of language such as stress, intonation or pitch. Speech 
phenomena like pauses, hesitation, backtracking and false starts are also not 
prominent in the recordings because the speeches of participants like 
prosecutors and counsel are largely rehearsed or partly rehearsed and some, 
like examinations by prosecutors, are also routine. The reason for excluding 
phonological information from the data is the (fact of the numerical) size of 
the data and the fact that the data is considered holistically and not 
phonetically involving detailed analysis of single, short stretches of talk. 
Instead, the data is used to exemplify generic structures and discourse at the 
theoretical levels of acts, moves, exchanges and transactions. The 
transcription highlights pairs of speakers such as magistrates and defendants, 
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prosecutors and witnesses, counsel and witnesses, and interpreters, but makes 
use of no other transcription symbols. The transcriptions are included in 
Appendices I to 7. As I was present in all the proceedings recorded, and 
transcribed the tapes myself, and able to replay the tapes during analysis, I 
was able to take the necessary phonological and extra linguistic information 
into account in the analyses. 
The total pace of the proceedings is very slow because other speakers in the 
court have to wait for the magistrate to make his record and, during 
mentions, he has to do the administrative work of deciding on dates for trials, 
further mentions or other stages of the trial such as dates for judgements. In 
other stages of the trial as in examinations for example, the magistrate 
controls the pace of the proceedings by the amount of time it takes him to 
make his record of the words of prosecutors, counsel and defendants and 
witnesses. For example, during a direct examination session the prosecutor 
does not ask the witness the next question until the magistrate gives the 
signal that he can continue by raising his head from writing and saying, 'Yes' 
with a falling tone. 
In this thesis four models of textual analysis have been employed relating to 
various discourses. These are genre analysis (particularly Martin (1993), 
which is applied to the texts of the mentions stage of the trial. Narrative 
analysis is applied to the submissions and judgements and as a metaphorical 
context for the whole trial, i. e. the trial seen as the building up of stories, in 
particular the story formulation of Bennet and Fieldman (198 1) reformulated 
54 
by Jackson (1988). The IRF model (Sinclair and CoutIthard 1975) and 
subsequent reformulations (1981) of discourse analysis is applied to the 
examinations. Analysis of bilingual discourse is applied to the stages of the 
discourse that involve the use of two languages, namely, examinations, 
readings of facts and readings of charge sheets. 
These models are more fully discussed in the sections in which they apply in 
the theses. 
3.4 The research questions 
This research is guided by and seeks to answer three questions relating to the 
use of language in the courtroom in Botswana. The first question is, 'What 
social issues underpin the uses of language or languages in the courtroomT 
The second question is, 'How does the court address the existence of other 
languages in the courtroomT and the third is 'How does English facilitate 
communication in the courtroomT Answers to these questions will be made 
throughout the data based sections of this thesis and will be abstracted in a 
summary in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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SECTION C: THE COURTROOM PROCESSES 
56 
Chapter 4 Communication processes in the courtroom 
4.1 Introduction 
The main or major courtroom process can be said to be the trial itself O'Barr(1982) 
describes the trial as: 
A situation in which many people, often as many as ten or more, present 
various versions of what happened. Their versions overlap to some degree 
and together tell a story. As the trial unfolds and opposing sides present 
evidence, it becomes clear that all versions cannot be equally correct. It is the 
role of the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) to decide which witnesses to 
believe and whose testimony to uphold above others in reconciling the 
differences. 
By reason of involving so many people on the two sides of the argument, and 
involving some obviously very lengthy processes such as the question and answer 
sequences of the examinations, the trial, if not differentiated into several very 
different processes with different purposes, may seem very tedious to the observer. It 
is when one gets inside it to characterise the processes involved in the trial that one 
gets a clear view of its nature. In this study, as indeed other studies of courtroom 
communication such as Danet (1979), Harris (1980) Maley (1994) the trial is viewed 
as a process involving several discourses between different interlocutors, each with its 
own particular purpose and structure. Harris (1980), applying a quite different model 
of analysis from, for example that of Maley (1994) terms these processes 
'Transactions'(after Sinclair and Coulthard 1975) and distinguishes between four 
main Transactions in the courtroom of her study as the Preliminary Transaction, the 
Information gathering Transaction, the Ordering Transaction and the Closing 
transaction (ibid p. 63). Danet (1979), again viewing the trial process from a different 
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analytical perspective - as genres- states that 'there may be several genres in a trial: 
opening statements, testimony, closing statements, and the judge's charge to the jury' 
(ibid p. 493). These different labels for courtroom processes may arise from the 
different analytical perspectives employed in their analysis as well as the existence of 
these processes in different types of courts. For example Harris (1980)'s transactions 
are those observed in the Arrears and Maintenance Courts in Britain in which the 
defendant and the magistrate communicate directly with each other without the 
intervention of lawyers. This may be the reason why there are only four transactions 
as against my seven, which include administrative transactions as shall be shown 
presently. Danet (1979)'s genres on the other hand are descriptive of criminal trials 
involving legal counsel, judges and the jury, hence the opening and closing speeches 
andjudge's charge to thejury, where the Botswana magistrate's courtroom has no 
charge to the jury. 
My perspective is one that brings together discourse analysis, genre analysis and 
narrative analysis to the enterprise of describing the various processes or discourses of 
the trial. Whether they are labelled transactions or sub-genres, there are seven 
processes involved in the magistrate's court of this study. I refer to them in the labels 
they are given by the discourse community itself Thus instead of opening or closing 
statements, this stage of the trial is termed submissions as they are called in this 
courtroom. And instead of the fact gathering transaction as in Harris (1980), or 
testimony as in Danet (1979), there are two transactions called the examinations 
transactions. The rest of the other transactions of the trial in this court are specific to 
the particular court as it is differently organised from, say, British or USA courts. In 
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the British criminal courts as observed in Coventry in 1999, for example, there are 
two separate courts conducting different stages of trials. The County Court deals Nvith 
the preparatory stages of the trial. Here cases are first mentioned. The magistrates 
then decide things like dates for trials, granting or refusing bail for defendants and 
referring cases to the Crown Court for trial. The Crown Court then conducts the trials. 
In Coventry these courts are in the vicinity of each other so that it is possible to walk 
from one court to the other. The Botswana magistrate's court on the other hand does 
not recognise a similar division of labour as the two British courts just described. 
Here the same court sits to hear mentions of cases, decide dates for further mentions 
or other stages of trials like examinations, final submissions, readings of facts or 
judgements and, often, a variety of these are transacted within the same sitting or 
working day. 
4.2 The order of courtroom transactions 
The following table sets out the communication processes in the Botswana 
magistrate's court in their order of appearance in the trial. 
Transaction Participants Activity Sample text Communicative 
purpose 
Mentions Prosecutor and Prosecutor I appear for the To initiate court 
Magistrate introduces himself, state, Your proceedings and do 
announ--- the stag er administrative 
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at which the trial is is a mention. work like set dates 
and makes a May the date of for trials. 
request. trial be set? 
Readings of Court Clerk and The court clerk You are L. M. To inform the court 
Charge defendants reads the charge You stay at and the defendants 
Sheets sheet to the court house and get the 
and the defendants numberl 888 defendants' 
and asks the Machoba 12. responses. 
defendants to make Gweru 




of .. etc. 
Direct Prosecutors and Swearing in of I swear that the To establish the 
Examinatio witnesses witnesses evidence I shall facts of the case 
ns give is the truth and build up the 
The prosecutors ask etc. story in favour of 
questions and the the prosecution 




Will you please 
tellthis 
honourable 
court how you 
came to know 
the accused 
Cross Defense counsel and Counsel ask Now, you have To find weaknesses 
Examinatio witnesses questions and described to this or inconsistencies 
ns witnesses answer court eloquently in the evidence 
how the adduce by the direct 
accident examinations and to 
happened. Will discredit the 
I be right if I prosecution 
say that when witnesses to re- 
the car moved establish the facts 
out of the road in favour of the 
you couldn't defense 
see clearly as to 
what the cause 
was? LS-ubmissions 
Prosecutors and Monologue Your Worship, To persuade the 
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points of law 
with respect, 
this honourable 





magistrate to judge 
against the 
opposing side 
Readings of Prosecutor Monologue The accused is To recapitulate 
Facts as named in the what was on the 
The prosecutor charge sheet. charge sheet before 
reads the facts of He is charged the judgement 
the case to the court with two counts 
much as of .. etc. On the 
recapitulation of 23rd day of May 
what was in the 1998, the police 
charge sheet but received 
this time in the information 
third person from a reliable 
narrative form source that the 
accused was in 
possession of a 
pistol-like 
object e c. 
Judgement Magistrate Monologue The accused For the magistrate 
person is said to to persuade the 
Argument have on the 2nd court that his ruling 
summarising the of April etc. He on the case is the 
case highlighting however was only one possible 
important evidence not sure given the evidence 
from either side, whether the and to make the 
quoting precedent machine was in judgement. 







(Texts exemplifying each Transaction come from the data of this study. ) 
want to suggest that courtroom processes fall into two types, substantive processes, 
which encompass the fact gathering of examinations, the arguments of submissions 
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and the judgements; and administrative processes being (in this courtroom) those of 
mentions, reading of charge sheets and facts. These processes were presented in table 
4 in the order in which they appear in the trial, which is basically a logical order of 
progression through the case. However an important issue in ordering of the processes 
involves the gross and internal order of the substantive transactions, that is the order 
of presentation of evidence in the examinations in terms of who speaks first, and order 
of presentation of argument in terms of what points are made first in the submissions. 
These orders in the adversary trial have been the subject of study of at least one team 
of researchers - Walker, Thibaut and Andreoli. They state that 
The order of presentation of evidence in an adversary proceeding has an 
important effect upon the final determination of guilt or innocence ... Gross 
order is determined by statute for the three parts of the traditional adversary 
processes: opening statements, presentation of evidence and closing 
arguments. The prosecution or plaintiff usually has the right to make the first 
opening statement. Present the evidence first and make both the first and the 
last final closing arguments. (1973-73 p. 216) 
They claim that the justification usually given for this order is that the party Nvith the 
burden of proof should have the advantage of the first and the last presentation. To 
study the effect of gross order on jurors, Walker et al. designed and carried out an 
experiment using a hypothetical case which could arise in either a civil or criminal 
court. The case comprised fifty brief factual statements divided equally into 'laNvful' 
and 'unlawful' bits of evidence. Their subjects were instructed to listen to the 
evidence and then decide whether the defendant's acts were lawful or unlawful. In the 
presentation of the facts, either the unlawful facts were presented first then the lawful 
facts or vice versa. The effects of gross order Nvere then measured by the judgements 
of the subjects to -whether the defendant's action was lawful or unlawful and their 
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certainty about those judgements. Each side presented the twenty-five bits of 
evidence five at a time and after each the subjects were asked to indicate their the 
extent to which they currently considered the defendant's actions to be lawful or 
unlawful by checking a nine-point scale (one being unlawful and nine being lawful). 
After the last set of facts, the defendants were asked to indicate their final opinion on 
the case and their degree of certainty. (p. 218) 
Walker et al reported that gross order does make a difference and the second presenter 
is in a more favourable position. They state that in three of the four cases, the party 
going second obtained more favourable results. These researchers used this 
experiment to prove that the gross order of presentation in an adversary trial is 
suitable for the process. They go on to account for the gross order results (p. 223) but 
the significant point here is that they find the order of presentation of evidence in an 
adversary trial supportable. They state that 'the traditional adversary trial thus appears 
remarkably well arranged to neutralise the effects of order and thus maintain the fact- 
finding process relatively free of this relatively powerful yet legally irrelevant 
influence. ' (ibid p. 226) The significance of internal order i. e. order of points ANrithin 
an argument is discussed in this thesis in the chapter dealing with submissions. 
The order of transactions in the magistrate's court observed is also aptly described by 
the University of Botswana law lecturer I interviewed. He explained that: 
... But the structure is as follows: Normally you make an opening statement You just give the court in broad strokes give them a picture of what you are 
going to tell them or what the evidence you are going to win from the 
witnesses is all about. You don't tell the court the evidence itself, you just give 
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them a broad picture of something you are going to tell them like a good 
introduction into the true story itself and after the opening statement you call 
the witnesses themselves who are going to give the meat or substance of the 
opening statement that you gave to the court. The witnesses, first of all you 
examine them, what is called examination-in-chief. So in the examination-in- 
chief you ask the witnesses a series of questions geared towards developing a 
particular point of view. You have to be very consistent. You must form a very 
good chain of events and a coherent picture. Immediately after you finish with 
the witnesses then there will come up your adversary in the case, the lawyer 
from the other side and now cross-examining your witnesses trying to also 
trying to discredit the coherence of your story so that at the end of the day his 
story may be the one that is accepted by the court. So after the cross- 
examination is now complete that is after the leading of the evidence-in-chief 
and the other side has cross-examined, cross-examination means testing the 
truthfulness of the evidence that was given in the examination-in-chief, then 
comes what is called re-examination. The first party who himself was 
examining-in-chief now has to rehabilitate the witness that is if there was harm 
done by the cross-examination. After all the examination has been led now 
comes the interesting part. That is where you have the closing arguments. 
Most people call it closing argument but normally it is called summing up. 
Now why do you sum up? You sum up because there has been evidence in 
chief that was led by the party who starts, there has been cross-examination, 
questions have been asked which tried to impeach the examination-in-chief, 
now there is the whole evidence, a mixture of facts and everything, and 
exhibits, pictures, diagrams and photographs, now the closing statements now 
that is when you get the real meat of the art of advocacy. Now after having all 
these raw materials, in the form of evidence now the lawyer comes in there to 
convince the court that his version of the events is the correct one... 
This explanation of the order of the substantive courtroom processes captures the 
essence of the processes, what happens in each process that is the examination-in- 
chief, the cross-examination, re-examination and counsel's submissions as they are 
taught to law students. (note that the re-examination process does not feature in the 
data of this courtroom and thus it is not listed in this courtroom's processes. ) 
4.3 Monologues and dialogues. 
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The communication processes in this courtroom, including substantive and 
administrative processes; divide into two theoretically important types of discourses 
namely, the monologue types including readings of facts, submissions and 
judgements, and the dialogues including the mentions, the readings of charge sheets 
and the tNvo types of examinations. 
The theoretical significance of dividing the processes in this way, as monologues and 
dialogues has to do with the types of issues and characteristics of courtroom discourse 
that can be seen to attach to each type of discourse and the methodologies that are 
applied to each type of discourse. The main issue attaching to monologues is that of 
persuasion in the courtroom and the role of narrative analysis in bringing out the 
strategies of persuasion through narrative coherence. Apart from the mentions, which 
are administrative, the substantive monologues, those central to the trial as a genre are 
the submissions and judgements. The dialogues, on the other hand when handled by 
the Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) model of analysis of formal discourse, reveal the 
interpersonal issues of power distribution among courtroom participants. The 
administrative dialogue is that of the reading of charge sheets, by the court clerk, to 
the defendant and the substantive dialogues are those of the examinations. 
Analysis of the administrative processes and the substantive processes, as well as 
analysis of the bilingual character of the courtroom, form the substantive (in terms of 
data analysis) part of this thesis. Thus we have chapters 5, Administrative Processes; 
Chapter 6 and 7 Substantive processes; Chapter 8 Bilingualism in the Courtroom and 
Chapter 9 Courtroom Interpreting. 
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I think it is important to get a clear picture of which participants in the courtroom are 
involved in which types of discourse. Therefore this table should make this clear. 
DISCOURSE TYPE PARTICIPANTS 
Monologues: 
Submissions Defense counsel 
and prosecutors to the court 
Readings of Facts Prosecutor to court 
Judgements Magistrates to the court 
Dialogues: 
Mentions The prosecutor and the 
magistrate 
Readings of Charge Sheets 
Court Clerk to Defendants 
Direct Examinations 
Prosecutors and Witnesses 
Cross-Examinations 
Defense counsel and Prosecution 
Witnesses 
Table 5 Botswana courtroom discourse types 
As has been explained in the description of the data in the methodology section of this 
thesis, a peculiarity of the data of this study is the absence of direct examinations by 
the defense and cross-examinations by prosecutors. This was because most cases were 
undefended and where defended, defense counsel never called witnesses. This was 
due, I believe, to the fact of the cases being traffic offences which would not have 
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defense witnesses, who in these cases would be eye witnesses to the events of the 
traffic offence charges. 
The distinction between administrative and substantive processes is also theoretically 
based. Administrative processes attach fundamentally to the facilitative role of routine 
in the everyday work situation of any organisation. This element of organisational 
discourse is more fully discussed in this thesis in Chapter 7.2. Table 6 reveals which 
court personnel also perform administrative roles. For example the prosecutor, being 
also a police officer, performs various administrative tasks such as commanding the 
people in court to stand up when the magistrate enters the court and when he leaves 
by the routine words, 'All rise in courd' He or she also mentions cases and reads facts 
of the case before the judgement is read. The other people involved in administrative 
functions in the court are the magistrates during mentions and throughout the 
proceedings taking notes for the record. The court clerk reads charge sheets and calls 
each new case by stating 'The matter between the state and X. ' Table 6 helps in the 
identification of the administrative and substantive processes. 
Administrative communication Substantive communication 
processes rocesses, 
Mentions (prosecutors & Examinations (prosecutors, 
magistrates) counsel and witnesses) 
Readings of Charge Sheets Submissions (prosecutors and 
(court clerk and witnesses) counsel) 
Readings of Facts (Prosecutors Judgements (magistrates) 
to court) 
Table 6 Administrative and Substantive courtroom processes 
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CHAPTER 5: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 
5.1 Introduction 
I have, in the chapter introducing the courtroom processes, made the 
theoretical distinction between administrative processes, including 
monologues and dialogues, and substantive processes, those central to the 
trial as a macro-genre also including monologues and dialogues. Following 
the table identifying administrative and substantive processes we will in this 
chapter, the second data based chapter of this thesis, proceed to describe and 
discuss the achninistrative processes and these are the processes of Mentions, 
Readings of Charge Sheets and the Readings of Facts. 
The data of Mentions, Charge Sheets and Readings of Facts are subjected to 
analysis by the analytical models of genre analysis developed and applied to 
texts by Martin (1993) and the narrative analysis model described by Kress 
(1993). The rationale for selecting these models will become clear in the 
following discussion of available genre analysis models. 
5.2 Some genre analysis models 
Genre analysis is a recent development in discourse analysis (Bhatia 1993 
p. 16). There are several models of genre analysis, which developed at around 
the same time, the 1990s. I distinguish these models largely by their 
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definition of the terrn genre, which tends to influence the practical steps 
taken in analysing genre. The first of these first of these approaches is that of 
Swales. Meriel Bloor (1998 p. 53) attributes the theory of genre to Swales 
about whom she writes that, 'the conceptual structure of a subject is 
fonnulated (or constructed) in language, ' and that 'it was to better understand 
the process by which this takes place that Swales developed the theory of 
genre analysis for which he has become well known. ' Swales (1990 p. 33) 
first gives the dictionary meaning of genre that 'a genre is a distinctive 
category of literary composition' but goes on to state that 'today genre is 
quite easily used to refer to any distinctive category of discourse of any type, 
spoken or written, with or without literary aspirations. ' I find that a definition 
like this is not very helpful to any researcher or writer wishing to analyse a 
specific genre, as it does not sayjust what distinguishes genre. However a 
definition that comes close to this is also attributed to Swales (1981b, 1985 
and 1990) by Bhatia (1993 p. 13) Swales is quoted by Bhatia as defining 
genre in these words: 
It is a recognizable communicative event characterised by a set of 
communicative purpose(s) identified and mutually understood by the 
members of the professional or academic community in which it 
regularly occurs. Most often it is highly structured and 
conventionalised with constraints on allowable contributions in terms 
of their intent, positioning, form and functional value. These 
constraints, however, are often exploited by the expert members of the 
discourse community to achieve private intentions within the 
framework of the socially recognizable purposes. 
Swales' definition approaches genre ftom the point of view of the discourse 
community and it use and understanding of its genre. We might add that 
genres are recognisable even to non-users. Given the tone and structuring of 
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elements in a text, anyone familiar with the domain of use of advertisements 
and sermons can readily assign such texts to these domains of use. However, 
the main contribution of Swales' definition is the notion of 'communicative 
purpose, ' which has been picked up by later scholars such as Martin (1993) 
and Kress (1993) and operationalised to aid in analysing genres. 
Two significantly different models of genre analysis, that by Gunther Kress 
and J. R. Martin, are set out in The Powers of Literacy: A Genre Approach to 
Teaching Writing. edited by Cope and Kalantzis (1993), with each model 
applied to the analysis of a different text. While Martin (1993) proceeds to 
apply his model to a text vvithout reference to any other model of genre 
analysis, Kress sets out in his chapter to contrast his model to Martin's. 
Martin defines genre as a 'staged, goal oriented process' (p. 116) and 
proceeds to analyse the text, 'Innovative Fisheries Management: 
International Whaling, ' written by the scientist, W. R. Martin (1989); 
describing the stages of its develoPment and accounting for them (see pp 
116-136). The simple definition of genre is shown to be very effective in 
analysing this ideationally complex, but textually simple text written by a 
scientist. This is the model I have elected to use in the description of 
Mentions, Readings of Charge Sheets and Readings of Facts one class of the 
courtroom genres. The reason will become apparent after I have discussed 
Kress's model and shoun why it is not appropriate for the analysis of the 
administrative processes in the courtroom. 
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Kress's is the more user-friendly discussion. He defines the first two things a 
student of discourse analysis would want to know about genre analysis, (1) 
what is a text? (The subject of analysis) and (2) what is a genre? (The model 
of analysis)He introduces his 'social theory of language' by pointing out that 
the text is the most important unit of analysis in a social theory of language 
and defines it as 'the socially and contextually complete unit of language. ' 
(p. 24). He exemplifies his definition with a greeting exchange between 
friends and states that as a text, 'its origin is entirely social, as it function. ' 
As far as defining the term genre is concerned, Kress (1993) states that 'even 
the so- called genre school does not have a unified approach to the terrn' 
(p. 32). He distinguishes between two approaches as his own approach and 
Martin (1993)'s approach. He states that: 
The best known and widely used approach, that of J. R. Martin and 
Joan Rothery, treats genre as a term which describes the whole 
complex of factors which needs to be described and understood about a 
text. In this approach, the term genre covers everything there is to 
know linguistically about a text, which in turn, can be accounted for by 
ideological context. 
He contrasts this approach to genre analysis with his own in which, 'which is 
to some extent reflected in work by others in Australia and which has some 
influence outside Australia, ' in which 'genre is a term used to cover one 
aspect only of textual structuring' (p. 32). This approach focuses 'not on the 
task being performed by or with the text, but rather on the structural features 
of the specific social occasion in which the text has been produced' which 
have been seen as 'giving rise to particular configuration of linguistic factors 
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in the text which are realisations of, or reflect, these social relations and 
structures' (p. 33). Kress points out that in describing or analysing a text, he is 
not interested in the stages, but rather, for instance, in discovering and 
describing who has the power to initiate turns and complete them, and how 
relations of power are realised linguistically (p. 33). 
The eminent aim and purpose of seeing genre in the light of social structural 
relations and the wider context of culture is pedagogic in origin and as Kress 
put it, '%vork on genre in relation to literacy developed out of quite specific 
educational and political aims, namely to bring about greater possibilities of 
access to the resources and the technology of literacy and through greater 
access, to bring about some of the conditions for redistribution of power in 
society' (p. 28). Although it is possible to envision an educational curriculum 
that equips the layman to the law with the skill of dealing with the law when 
they come against it, Kress's wider social structural definition of genre is one 
that is not very productive for the analysis of data relating the administrative 
processes in this study for the main reason that the administrative genres in 
this courtroom involve professionals, being prosecutors; defense counsel and 
magistrates, talking to each other and therefore the social relations reflected 
in these processes are less those of inequality of power than those to be found 
in the examinations. So for the purposes of analysing these genres the 
simpler 'purposes' model of Martin (1993) is more suitable. This is the 
model of analysis that 'focuses most on the purposes of the participants who 
produced the text; on the task they wished the text to perfonn, which reflect 
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the stages of the social task which the participants are perfon-ning' (Kress 
1993 p. 32). 
This model, which I call 'purposes and stages model' and another model, that 
of narrative structure, are particularly powerful for describing all the 
administrative processes, both the dialogues of Mentions and Readings of 
charge Sheets and the monologues of the Readings of Facts. The following 
quotation neatly explains why they are so productive: 
Two types of textual form have been particularly influential in shaping 
this approach. Both have strongly marked sequential stages. One is the 
model of the 'service-encounter following the work of Eija Ventola 
(Ventola 1987). This describes the shopping encounter, from the first 
exchange between buyer and seller to the concluding exchange... such 
encounters have great regularity and predictability about the unfolding 
of successive stages in the encounter, so much so that one can readily 
produce the algorithms and flowcharts to map out the sequential 
unfolding. The other model is that of narrative structure. Here the text 
is not a record of direct interaction between the participants in the 
production of the text; rather, a strongly marked, strongly 
conventional ised sequence which itself reflects or realises a more 
abstract cultural algorithm of initial equilibrium - disturbance of 
equilibrium - conflict or tension - resolution of conflict - re- 
establishment of new equilibrium... The text performs a more abstract 
cultural task, in this case assimilation and incorporation of some 
problematic event or factor into the larger classificatory structures of 
the culture. (Kress 1993 p. 32) 
The Mentions, Charge Sheets and Readings of Facts texts making up the data 
of this study are perfectly suited to analysis by this genre analysis model in 
which genre is defined as 'a staged, goal-oriented social process' for the 
reason the stages and purposes of texts are highly recognisable in these texts, 
making them amenable to analysis by a model which recognises these 
aspects of texts, that is, the fact that their structures reflect the social 
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purposes for which they are created and the successive unfolding of the 
stages that perfonn theses purposes. The Readings of Facts texts on the other 
hand reflect stages in the second sense described in the preceding quotation, 
that is the sequencing of narrative events in the texts. I shall therefore 
proceed to describe the Mentions and Charge Sheets as dialogues and the 
Readings of Facts as monologic narratives. 
53 Mentions 
53.1 Definition 
The term Mention in the court derives from the canonical meaning of the 
term. The dictionary meaning is 'to refer to by name. ' This stage of the 
proceedings is where a case in the court's day's business is named by the 
Court Clerk to initiate the proceedings of the particular case The words 
uttered by the Court Clerk to name the case are: 'The state versus X, ' by 
which words the defendant is summoned to the dock. Mentions in the 
Gaborone Magistrate's court are the preparatory stages of trials. They are 
allowed as the first stage of any case or 'matter ' before the court and can be 
returned to at any stage of the trial. They enable movement back and forth in 
the trial and give everyone - prosecutor, counsel and litigant a chance to 
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prepare for the particular stage of the trial. For example a case at the trial 
stage can be suspended by applying for a date of mention to allow further 
investigation by the police and a case can be mentioned several times before 
it is tried. Any day in the life of the courtroom can have the bulk of the 
proceedings being mentions and one or two other stages like examinations, 
readings of facts, charge sheets and pleadings, andjudgements. 
Mentions are addressed to the magistrate by the Prosecutor and their main 
function is administrative, to inform the court about the case and supply 
other details pertaining to the case so that decisions can be made by the court 
regarding the cases, whether the case will be set for trial or any other stage of 
the trial. The Mention's and Reading of Charge Sheet's statuses as 
administrative processes become very clear when they are followed by the 
first substantive process of the trial, which is Examinations. It becomes clear 
that the Mentions and Reading of Charge Sheets are preparatory to the 
substance of the trial which is the information gathering of the examinations, 
the arguments of the submissions and judgements, and the magistrates' 
rulings. 
They constitute a dialogue between prosecutors and the magistrate in the 
presence of the defendant. For example: 
Excerpt 1. Case number 8 06-08-99 
Pros: Your Worship, I appear for the state in this matter. It is a mention. 
May another date of mention be set? The accused is remanded in custody 
Mag: How old is he? 
Pros: He is nineteen, your worship. 
Mag: Why did you detain him? 
Pros: Er well eh, your worship the evidence ... In any case I 
do not have any 
objection to releasing him, the only reason which we remanded the accused 
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is that by that time rape was (inaudible) We know where he stays. He can be 
granted bail. 
Alag: (to the accused): All right. I "I take you in my confidence and grant 
you bail for P 1000. Report to this court on the seventeenth of September. 
5.3.2 Description of the data 
The database of this analysis is seventeen mentions numbered Cases one to 
seventeen. The data is transcribed from two tapes dated the 6h of August 
1999. All the seventeen cases began Nvith prosecutors and counsel introducing 
themselves to the magistrate and ended in magistrates setting the dates of 
further mentions or dates of trials. The legal officers mentioning cases are 
police prosecutors. It appeared that about ten police prosecutors were 
regulars, i. e. the same people bringing cases for mentions, in the duration of 
the data- recording period. 
533 Data Analysis 
The Mentions stage, being the stage that initiates the court proceedings, for 
each case, and being administrative processes always involved the Prosecutor 
introducing himself in the first move. So trial opens with self-introductions 
of the court personnel to the magistrate. These self-introductions involve 
utterances of a particular grammatical kind and variations thereof The table 
gives information on variations of the self-introduction stage. 
76 
Table 7 Realisation of the self-introduction stage 
Utterance Participant Frequency Style 
I appear for the state Your Worship. Prosecutor 12 Unmarked/regular 
If it pleases Your Worship, I appear for the accused. Counsel 2 Flamboyant 
May I appear for the state, Your worship? Prosecutor I Flamboyant 
Your Worship, I represent the state. Prosecutor I Variation 
Your Worship, I am Inspector M. appearing for the 
state 
Prosecutor I Flamboyant 
As shown in Table 7, the prosecutors' preferred linguistic manner of self- 
introduction is a simple'l appear for the state. The grammatical realisation of 
the self-introduction is generally a simple Declarative with the structure - 
Subject-Predicate-Adjunct (SPA), 'I appear for the state, Your Worship. But 
more flamboyant expressions are employed, especially by counsel, for 
example, 'If it pleases Your Worship, I appear on behalf of the accused, ' the 
prosecutor in this case, case number13, seems to take the cue for style from 
defense counsel and declares, 'Your worship, may I appear for the stateT 
The use of the conditional phrase 'If it pleases the court... ' and the modal 
verb phrase 'may I... ' are terms of deference and polite request respectively 
and serve to hold the magistrate and the court in high esteem. This tendency 
for the court to be reified is pervasive and prevalent throughout the court 
proceedings and sometimes even litigants engage in this aspect of the 
language of the court. I have met someone who had never heard a court in 
session before and was shocked to hear the magistrate being addressed as ' 
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Your Worship. ' I tried to explain that the practice was not sacrilegious 
because as the law derives from the commandments of God, the person of the 
magistrate may be seen to be the vicar of God, even in a secular institution. 
However a more powerful apologetics for the practice is to be found in the 
literature. Walker (1987) explains the socio-cultural basis of this power. She 
states that 'as institutions for dispute resolution evolve, certain members of 
society are sanctioned by the group as authorised participants whose roles, if 
not persons, command respect ... thus a societal 
institution, cultural norms for 
role assigmnent and deference toward those roles and a body of laws (p. 58- 
59) 
533. lThe purposes and stages of the Mentions genre 
Mentions may be regarded as a courtroom genre as they have a clear generic 
structure that can be described in terms of purposes and stages. The stages 
include the opening, the development and the closing of the mention of a 
case. 
The opening begins with self -introductions of prosecution and counsel to the 
magistrate - 'Your Worship, I appear for the state' and 'if it pleases your 
worship, I appear on behalf of the accused. ' The next stage is then an 
announcement by the prosecutor of what stage the case is at whose purpose 
is to inform the court about the stage the case is at in the proceedings. ' The 
case is for mention. ' This is followed by a request, 'may another date of 
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mention be set' or 'may a date of trial be seff This is followed by further 
information of the court 'the accused is remanded in custody your worship' 
and 'the matter is still under investigation, ' and 'The accused person is not in 
attendance. ' The stages of Self introductions, announcement of stage of 
proceedings and the request for the court's action to further the processing of 
the case are obligatory and follow each other in this set order. After these 
stages in the text, the further infonnation for the court is optional. By this 
move the court is given various kinds of information, for example, 'this case 
was supposed to be... ' or 'the accused is remanded in custody, ' or 'the 
accused is not in attendance, ' or 'the accused is out on bail, ' or a more 
extended explanation, 'the accused person is not in attendance during the last 
mention, a warrant of his arrest was applied for. May another date be set, 
your worship as we are likely to arrest him. ' 
This structure captures the essence of the definition of genre as staged, goal- 
oriented social process, a social process by which the court prepares to carry 
out its mandate to settle disputes, which mandate is honoured in the 
substantive stages of the trial 
The basic structure of the stages is: 
I appear for the state your worship. 
The matter is for mention. 
I apply for another date of mention to be set. 
The accused is remanded in custody. 
Magistrate set and announces date 
This translates into the theoretical generic structure: 
Self-introduction of prosecutor 
Is 
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Establishment stage of trial 
Request for date for next stage of trial 




The development of the mentions stage involves various activities by the 
magistrate and sometimes a dialogue initiated by the magistrate whose aim is 
to elicit details that the magistrate needs to establish. This is the type of 
dialogue excerpted at the beginning of this discussion of mentions. The 
activities by the magistrate represent non-verbal responses to the Prosecutors 
opening. These include checking the court diary and looking up dates on the 
calendar usually pinned up on the wall opposite his or her seat. The 
magistrate then closes the dialogues by announcing the date of the next stage 
of the case and checking that the accused person has understood what was 
said. Some wordings of the magistrate's closing are: 
Mag: This case is scheduled for the 24"' of November at 8.30 in the morning. 
Make sure you notify your lawyer. 
Or 
Mag: So how about setting the date for the next appearance. Here are the 
dates. The case will be heard on the 10h, 17'h, and Ie of September. So 
make sure that you don't miss this one. 
Or 
Mag: You will be granted bail for one thousand Pula. You will report to the 
police twice a week on Tuesdays and Fridays at 7.30 a. m. Trial 18th 
November. Do you understand? 
Or 
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Mag: Accused, you have heard my explanation with regard to the availability 
ofjudicial officers. 8h September. 
The magistrate's turn involves the mandatory move of announcing the date 
for next proceedings on the case and some optional moves addressing the 
accused person. The accused persons' responses are again minimal being 
either a clearly heard 'Yes' or a mere grunt as acknowledgement of 
understanding. The prosecutor always responds to this closing of the 
mentions stage by thanking the magistrate or deferring to the court decision 
with, 'If it pleases the court. ' 
5.3.3.2 The grammar of the Mention 
The first inform move that follows the self-introductions is the 
announcement of the stage of the case. We saw, in the table, the various 
realisations of the self-introduction stage. The grammatical realisation of the 
first inform stage is a simple SVC (subject verb complement) -'this matter is 
a mention, ' 'It's a mention. ' Or a more elaborate structure, 'This case is 
coming for mention. ' The request moves that follow the announcements 
always relates to the setting of further dates of mentions or dates for trial. 
These request are realised grammatically by the modal 'may' or a more 
elaborate structure like 'I am applying for another date of mention to be set, ' 
being the language of polite requests. 
The grammatical structure of the text is a number of single, short, 
unconjoined. sentences, strongly suggesting that these are different stages of 
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the text. There is some variation between prosecutors as to the order of the 
stages. Cases numbers 14 and 15 realise the same structure slightly 
differently in that they employ some conjoining: 
I appear for the state. The case is coming for mention and I apply for another 
date. Excerpt 3. Case no. 14 06-08-99 
Case number 15 employs even more conjoining. 
I appear for the state your worship. The case is coming for mention. The 
accused is remanded in custody and I apply for further detention and yet 
another date of mention. 
This is an unusual structure in the Mention in that it deviates from the 
structure discussed above while there is no specific explanation for doing so. 
5.3.3.3 The court context for mentions 
The explanation for this kind of simplicity of grammatical structure seems to 
lie in the demand for clarity, order and brevity which allows for the normal 
business of the day to be carried out as swiftly as possible. I have not come 
across a description of this stage of court proceedings. This is probably 
because most descriptions of court proceedings have concentrated on the 
later body of the trial like questioning in examinations andjury instructions. 
This may lie in the differences between organisation of the courts in 
Botswana and places like the UK. In Coventry, for example, there are two 
separate courts for dealing with mentions and trials. The courts are in the 
vicinity of each other and when I visited them in May 1999, the usher 
informed me that the County Court was a 'fast moving court. ' It turned out 
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that in the space of a moming, at least tNvo hours, the court processed as 
many as five cases because it only performed the preliminary, preparatory 
work of mentioning the case, granting or refusing bail, setting the dates of 
trial, making decisions to withdraw cases or commit cases to the Crown 
Court for trial. In Botswana both trials and mentions are handled in the same 
courtroom and at the same sitting. 
The daily administrative business of any organisation, the courtroom 
included, seems to require clarity and conventionalised processes such as the 
ones described in this genre. Thus routine is seen as an enabling rather than a 
deadening element of day-to -day business. This concept of routine will be 
further elaborated under the genre of Direct Examinations in this thesis 
where it comes out more clearly as facilitative of the proceedings in that 
when routine is inadvertently interrupted, the proceedings are adversely 
affected. 
A further clement of the Botswana context of the courtroom is the language 
of the proceedings. As the official and statutory language of the magistrates' 
courts is English, the administrative function is carried out in English and the 
accused is informed of the date by the clerk who interprets that aspect of the 
proceedings to the accused person. 
Observation of the nature of English used at this stage run counter to the- 
popular criticisms of the language of law as unnecessarily complex and 
inscrutable. This is probably because of the spoken nature of the language 
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although it has been observed by other researchers that the language ofjury 
instructions in the United States for example, though spoken, is hardly 
comprehensible (O'Baff 1982 p. 388). He points out, from Mellink-off(1963), 
that 'lack of clarity' is another characteristic of legal English as in the jury 
instruction that follows: 
You are instructed that contributory negligence in its legal significance is 
such an act as omission on thepart oftheplaintiffamounting to a want of 
ordinary care andprudence as occurring and co-operating with some 
negligent act of the defendant was proximate cause of the collision which 
resulted in the injuries or damages complained of It may he described as 
such negligence on the part ofthe plaintiff, iffound to exist, as helped to 
produce the injury or the damages complained of, and ifyoufindfrom the 
preponderance ofall the evidence in either ofthese cases defendant was 
guilty ofany negligence that helpedproximately to bring about orproduce 
the injuries of which plaintiff complains of, then in such a case the plaintiff 
cannot recover. (O'Barr 1982 p. 388). 
Communication by the prosecutors to the magistrates in mentions stage of 
court proceedings just described stands out in stark simplicity compared to 
communication by thejudge to thejury in this extract. It would be interesting 
to find out why the language of the judge in American jury instructions is so 
inscrutable, perhaps from the practitioners of the genre themselves. 
5.3.3.4 The content of the communication process 
Finally what is communicated in this sub-genre of courtroom discourse? 
There is first the ideational content of the language where infortnation is 
shared and facts are stated. Then there are expressions of attitude as in the 
formality of language used to address the magistrate. Finally role relations 
are clearly revealed when prosecutors and counsel introduce themselves and 
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when they defer to the magistrates' decisions with expressions like 'as the 
court pleases. ' The defendant is involved in this administrative process only 
minimally as he is silent even when he is informed when next to appear in 
court. In this data his response is not heard either because he speaks so softly 
that the recording missed his 'Yes' or he makes no verbal response. This 
only serves to emphasise the fact that at this stage of the trial the court speaks 
largely to itself in preparation for handling the case. 
5.4 The Reading of Charge Sheets 
The reading of charge sheets is the second administrative process follovAng 
the mentions stage. This means that when the prosecution are ready to 
proceed with the case, the next stage in the trial is to request that the accused 
person be arraigned and as soon as the magistrate agrees to this the court 
clerk asks the accused person what language he understands and proceeds to 
read the charge to him or her. 
5.4.1 Description of the data 
The data for analysis of Readings of Charge Sheets comprises three Charge 
Sheets. One in English and two in SetsNvana. In contrast to the language of 
mentions the language of the Readings of Charge sheets is the language of 
the defendant, not the language of the court. The nature of the bilingualism 
of this stage is fully discussed in Chapter 7.4.2. In this chapter we are mainly 
concerned with revealing the generic structure of the process of arraignment. 
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5.4.2 Analysis of the charge sheet genre 
The opening of the stage of the reading of the charge sheet is an interaction 
involving at most four interlocutors, as in the following: 
Excerpt 1. Tape No. 12 Case No. 29 29-03-99 
Pros: I appear for the State, Your Worship. Our investigations are complete. 
Mag: Lets have the accused plead to the charge. 
Int: Stand up accused. What language do you speak? 
Acc: English. 
This multi-party dialogue involves a certain kind of knowledge of court 
procedure on the part of the court personnel, the prosecutor, the magistrate 
and the interpreter. Thus the introduction of the process can be accomplished 
jointly as in the first threes turn just shown above, or it can be done by only 
two people, the prosecutor and the court clerk-curn-interpreter, as in the next 
charge sheet reading: 
Excerpt 2. Tape No. 6 Case No. 4 18-01 -2000 
Pros: Your Worship I appear for the State. The matter is scheduled for trial 
today ... (a request 
for amendment to charge sheet)... as a result I would like 
the accused to be arraigned. 
Court Clerk/Int: Emang ka dinao. 
(Stand up accused persons. ) 
(The accused persons stand up) 
Court Clerk/Int: Mosekisiwa wa ntIha maina a gago ke... 
(First accused your names are... 
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Although it evinces typical courtroom dialogue, the opening of the reading of 
charge sheet is quite fluid or flexible involving three or four people who all 
know the processes and therefore co-operate in the opening. The next stage, 
after the opening, however is more strictly structured and conventional ised 
and involves only the court clerk and the accused person(s). The first few 
turns between the court clerk and the accused person have the purpose of 
establishing the identity of the accused person. 
Excerpt 3. Tape No. 12 Case No. 29 29-03-99 
Court Clerk: You are L. M. 
Acc: Yes. 
Court Clerk: You Stay at House Number etc (details ommited) 
Ace: Yes. 
Court clerk: You are unemployed. 
Ace: Yes. 
The second stage of the reading of the charge sheet is lengthier and involves 
the reading of the charge to the accused person at the end of which he or she 
must plead to the charge. It begins with stating the charge the accused is 
facing (You are charged with. ) Immediately following this point of 
informing the accused is the reading of the charge sheet to him or her. The 
charge sheet is an intriguing text in a number of ways. First, though it begins 
with 'it is alleged that' it makes a very strong, direct accusation expressed in 
deictic, terms. The statement of accusation selects from the grammatical 
system of deixis. Deixis is defined in Trask (1993)'s A dictionary of 
Grammatical Terms in Linguistics as 'reference by a term fonning part of a 
system expressing deictic category' He defines deictic category as 'any 
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grammatical category which serves to express distinctions in terms of 
orientation within the immediate context of the utterance' and argues that 
deictic categories are those that make crucial reference to such factors as 
time or place of speaking or the identity or location of the speaker, the 
addressee or other entities. Among the most frequent deictic categories are 
those of person, tense and deictic position (Trask 1993 p. 75). 
The deictic categories of courtroom accusations are mainly those of person 
and time. The charge sheet is expressed in what Trask (1999) in his Key 
Concepts in Language and Linguistics terms 'linguistic finger pointing. ' He 
says that 'a deictic category is literally, a 'pointing' category. It allows the 
speaker to 'point' at particular times, places and individuals' (p. 68). By its 
selection from the grammar of deixis, the charge sheet is thus almost 
pictorially pointing a finger at the accused and pointing at the times and 
places of the alleged misdemeanour. The repeated use of the person deictic 
category 'you' gives the charge sheet the character of strong accusatory 
spoken text. More over, the stress and intonation of the court clerk added to 
the grammatically signalled accusatory tone. This element of courtroom 
narrative distinguishes them from narratives created for aesthetic 
/entertaimuent value. The charge sheet also selects the time deixis of the past 
tense, emphasising the story aspect of charge sheets which relate to the 
imputed past action of the accused. The following excerpts demonstrate this 




Court Clerk: It is alleged that on the 10' day of October 1998, at the 
Ramotswa National Registration Office in the South East Administration 
District, yqu gave false information to the Registrar of the National 
Registration that you were a MotsNvana born in Matsilobjoe village and 
intending thereby to cause the Registrar to issue ygu with a Botswana 
National Identity Card an act which the registrar would not have done if he 
was aware of the true state of facts. (Tape no. 12 case no. 29 o3-09-99) 
Another charge sheet confirms the charge sheet as always similarly worded 
and structured -Aith the same linguistic features of deixis. 
Excerpt 5 
Court Clerk: You are K. D. You are 33years old. You stay at_House Number 
9158 at-Jinja in Gaborone. You are facing a charge of stealing with force. On 
the 30th October 1999 at Jinja y2u stole forcefully the sum of P600 from M. 
1. You hit him with your fists. Do you understand? 
Such strong incrimination demands from the accused an equally strong self- 
defence or as is most usual in contested cases, defence by powerful counsel. 
This defence begins with the accused pleading to the charge (s) and proceeds 
directly to the evidence for such charge(s). The opening of the proceedings 
of the case represent, therefore, the powerful acts of accusation and defense 
of the defendant in the trial. The substantive trial processes are introduced 
immediately following the arraignment with responses from prosecutors such 
as 'Your Worship,, %ve have completed our investigations. We intend to call 4 
witnesses in this matter. May the case be set for trialT 
5.5 The Reading of Facts: The Narrative genre 
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The Readings of Facts are the last stages of the trial functioning 
administratively to prepare the court to hear the judgement on the case. The 
texts of the Readings of facts are wholly narrative in structure as they recount 
the stories that gave rise to the court cases. One dialogue between the 
magistrate and the accused person in the data relating to these narratives 
seems to me to neatly encapsulate the meaning of the reading of the facts as 
seen by the magistrate. He engages the accused in the following dialogue: 
Mag: You will remember that on the 2d of this month, you pleaded guilty to 
several counts? Driving a car dangerously, secondly driving without a drivers 
licence, thirdly driving without due care as well as driving without a valid 
drivers licence? You remember you pleaded guilty to these charges? 
Ace: Yes. 
Mag: Do you still plead guilty to the charges? 
Ace: Yes. 
Alag: Alright, listen then very carefully to the reading of the facts of the 
case. 
This dialogue seems significant in revealing the reason for this genre of the 
trial, which is to recapitulate the story in the trial to aid everyone's memory, 
especially necessary after the substantially lengthy processes of examinations 
and submissions and also probably after the breaks in the trial during 
adjournments. The facts are read by the prosecutor whose role in the court 
seems also to attach to administrative duties. 
The model of narrative described by Kress (1993 p. 32), linking narrative to 
genre as staged, goal oriented social process fits the courtroom narrative of 
Readings of Facts so adequately that we need go no further in search of 
narrative models to analyse these texts. I am aware of the existence in the 
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literature of many models, all of which rely on stages of the genre. It seems 
to me however that all models are showing the same elements of narrative 
structure even though they label them variously depending on the 
disciplinary origin of the models. Cortazzi (1993), for example, describes 
these models from the disciplines concerned such as sociological and 
sociolinguistic models of narrative, psychological models of narrative, 
literary model of narratives and anthropological models of narrative. Kress 
(1993)'s linkage of narrative genre to the basic definition of genre as 
purposes and stages of the social process is attractive. 
The first Readings of Facts to be described is one that seems to me to be 
typical of this courtroom narrative. I borrow from Kress (1993) the term 
'algorithm of the sequential unfolding' of the text, which involves initial 
equilibrium - disturbance of equilibrium - conflict or tension - resolution of 
conflict - re-establishment of equilibrium from Kress (1993) and display the 
unfolding of the story in the Reading of Facts. 
Speaker Transcribed talk Stage 
Prosecutor The accused is as named in establishment of 
the charge sheet. He is charged main character 
Nvith two counts of breaking and stealing. 
The complainant, X resides at house number Setting 
XXX Phase Two, Gaborone. 
On the evening of the 17th she accompanied Equilibrium 
her younger sister to their home in Kanye. 
They came back on the 18"' July 1999 in 
the evening. 
On arrival she noticed that the kitchen lock Disturbance 
had been broken. She then suspected that of equilibrium 
someone may have broken into their house 
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in her absence. She the started her observations 
within the house. She realised that her property 
already exhibited in the charge sheet had been stolen. 
She went to report the matter to the G-West Police Conflict 
Station, who investigated. Tension 
On the 13"' of August the investigating officer Resolution 
Inspector K. was given those properties and the of conflict 
accused by Sergeant M. When the accused was 
confronted with the allegation, he admitted that 
he broke into the lady's house and stole the 
property. 
He was then charged as charged and we tender re-estab- 





If we analogise between the legal profession and other social organisations 
we will find that it is both different and the same as any other organisation. 
The similarity is that lawyers, the police and magistrate belong to a particular 
abstracted entity but unlike other organisations, they are largely autonomous 
as individuals. However, as Mead (1985: 22) says, 'magistrates have a 
governing authority (Weber 1947: 146), and are responsible for directing the 
corporate activity' (ibid. 147). What all the foregoing description of language 
in the courtroom as a social organisation reveals is that any type of 
organisation 'exists in so far as their members create them through discourse' 
(Munby 1997: 181). By analysing the language of professions and 
organisation, we are able to better understand how 'through discourse, people 
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accomplish the everyday task of functioning as part of large coordinated 
institutional structures' Munby (1997: 18 1). Thus the administrative processes 
are the everyday routine discourses enabling the 'everyday task' of the 
courtroom functioning as an institution. 
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CHAPTER 6 SUBSTANTIVE PROCESSES 1: The monologues of 
Submissions and Judgements 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I introduced the notion of there being two classes 
of courtroom communication processes, namely administrative and 
substantive processes. The substantive processes further divide into 
monologues and dialogues. This chapter introduces the analysis and 
discussion of the processes of submissions and judgements. Although the 
submissions and judgements come later than examinations in the trial 
process, to create cohesion in the later parts of the thesis, I shall deal with the 
submissions andjudgements first. This will help maintain the link between 
the chapter on the examinations transactions and the chapter on bilingualism 
because the uses of different languages in the courtroom takes place in the 
context of the dialogues of examinations, as well as the administrative 
processes of readings of charge sheets and readings of facts. 
The main rhetorical link between the processes of examinations, submissions 
andjudgements is the fact of their sharing the same purpose, being that of 
persuasion in the courtroom. The whole process of the trial is really an 
argument between the opposing parties about the truthfulness of the 
prosecution story. The outcome of the trial depends essentially on the 
persuasive skills of the oppositionists, in the trial. This chapter of this thesis 
therefore makes the theories of the trial as storytelling and as persuasion 
central to the analysis of the data of submissions and judgements. This 
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centrality of rhetoric and narrative to courtroom processes is legitimate and 
now well documented. Brooks and Gerwitz (1996) have edited a volume 
called Law's Stories, in which nineteen writers have contributed chapters 
examining many aspects of narrative in the law or narrative and the law. 
Gerwitz (1996 p. 5) points out that: 
'The consideration of narrative in law must take explicit account of the 
distinctive context within which legal narratives occur. Story telling in IaNv is 
narrative within a culture of argument. Virtually everyone in the legal culture 
- whether a trial lawyer presenting her case to a court or jury, a judge 
announcing his findings about what happened in the case, even a law 
professor writing an article - is explicitly or implicitly making an argument 
and trying to persuade. Storytelling is, or is made to function as, argument. ' 
Thus this thesis takes a much acclaimed theory of the trial - that originating 
with Bennett and Fieldman (1981) and echoed, albeit without mentioning 
these authors, in the Yale LaNv School's 1995 symposium on narrative and 
rhetoric in the law Two groups of contributors to Law's Stories, focus on 
trials and narrative transactions (mostly criminal trials), one group 
considering the construction of cases, that is, how lawyers, witnesses and 
judges put together and communicate stories at trial, and the other focusing 
on narratives that courts have considered problematic... in particular 
confessions and victim impact evidence. My application of this theory is to 
the trial stages of examinations, submissions andjudgements. 
6.2 The place of narrative in courtroom communication 
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That narrative should turn up as an important element of courtroom 
communication is not surprising as one of the most intriguing aspects of the 
genre narrative is its ubiquity. 'Narratives are the most frequently occurring 
and ubiquitous forms of discourse. Stories of personal experience, for 
example, crop up repeatedly in informal conversation, in doctor-patient talk, 
in the proceedings of law courts, in psychotherapy sessions, in newspaper 
reporting and in social science research interviews' (Cortazzi 1994). It has 
been suggested by narratologists that narrative is a basic means of human 
organisation of information for everyday sense making of experience 
Georgapoulou and Goutsos (2000). These writers point out that traditional 
views of narrative suggest that narrative is 'a primary mode ... since 
it forms a 
constitutive element of human experience and reality (p. 70). Ochs (1997 
p. 193) even proposes that 'the capacity to create and decipher plots is a 
quintessential faculty of the human species' and reports that Jerome Bruner 
(1990), 'has proposed that narrative is a basic instnunent of folk psychology' 
(also Cortazzi 1994p. 157). Georgapoulou. and Goutsos (2000) quote the 
proponents of the primacy of the narrative mode as stating that narrative is 
4 central to our essential cognitive activities; to historical thinking; to 
psychological analysis and practice. ' Fischer (1987) (cited in Georgapoulou 
and Goutsos 2000 p. 68) has even coined the term homo narrans to underline 
the importance of narrative to human thinking. In their criticism of these 
traditional views of narrative, Georgapoulou and Goutsos argue that these 
views are idealisations arising from the standardisation achieved by a long 
tradition of the study of narrative. But their own attempts to free the 
conceptualisation of narrative from the traditional romantic views fail as they 
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eventually come round (after suggesting that they would propose a 'more 
scientific analytical consideration of both narrative and non-narrative 
modes, ' to the recognition that the narrative mode 'seems to enter into all 
kinds of interaction' (p. 75). In fact, as Cortazzi (1994 p. 57) puts it, 'narrative 
structures are used to interpret an ever widening range of human experience. ' 
It is for reasons of this ubiquitous nature of narrative that it is not surprising 
that it should crop up as a tool of argumentation and persuasive intent in the 
courtroom. Narrative is the organising principle of the whole trial process. 
The manner of adducing evidence is basically by telling the stories of 
different participants, especially the stories relating the events that gave rise 
to that litigation. Stories are also told in the submissions by counsel, mainly 
the story of the trial itself - what different witnesses have said- and counsels' 
opinions about how the stories are to be interpreted and which story is to be 
upheld in judgement, whether the story of the prosecution or that of the 
defense. Boje, (1991 p. 106) recognises this role of naffative when he 
discusses the role of storytelling in organisations other than the courtroom. 
He states that stories are 'the institutional memory system of the 
organisation' and makes a parallel between courtroom story telling and 
storytelling in other orgartisations when he states that, 'stories are to the 
storytelling system what precedent cases are to thejudicial system. Just as in 
courtrooms, stories are performed among stakeholders to make sense of an 
equivocal situation. ' 
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Finally, relating narrative and the law, Brooks (1996) points out that 
narrative 'appears to be one of our large, all-pervasive ways of organising 
and speaking the world - the way we make sense of meanings that unfold in 
and through time' and that 'the law, focused on putting facts in the world 
into coherent form and presenting them persuasively - to make a 'case' - 
must always be intimately intertwined with narrative and rhetoric' (p. 14). 
6.2.1 Stages in the persuasion process 
The trial process as a whole is characterised by the attempts by opposing 
parties to persuade or convince the judge, in the context of this study, the 
magistrate, to judge the case in either side's favour. This is done mainly 
through storytelling on the side of the prosecution and the challenging of the 
story told, by the defense counsel. In the absence of opening speeches by 
parties to the court, as in the data of this courtroom, the examinations are the 
first processes to initiate the persuasion attempts. They do this through the 
process of storytelling (Bennet and Fieldman 1981). The importance of 
telling a good story in court is also underlined by the law lecturer I 
interviewed at the University of Botswana. Who responded to my question 
on how lawyers are trained for court practice in these words: 
So what do we teach them? To tell a story, basically. What you do in a court 
of law is to tell the court a story in accordance with your theory. You tell a 
very light story with nice continuity and the like. But make sure you tell a 
very convincing story to the judge, that is a coherent story, so that at the end 
of the day you can convince the judge, because your duty as a litigator or as 
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an advocate is to convince the court that your case or your point of view is 
the correct one. You have to know how to deal with your witnesses but the 
structure is as follows. Normally you have to make an opening statement. 
You just give the court, in broad strokes what a picture of what you are going 
to tell them. Like a good introduction into the true story itself Then after the 
opening statement you call in the witnesses themselves who are going to give 
the meat or substance to the opening statement. The witnesses, first of all you 
examine them, what is called examination-in-chief So in this examination- 
in-chief you ask the witness a series of questions geared at developing a 
particular point of view. You must form a very good chain of events and a 
very coherent picture. (A University of Botswana law lecturer, 2000). 
This quotation outlines two very important points, that storytelling in the 
courtroom is the way of presenting the facts of the case and that the aim of 
this presentation is to persuade or convince the judge of the correctness of 
their side of the story. This process of persuasion begins with the first 
substantive communicative process - examinations (the story-in-the-trial) 
and culminates with thejudge telling (the story-of-the-trial) in which he 
exercises his right to view the trial stories in his own way (Maley 1994p. 47). 
The important question to ask here is why the medium of narrative is such a 
powerful organising device for the process of adjudication. The answer is 
that 'stories of the sort people tell in everyday life help organize inforination 
presented in criminal trials so that they can be evaluated by jurors, ' (or in this 
case magistrates) (Bennet and Fieldman 1981 p. ix also Lloyd-bostockl988 
p. 45). These researchers point out that without the story framework it would 
be very difficult for decision-makers to retain and use the large bodies of 
information generated within the trial for the purpose ofjudgement. Bennet 
and Fiedman point out that the 'judgement process is a demanding one that 
must take into account large amounts of information and process that 
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information in ways that conform to norms ofjustice and legal 
requirements. ' (p. 8) So how does the story as a form aid in this process? 
'First, stories help solve the problems of information load in trials by making 
it possible for individuals continuously to organize and reorganize large 
amounts of constantly changing information. ' And 'Evidence gains 
coherence through categorical connections to story elements such as time 
frames, the characters, the motives, the settings and the means. (p. 8) ... 
'Once the basic plot outline of a story begins to emerge, it is possible to 
integrate information that is presented in the form of subplots, time 
disjuncture or multiple perspective on the same scene. '(p. 8) 'In trials cases 
often unfold in complex and disjointed fashion ... and the 
juror or spectator 
in a trial may be confronted with conflicting testimony, disorienting time 
lapses, the piecemeal reconstruction of a scene from the perspectives of 
many witnesses and experts, and a confusing array of subplots (p. 9). Without 
the aid of an analytical device such as the story, the disjointed presentation of 
information in trials would be difficult, if not impossible, to assimilate (p. 9) 
In this way judgements rely heavily on the stories told and their plausibility, 
to 'pass the test of reasonable doubt. ' (p. 9) 
Bennett and Fieldman further elucidate the functioning of the story in 
making judgements by pointing out that: 
The structural form of a completely specified story alerts interpreter to 
descriptive information in a story that might be missing and which, if filled 
in, could alter the significance of the action. The inadequate development of 
setting, character, means or motives, can as any literature student knows, 
render the story's action ambiguous. In a novel or film, such ambiguity may 
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be an aesthetic flaxv. In the trial, it is grounds for reasonable doubt' (ibid 
P. 10) 
This applies equally to judges andjurors decisions at courts of first mention 
as well at appellate courts. For example, a case decided by a jury 'beyond 
reasonable doubt', ' can go to appeal and have the narrative that won out in 
the courtroom reversed. This is possible because appeal court judges look for 
judicial error, or story or events overlooked or excluded from the jury's 
attention ... or 
items wrongly given the status of events (Brooks 1996 p. 18). 
This theory is a powerful and plausible way of arriving at an understanding 
of how judgements are made. It is also a theory that is subscribed to by legal 
practitioners themselves, as a validation exercise I carried out in September 
2000 revealed. The law lecturer I interviewed confin-ned the view by other 
researchers that the trial, as lengthy a process as it may be, is basically 
'organised around storytelling' and that the opposing sides' struggles over 
facts definitions and interpretations of the same incident, 'become the hard 
substances ofjudgement, ' (Bennet and Fieldman 1981 p. 10). For stories to 
play such a crucial role in courtrooms' search for the right verdict, the teller 
of the stories must be highly competent in the telling. In fact these 
competencies relate basically to the lawyers arguing the case. They have to 
have clear conceptions of their roles and how to carry these roles out, thus 
the following discussion of the mandates of opposing counsel in the trial. 
63 The prosecution and defense strategies of persuasion 
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One good description of the strategies of persuasion is that made by Bennet 
and Fieldman (1981) in their discussion of the purposes of prosecutors and 
those of counsel in the courtroom. They posit a theory of courtroom 
processes as the building up of stories whose aim is to persuade judgement to 
favour their side. They say that, 'It is clear from patterns of opening and 
closing remarks of opposing counsel and examination practice that both sides 
struggle to redefine facts consistently in the direction that best establishes 
their competing claims about the incident (Bennet and Fieldman (1981 p. 93). 
Relating to the roles of the prosecution and defense in the trial, Bennett and 
Fieldman (1981) point out that, the obligation of prosecution is to prove the 
guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. To carryout this mandate, 
'All prosecution cases must attempt to construct a structurally complete 
story that constrains an internally consistent interpretation for the defendant's 
behaviour. This means that prosecution cases must develop an action through 
a clear set of scenes, actors, agencies and purposes that can be connected in 
support of the same interpretation of the defendant's behaviour. The 
prosecution case cannot satisfy the standards of reasonable doubt if it fails to 
define all the structural story elements (scene, act, agent, agency, purpose) in 
terms that support the same meaning of the defendant's behaviour' (ibid 
p. 94). 
The defense's mandate, on the other hand is to respond to the prosecution 
case in order to create reasonable doubt. And this can be done by 'exploiting 
different properties of the prosecution story' (Bennet and Fieldman 1981 p. 
98). Their strategies therefore are ways of dealing with the prosecution 
story. According to Bennet and Fieldman, the defence does not have to prove 
the defendant's innocence and therefore the strategy of constructing a 
complete story of its own is only one option. 
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The defense has three general strategies that it can employ in response to the 
prosecution case, namely the challenge strategy, the redefinition strategy and 
the reconstruction strategy. The challenge strategy is employed if the 
prosecution has not constructed a structurally complete or internally 
consistent story. Here the defense may choose to merely 'show the missing 
elements in the prosecution case or that the definition of the various scenes, 
acts, actors, agents or purposes do not all support the same interpretation of 
the defence's behaviour. ' 'If the prosecution case represents an adequate 
story in its own right,, the defense may use a second strategy 'involving the 
redefinition of particular elements in the story to show that a different 
meaning emerges when slight changes are made to the interpretation of the 
evidence. ' In cases where the defense finds it difficult to challenge or 
reinterpret the prosecution story, and, it may elect to tell a story of its own. 
'Under this third strategy the defence may introduce its own evidence in 
order to tell a completely different story about the defendant's behaviour. ' 
(Bennet and Fieldman 1981 p. 94) 
The story theory is a powerful instrument of explanation for the processes of 
proving and disproving a case and we have seen how it is an element of the 
trial in all its various stages. However Examinations in court are described in 
this thesis by an entirely different model of discourse analysis for reasons 
that as dialogues they exhibit the characteristics most defined in the Sinclair 
and Coulthard (1975) and for purposes of discussing the social underpinnings 
of courtroom discourse this model has been found most productive. Because 
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this process is substantially different from the other substantive courtroom 
processes, it will be discussed in a separate chapter, chapter 7.1 shall here 
therefore proceed to discuss the monologues of submissions and judgements 
in the order in which they appear in the trial, that is submissions first. 
6.4 Courtroom Submissions 
The closing remarks of opposing counsel, otherwise known as summations in 
the United States or submissions in Botswana, are an area of the study of 
courtroom discourse that is not as well subscribed as the study of power 
relations as evidenced by the processes of examination in the courtroom. 
Major researchers in the field of language and the law such as O'Barr and his 
colleagues at the Duke University Law Project in The United States, Danet, 
Wodak, Gibbons, Shuy, Atkinson and Drew, Walker and others, have said 
nothing at all about the monologues in the courtroom. Even overviews of the 
field such as that by Danet (1990) and Mertz (1992) do not indicate that there 
is substantial literature on this topic. In her chapter, in Howard and Giles 
(1990), ' Handbook ofLanguage and Social Piychology, entitled Language 
and Law: An Overview of 15 Years of Research, Danet does mention 
Goldberg (1986)'s work on attorneys' summations. In fact this work is a PhD 
dissertation entitled A Jury Summation as a Speech Genre: An 
ellinomethodological study of what it means to those who use it, submitted to 
The University of Pennsylvania. 
Danet and Bogoch (1980) have this to say about what in the magistrate's 
court of this study is termed 'submissions': 'In trials as we know them the 
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effort to convince or persuade the other side (or strictly speaking the 
decision-maker, in this case) that one's beliefs should prevail is most 
apparent in the in the opening and closing statements when attorneys may 
directly address the decision-maker, Nvhetherjudge orjury. Only here, and 
not during questioning of witnesses may lawyers assert, claim, 
exhort. '(Danet and Bogoch 1980 p. 39) 
But having said this they do not then go on to examine or subject these 
genres of courtroom discourse to any analysis, as indeed they say about their 
study that, 'Our main focus is on the nature and functions of questioning in 
the courtroom, '(p. 40) They continue to say that, 'The findings to be 
presented here are drawn from the analysis of six criminal court trials 
recorded in the Superior Court of Boston, Massachusetts in 1976. We take as 
our basic unit the question response sequence. '(p. 40) It is surprising that a 
study based on such extensive data would not widen their focus to treat the 
whole data, or that submissions did not come up as a potentially a worthy 
area of study. They report that their report was one of five other studies 
presented at the Symposium on Language and Law, International Conference 
on Language and Social Psychology, University of Bristol 1979, ' but none of 
the papers focused on this element of courtroom discourse. 
In her thesis, Goldberg (1985) examines the summation in ajury trial where 
the speeches are directed at juries and represent the final attempt by counsel 
to persuade the jury to judge the case in their favour. She describes the 
summation or closing speech to ajury as "an exercise in persuasion. ' (Jeans 
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1975). " While she claims that 'the closing arguments are the chronological 
and psychological culmination of a jury trial, ' (p. 1), however, in the non-jury 
context of the Botswana magistrates court the judgement is the chronological 
and psychological culmination of the trial. Here both the closing speeches 
and the judgements are integral to the trial. They both involve argument, and 
the trial is not over until the magistrate has made and argued his verdict. 
As far as the summation is concerned, Goldberg points out that summing up 
for the judge or judges in appellate courts may involve different kinds of 
lawyer emphases. She points out that: 
'When a lawyer sums up to this court, the arguments are made not to 
naive jurors, but to the judges who as former lawyers are educated in 
the law. Therefore many emotional issues are deleted and the focus is 
trulY on argument (ibid p. 290). 
This statement by Goldberg (1985) is insightful even though it does not 
develop the idea of the basic differences between different kinds of people to 
-vvhom speeches are directed. In fact, Bergoon and Bettinghaus (1980) 
develop this argument from a communication studies perspective, pointing 
out that 'one of the oldest controversies in communication is whether a 
persuasive speaker is better advised to construct messages based on peoples' 
emotional needs (such as patriotism, love, self-interest etc. ) or their rational 
bent (tending to respond best to well-constructed, logical arguments) (ibid 
p. 143). They suggest a theoretical position in which they argue that the 
proponents of either emotionalism or rationalism differ fundamentally in 
their view of the 'nature of hurnanity. ' This thesis will not go on to discuss 
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the argument as to which class of people are best persuaded by emotional 
rational appeal, that is, whether there is a basic difference in response to 
speeches between the highly educated, such as judges and those not educated 
(at least in the law) like jurors. In the area of courtroom persuasion it has 
been actually pointed out by several scholars that even judges are 'human' 
(Crowther 1984, Dobson and Fitzpatrick 1986, Napleyl. 987). This claim will 
be developed and put in perspective, later in this chapter in the section 
labelled 'persuading the judge. ' 
Goldberg's study is quantitative, using large samples of the population of 
lawyers and large samples of their responses to establish the regular feature 
of summations. She lists observed features by placing them under four 
categories: Their choice of words; Apart from words; Hearer response and 
topics for argument. Under choice of words are listed: A. Structural slots in 
the summation - opening words, signals closing, closing words. B. Small 
genres of speech - apologies, compliments, descriptions, enumerations, 
insults: other lawyer; witnesses, jokes, politeness formulae, requestsý 
rhetorical questions, sarcastic comments, suggestions and urgings. C. 
Message forms - direct quotes, Latin used, memorised material and reads 
from written material. The section labelled 'Apart from words' makes a long 
lists of non verbal features of speech such as body motion used for emphasis, 
use of charts, photographs exhibits and maps, eye contact use of hands, etc. 
Hearer response includes a long list of adjectives used by the observer to 
describe tone of speaker such as angry, brusque, defensive, direct, dramatic, 
gentle, impassioned, informal, etc. The fourth category - Topics of argument 
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- includes a list and outlines four topics being - appeals to emotion, appeals 
to intellectual issues, legal definitions and refutational arguments including 
arguments which were made or might be made by opposing counsel. 
Goldberg's thesis table of contents lists the following topics: A description of 
the summation according to trial lawyers; Summations in the words of the 
senders; Learning and teaching of ways of speaking like a lawyer. The first 
two chapters listed here involve a large list of quotation from lawyers' 
descriptions of what they think they are doing in the summation. I have 
found the really interesting chapter to be that describing the learning and 
teaching of speech making. In this chapter she decries the paucity of formal 
training of lawyers in speech making in modem law schools. She points out 
that 'The summation is considered by many in the legal profession to be a 
critical part of almost everyjury trial, ' and that it is therefore 'surprising how 
little formal instruction is offered to those in law school who will soon come 
to the bar. Until the last ten years or so, no instruction was available and even 
today it is but optional' (ibid p. 9). in her survey of successful American 
lawyers in 1985, Goldberg reports that 71% of the lawyers said they learned 
to speak like a lawyer summing up by observing other lawyers and only 21% 
had learned it from books and 15% had learned public speaking from courses 
or debate in high school (ibidp. 101). Accordingly I have not found a fully 
outlined syllabus on the teaching of persuasive skill at The University of 
Botswana, which trains and educates lawyers in courtroom practice including 
the teaching of persuasive skills in the year 2000. However, a lecturer I 
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interviewed on how they prepare law students for the composing and 
delivering of opening and closing speeches in the courtroom responded thus: 
Interviewer: I want you to begin where in court practice you teach 
them the skills of speech making like opening and closing statements 
or submissions. 
Respondent: Its not a theoretical subject as such, it's a very practice 
oriented course and normally what we teach them in practising, 
normally they deal with magistrates which are the audience they 
normally talk or argue to the court not with the court as they say. Then 
there is the other side, the adversary in the case, so he is also interested 
in as part of the audience and the gallery at large, but the key person 
you'll be arguing to or speaking to is the court itself, it may be the 
judge or the magistrate. So what do we teach them? To summarise the 
to tell a story basically what you do in a court of law is to tell a story in 
accordance with your theory. That is the goal of your speech. You tell 
a very light story with nice continuity and all the like but make sure 
that you tel Ia convincing story to the judge a coherent story so that at 
the end of the day you can convince the judge because your duty as a 
litigator or advocate is to convince the court that your case or point of 
view is the correct one so you have to be as persuasive as possible. 
And most professors retain this view of law especially Professor... Sir 
David Napley emphasises that advocacy is just that, it is the art of 
persuasion and you have to learn persuasion, you have to sound 
convincing. 
The respondent then goes on to explain the relationships between all stages 
of the trial from the opening speeches, through examination to closing 
speeches. 
He continues: 
Respondent: After all the examination has been led now that is when 
the interesting part comes in that is where you have the closing 
arguments. Most people call it closing arguments but normally it is 
called summing up you sum up the whole case. Now why do you sum 
up? You sum up because there has been evidence-in-chief which was 
lead in by the party who starts, there has been cross-examination, 
questions have been asked which tried to impeach the examination-in- 
chief Now there is the whole evidence, a mixture of facts and 
everything and exhibits, pictures, diagrams and photographs. Now the 
closing argument now that is when you get to the meat of the art of 
advocacy. Now, after having all these raw materials in the form of 
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evidence, now the lawyer comes in to convince the court that his 
version of the events is the correct one and that's when you have to 
show the court that you can be very persuasive. You have to be very, 
very tactful, you know it's an art ... But normally you know about 
moves, to gesture, gesticulation, you have to convince, where to look 
and when to look there, how to do it. You must be able to shout if 
necessary. Sometimes you even have to know the personality of the 
judge and then appeal to his sentiments, to his heart, because they are 
human beings. Like Sir David Napley says that in most cases you have 
to be a very good student of psychology to understand howjudges 
work- If you understand how they work, you say what they want to 
hear together with the facts. You have to understand the mechanics of 
persuasion. 
6.4.1 Persuading the judge 
However, while so little teaching takes place in law schools regarding 
making speeches in court, trial manuals themselves offer a great deal of 
sound advice on the art of persuasion in the courtroom. Dobson and 
Fitzpatrick (1986 p. 18). advise the budding advocate that, 'When it comes to 
presentation of your case, one of the greatest virtues is a keen awareness of 
the way in which the judge's mind is working. For example never be afraid 
to abandon a point if it is proving a liability, or alternatively beef up the point 
if it appears to be more attractive to the judge than you had anticipated. ' 
(p. 18). Crowther advices his advocate to be 'selective in your argument. You 
do not have to throw in every point. Indeed be selective according to the 
idiosyncrasies of the judge. ' He tells a story of a Judge before whom he 
appeared in Surrey years ago. He was appearing for a tenant in a rent case. 
His landlords wanted the house in which he and his family were living and 
offered them a flat instead. The issue was whether this was 'suitable 
alternative accommodation. ' He says that 'the nature and frequency of the 
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judge's interruptions during my closing speech indicated clearly to me that I 
was losing. Suddenly, I remembered seeing a little snippet in the Evening 
Standard a few nights before of a dictum of this Judge, a great animal lover. 
"If there are no dogs in heaven, ' he had said, "I do not wish to go there. " 
turned to the defendant: "Have you got a dog? " I asked. "Yes, Why? " He 
exclaimed and looked at me as though I were completely mad. But I was 
back addressing the Judge. "And then Your Honour, there's the question of 
the dog. The dog would never be happy in this flat, with no garden, no 
trees... " The Judge's face brightened: Oh, there's a dog, is there? He smiled. 
"I didn't realise there was a dog. A dog is a member of an English family and 
as such is entitled to be considered. This flat would be quite unsuitable for 
the dog. I shall certainly not make an order"(Crowther 1984 p19). 
Thisjudgement is one that shows thatjudges are human and are liable to be 
persuaded by counsels' arguments even when they think themselves immune 
from the tactics and persuasive techniques of clever lawyers, as one 
magistrate in my study most emphatically disclaimed. She said that it is the 
content of the speech and the facts as adduced from the whole case and not 
the manner of presentation that convince her what ruling to make. However, 
as one of the respondents of my validation interviews pointed out, the art of 
persuasion is a feature of the whole proceedings from the opening speeches 
of counsel, through the fact finding of examinations to closing speeches of 
submissions. So thejudge is being subjected to the process of persuasion 
throughout the trial. The law lecturer responded to my suggestion that 
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throughout the trial there are lots of mini-arguments and persuasion tactics 
that: 
Respondent: Yah, numerous There's a lot, lots and lots of argument 
throughout the trial in between. Closing arguments now this is the 
importance of it, that it's the final, final argument that will take into 
account all the objections that you have made, all the argument, the 
nature of the witnesses how they behaved when they were in the 
witness box. Even when you make the your final argument you can tell 
the court that now please, if some witness's evidence was very 
dangerous to my case I'll say 'I'd urge your Lordship not to take 
account of the evidence given by so and so because that witness as you 
saw My Lord was in the witness box and was scared. He was not very 
free when he was giving evidence. He was stammering but normally he 
is not a person -who stammers and his story was very inconsistent and I 
would urge Your Lordship not to agree with him. Something like that. ' 
My interview question as to whether the intellectual nature and standing of 
judges including being highly educated and, possibly, cynical, does not 
preclude them being persuaded by mere technique on the part of counsel was 
answered in this manner: 
Respondent: Sometimes cases are borderline cases so if it is a 
borderline case it can go either way so you have to fightwith all that 
you have. Sometimes, you know, judges are human beings; you know 
what they like and what they don't like. 
The respondent Nvent on to suggest things that may affect the judge's 
judgement like experience in court of various counsel and even the age of 
counsel and their educational background may affect the way the judges 
view them and their presentations in court. He says that this human 
dimension of adjudication works. But he does point out that, 'First you have 
to be grounded on the facts. They have to be at your fingertips, then the law 
which can be applied to those facts. And also you have to be skilled in the art 
of oral advocacy. 'It is also part and parcel of the whole lawyering process. ' 
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Dobson and Fitzpatrick (1986 p. 21) do also point out that 'There's nothing 
that any book can say which compares with going through the experience 
yourself ' However there are points that can be made to help the advocate 
judge for himself or herself what a good argument is like. First they caution 
the student of law and courtroom practitioner that 'A hotchpotch of ideas will 
only leave the judge confused, not enlightened. ' On how to present their 
argument they say that, 'there is much to be said for a contemplative 
approach arguing from a confined number of principles properly explained to 
the judge in careful measured tones backed up by a small number of crucial 
authorities. A well-presented argument' they say, 'begins with a limited 
number of submission of principles upon which your case is based. Each 
submission is then examined and developed on the basis of legislatory, 
statutory interpretation of common law and policy considerations. Another 
point is that of order of presentation of the points in an argument. Here there 
are varying opinions, like those of Walker, Thibaut and Andreoli (Order of 
presentation at Trial, Yale Law Journal 19 72-73) and those of Dobson and 
Fitzpatrick (1986). Dobson and Fitzpatrick advise the advocate to, 'be careful 
to prepare you submission in a logical order. Some prefer a rigid order to 
their submission, but be careful to give your full weight to your strongest 
points. Dobson et al and Walker et al then differ on the order of presentation 
of points in the submission. Dobson et al suggest that 'If possible and 
without undue contortion of your argument, lead with your strongest point, 
or at least one of your strongest. ' The reason they give for this order is that, 
'there is no point in exasperating the judge by leading with a series of barely 
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tenable points for the sake of completeness. ' (p. 2 1) Walker et al on the other 
hand point out that 'there is no established internal order for adversary 
proceedings; such an ordering is left entirely to the participants. 
Nevertheless, they point out, 'most practitioners normally save their 
strongest most convincing evidence for the last. ' (p. 216) The reasons for this 
order being that 'it is the most dramatic way to present one's case and that 
the jury or fact-finder will remember the strongest evidence more vividly. ' 
The difference of opinion here may lie in the fact that Dobson et al. are giving 
advice to law students participating in moot courts. They say that Moots are 
organised on different principles from trials. And they give the reasons that 
'In a three day trial you must save your strongest for last but in a moot, the 
sands of time run quickly against you. ' (p. ) So, it seems that the order of 
presentation of points in the submission is entirely discretionary and depends 
on the length of the trial. Advocacy, the writers of trial manuals say, is an art 
that develops in with courtroom experience on the part of the advocate. So, I 
conclude this section on the art of persuasion with a quotation from Dobson 
et al (1986 p. 2 1). They caution the advocate that, 'No one can write a 
submission for you ... no researcher can take the place of a mooter when 
it 
comes to the crunch of deciding what to put in, what to leave out and how to 
express yourself Suffice it to say here that as your legal training progresses, 
the sophistication of your argument will increase. ' 
I shall in the next section of this chapter go into analysis of submissions texts 
collected in the courtroom of this research, focusing first on their linguistic 
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characteristics and, secondly, on their social purpose and their corresponding 
generic structure. 
6.4.2 Analysis of submissions 
The foregoing discussion has centred around the general conceptions of the 
language of submissions otherwise labelled summations of closing speeches 
in different local contexts. This section now proceeds to deal with the 
specific data of this courtroom. This data involves several texts of lawyers' 
submissions in the Botswana courtroom and is analysed in the backl7ound of 
the theories discussed in the preceding section for example the features of 
submissions discovered by other researchers and the models given in the 
court practice manuals cited. The analysis will focus on the language and the 
generic characteristics of submissions. 
6.4.2.1 Linguistic features of submissions 
Submissions, like examinations, are very interesting as they involve attempts 
by opposing sides to convince an audience, in Botswana's case, only the 
magistrate, that their side has the monopoly of truth. For this reason they use 
very strong language which is full of hyperbole or overstatement when 
counsel presents his own side's story and understatement when a negative 
observation is made by opposing counsel. 
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Defence counsel: My submission is that the mistake is not fatal. The court 
has the discretion to ignore such a little omission. 
Defence Counsel: Your Worship uhm the case my learned friend is referring 
to is one in which there was clearly an abuse of process. And it is noted in 
the judgement thereof that there was substantial departure in the fundamental 
character of the cause to trial. However Your Worship, there are vital 
elements of the offence in question which require an insight of cross- 
examination to ensure that the ends of justice are met in a free, fair and 
equitable manner. 
Defence Counsel: To what extent can we rely on his knowledge when he 
owns up to the court that certain features of the machine that was displayed 
he does not understand? ... Your Worship, the witness 
is not trained in the 
use of the machine. He was probably shown in three minutes that when you 
operate the machine this is -what you do. If that is the case, any layman is in a 
position to operate the machine. Can we then rely on his evidence when he 
comes to court? Certainly not! You're Worship we submit with respect, that 
it means two things. First that the extent of his knowledge of as far as the 
machine is concerned is dismally limited. 
Counsels own points are described as salient, while those of the opposition 
are full of discrepLancies. 
Counsel: Your Worship, I submit with respect, all these salient points would 
put in question the results. 
Counsel: However, Your Worship, we'd like to submit that the effect of the 
successful objection to the production of the certificate is to cast serious 
doubt on the results of the printout... 
Another characteristic of the language of submission is that of putting the 
magistrate at a very elevated position and using hyper-formal language in 
addressing him or her. 
Counsel: Your Worship, we submit with respect, that pursuant to the 
successful objection 
Counsel: Let me summarise, Your Worship, by making reference to the case 
of KI3 and the state. It being stated in the 1988 Botswana Law Report at page 
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102, judgement of the honourable judge, the late (inaudible). This statement 
is apposite to this case when he was dealing, Your Worship, with issues like 
traffic. 
Counsel: Your Worship, in the case before us at present, the accused is a 
layperson and is not aware of the technicalities pertaining to and arising from 
conducting his own defence, as such, he has sought legal counsel. It is 
pgrtinent to observe that... 
In their attempt to completely discredit the evidence or argument of the 
otber side they also make very striking use of derision and sarcasm in 
referring to the efforts of the opposing side to win the magistrate to his or her 
side. For instance, one counsel, in his efforts to deprecate opposing side's 
evidence submitted that Vith respect, Your Worship, The time would be 
vejy ridiculous. ' And, 'With the respect, Your Worship, this honourable 
court has not been favoured with an explanation of this discrepancy. ' Or 'I 
will not belabour this court with the first submission. ' Or 'The judgement 
that my learned friend is hea0y rel3ing on... ' Counsel refer to each other as 
'My learned friend' but all they do all the time is to disparage each other, for 
example, 'To use my learned friend's common terminology. ' This makes the 
reference to each other as 'learned friend' sound sarcastic. 
Another characteristic of counsels' language during submissions is that of 
use of colloquialisms. The interesting aspect of this characteristic is its 
contrast to the hyper-formal mode of addressing arguments to the magistrate. 
One counsel prayed that the other's affidavit be 'Thrown out through the 
open window. ' And the other lawyer apparently smarting from this scathing 
attack, later referred to this statement as the other counsel's 'self-shooting' as 
he himself prayed that both of their affidavits be admitted. He said, 
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derisively, 'my learned friend has said my affidavit be thrown out of a 
window. I pray that his own also thrown out. ' Other colloquialisms are 
statements like, 'Any attorney worth his salt, ' '... be taken with a pinch of 
salt' and 'the long and the short of it. ' The colloquialisms are probably 
triggered by the strong fighting stances that counsel take toward each other. 
So we see here that some characteristics of the language of submissions are 
those of hyperbole and understatement, hyper-formality when addressing the 
magistrate, sarcasm and derisions of each others' attempts to convince the 
magistrate of the strengths of their cases and the colloquialisms that arise out 
of their 'fighting' attitudes to each other. 
A final and characteristic element of counsel's final speeches or submissions 
is that of the routinised language or linguistic manners of counsel. It 
comprises in the frequently repeated modes of address like 'Your Worship, ' 
repeated at intervals in the speech, 'My learned friend, ' 'This honourable 
court' and the often repeated 'I submit with respect... ' This can onlY be 
explained as courtroom culture, a way of behaving and relating to each other 
in court. These characteristics are represented in the literature such as the list 
of characteristics given by Goldberg (1985) including descriptions, and 
sarcastic comments. 
6.4.2.2 Submissions as a genre of discourse 
118 
The linguistic features (mainly diction) of the submissions texts have been 
discussed. We turn now to a discussion of the generic, textual structuring of 
the texts, that is, the level of structure beyond the individual sentence 
structure. The submissions texts are seen as the unfolding of purposive stages 
each stage of the text serving a particular social purpose. These purposed and 
the textual structure they give rise to will be discussed in the next few 
sections of this chapter. 
6.4.2.2.1 Social purpose and textual structure 
Firstly, how is social purpose related to textual structure? Hence the subtitle 
social purpose and textual structure? This subtitle reflects a particular 
approach to linguistic analysis, that of genre analysis. As indicated in the 
statement of the methodology of data analysis of this research effort, genre 
analysis is one of the analytical perspectives adopted for this research effort 
(Specifically, it is Martin's (1992) approach that Kress (1993) describes as an 
approach which seeks to describe, 'the whole complex of factors which need 
to be described and understood about a text. ' Kress (1993) says that the 
approach focuses most on the purposes of the participants who produce a 
text. 
6.4.2.2 Textual structure 
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The texts of submissions to be largely purposive summaries of the stories 
developed in examinations evidence. In going through the data by colour 
coding the parts of the texts, the potential structure of submissions emerges. 
Most beginnings included a statement of belief about the effectiveness of 
either side in proving or disproving the guilt of the defendant during the 
examination, most often at the beginning of the text. 
Prosecutor: Your Worship, I wish to submit that the state has proved its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
Prosecutor: We submit that the accused has a case to answer. 
Prosecutor: On the basis of the above submissions, I submit that the state 
has proved it case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
Defence Counsel: We wish to make a submission that the accused person 
has no case to answer on all eight counts charged. 
Defence Counsel: We humbly submit that the prosecution has not 
discharged its onus of proving the accused guilty on all eight charges. 
After these beginnings there follow in both sides' submissions, reasons for 
the prosecution or defence claims. 
Prosecutor: The evidence led by the state connects her to the animals, 
which are the subject of these proceedings. 
Defence: The basis of our submission is that there is no evidence connecting 
the subject matter of the charges to the accused person. The goats which 
were identified by the court by their alleged owners have not been shown to 
have been recovered from the accused person. 
Points of information for the court follow these claims and their reasons: 
Prosecutor: The accused is facing eight counts of stealing stock. The state 
called twenty-two witnesses. The defence on the other hand called two 
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witnesses. The evidence of the accused and her mother is a complete denial 
of the charges. 
Defence Counsel: Your worship eh the state in this matter has filed a charge 
of driving a motor vehicle whilst unf it against the accused person. 
Then the main body of the argument is initiated. This involves recounting the 
events of the trial itself by reference to evidence elicited during examinations 
and how it should be used as a basis for favourable judgement for each side, 
i. e. reviewing the evidence. 
Prosecutor: Rosie Van Nierkerk told the court that she purchased five sheep 
and three goats from the accused and these same goats and sheep were later 
identified by Prosecution witness number I and Mmanjo Ditodi as theirs. 
Defense counsel: The evidence of Blackie is that on 07-02-99, when he got 
to the farm he Nvas asked to slaughter and skin some goats and sheep. He 
stated that Mrs Van Nierkerk told him that she had bought the animals from 
the accused. Mrs Van Nierk-erk told the court that when she came back from 
church in Selibe Phikwe, Blackie told her that the police had collected the 
animals saying they were stolen. It cannot therefore be said that such animals 
were the same animals that she had bought from the accused. 
The defense counsel reasoning in this last excerpt is rather contorted but the 
point is made in this thesis that there is in submissions painstaking review of 
the evidence on which the arguments rest. The following Table highlights the 
structure of the submission genre. 





REMIND THE COURT 
OF THE CASE BEING 
ARGUED FOR OR 
AGAINST 
Your Worship, I wish to 
submit that the state has 
proved its case beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
We wish to make the 
submission that the 
accused has no case to 
answer on all eight 
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charges. 
BASIS OF TO INTRODUCE LINE The evidence led by 
SUBMISSION OF ARGUMENT The State connects her 
(the accused) to the 
animals that are the 
subject of the 
proceedings. 
The basis of our 
submissions is that 
there is no evidence 
connecting the subject 
matter of the charges to 
the accused person. 
STATEMENT TO REMIND THE The accused is facing 
OF CHARGES COURT OF THE eight counts of stealing' 
CHARGES stock. 
Your Worship, The 
State in this matter has 
filed a charge of driving 
a motor vehicle whilst 
unfit against the 
accused mrson. 
ARGUMENT: REVIEWEVIDENCE ROSIE Van Nierkirk 
INVOLVING ELICITED DURING told the court that she 
THE EXAMINATIONS TO purchased five sheep 
PROSECUTOR ARGUE GUILT OR and three goats from the 
AND OTHERWISE OF accused person and 
DEFENSE DEFENDANT these same goats and 
STRATEGIES sheep were later 
identified by the 
prosecution witness 
number I and Marjo 
Ditodi as theirs. 
CLOSING: FINAL SUBMISSION: With that Your 
CONCLUSION REINFORCE EITHER Worship, we submit 
SIDE'S SUBMISSIONS that the evidence 
adduced was sufficient 
enough to render 
reasonable to convict 
the accused personas 
charged. 
Table 8 Stages of the submissions genre 
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This table displays the major characteristics of the submissions as persuasive 
attempts through narrative, which I outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
and as attested to by the literature on courtroom speeches. The first three 
stages - opening, basis of submission and statement of charges may be 
termed according to Labov (1972) the 'Abstact, ' summarising the whole 
story. The fourth stage, arguments of the prosecutors and defense counsel 
begin by introducing the first event of the either the prosecution or the 
defense story-of-the-trial. The rest of the events of either side's story follow 
through to the complicating action. The conclusion evaluates the stories, i. e. 
the 'point of the story is stated: 'With that Your Worship, we submit that the 
evidence adduced was sufficient enough to render reasonable to convict the 
accused person as charged. ' 
6.5 Judgements as a courtroom genre 
Judges and judicial decision making is an area of research which has not 
received much attention from researchers either of the psychological 
experimental approach like those of the Perspectives in Law and Psychology 
series edited by Bruce Dennis Sales in the early eighties, or the discourse 
analytic approach. However, three important contributions to the topic of 
judges and their roles and decisions, do indeed lay the framework for work in 
this area. These are the studies of Sales et al (1981) in the psychology 
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perspective and Maley (1994) in the discourse analysis perspectives and 
Bennet and Fieldman's (1981) in the narrative perspective. 
Sales, Elwork and Siggs (198 1) in their book entitled the Trial Process do 
point out that '... although the judge is equally if not more important than the 
jury in the trial process, relatively little experimental attention has been paid 
to his or her work. ' (p. 34) They then go on to outline the studies that had 
then been made. These include those studies that had 'focussed on the 
judge's role during fonnal adjudicative proceedings' (p. 34). The one by 
Ryan et al 'points out that in addition to this stereotypic role, the state trial 
court judge must also engage in administration, affiliation, community 
relations, legal research and negotiations, ' and they say that, 'To have a full 
understanding ofjudges and judging we must engage in research which takes 
into account all of these different roles' (p. 34). The most studied of the 
activities of thejudge is the jury instruction, which has been criticised for its 
complexity and inscrutability when it is considered that jurors are themselves 
ordinary users of language. We have discussed the genre judgement from a 
narrative perspective in 6.2.1 and have seen how the assessments of the trial 
stories and the characters of the magistrates doing the assessing characterise 
judgements. Although objectivity ofjudgement is intuitively the most 
important element in our sense of what is just and unjust, and underlies the 
fact that the judge must himself or herself argue for his or her 
own decisions, human factors do also intervene in judgements. We noted in 
the submissions section howjudges can be manipulated by very skilled 
advocates' arguments. This is not to say however that all judgement is 
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idiosyncratic, as indeed judgements are reasoned and argued by the judges 
themselves who have to convince the audience he knows he has in court, 
especially the parties to court, as well as the court itself of the reasonableness 
of their judgements. The demands ofjustice require this reasoning. Which 
point brings us now, in the discussion ofjudgements as a genre, i. e. to the 
particular characteristics ofjudgements. 
6.5.1 The generic structure of judgements 
The present study is interested injudgements as a genre but in the non-jury 
context andwill attempt to use the data, which comprises transcripts of 
judgements, to elucidate the structure and functions ofjudgements in the 
trial. 
The first and important point to note is that 'Judges give their decisions and 
orders verbally in court to the litigants involved' (Maley 1994 p. 42). 
However, 
'In delivering judgements, appellate judges have in mind a wider 
audience than the individual litigant in the case which is before them' 
(Kittol. 975 cited in Maley 1994 p. 44), ratherjudges are thinking of the 
scrutiny of their peers both present and future' and 'if the judgement 
contains an important principle of law, then they may well be speaking 
to posterity. Even if they lack a taste for immortality, judges are well 
aware that theirjudgements can be confirmed or overturned in later 
cases, so there is a strong incentive to be careful and explicit, '(Maley 
1994 p. 44). 
This is whyjudgements are stringently argued. Bhatia (1993) discusses the 
importance of reasoning in judgements stating that they are material for legal 
cases, which are the fonnalised written 'abridged versions of court 
125 
judgements to be used by legal specialists whether they are law students or 
practicing lawyers. ' He states that legal cases are essentially tools used in the 
law classroom to train students in the skills of legal reasoning, argumentation 
and decision-making. This points to the necessity for careful statement and 
arguments in the judgement as they are meant to serve as precedents for 
subsequent cases. This point is made succinctly by Maley (1994 p. 44) who 
states that 'judicial decisions are an important source of law in common law 
countries, since the reasons for the decisions provide a precedent which can 
be applied to the facts of later cases. ' So judges have to reveal the reasoning 
processes by which they came to their decisions. Gerwitz (1996) points out 
that the judicial opinion 'not only states what the court believes are the true 
facts of the case, but also sets forth an explanation and justification for the 
legal conclusion reached. ' 
As far as rhetorical structure is concerned, Maley (1994) points out that 
individual styles vary considerably in judgements but that because of 'the 
social gravity of the occasion or speech event, a consistently lofty and formal 
tenor is typical' and that 'in English high courts formal modes of address like 
judges referring to their colleagues as 'my noble and learned friend' prevail. 
These descriptions hold equally well for the judgements made by magistrates 
All judgements share a set of structural elements and therefore can be said to 
have a 'generic structure potential' (Maley 1994 p. 44) also see Harris (1988) 
for a discussion of the concept. Bhatia (1987 p. 230) explains this GSP of 
judgements very clearly as he points out that, 'Almost all legal cases and 
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judgements available to date, and there are millions of them, consistently 
display a typical discourse organisation which is unique to this genre. ' An 
integration of Bhatia and Maley's models yield the following stages of the 
genre judgements 
I. Facts-an account of the events or relevant history of the case 
2. Reasoning by the judge which may include a discussion of earlier relevant 
cases having a bearing on the one being considered, and the rules of law, if 
any applicable to the case. 
3. The ratio decidendi of the case which is the principle of the law which is 
deducible from the case description and the arguments of the judge, normally 
laid doNNm by the judge for application to other cases of similar or 
overlapping case descriptions 
4. Ordering or the decision of thejudge (Bhatia 1987 p. 230 Bhatia 1993 
p. 136, Maley 1994 p. 44). 
6.5.2 Purposes and functions of each stage of the judicial decision genre 
Gerwitz (1996 p. 10) states that: 
Judicial opinion serves three main functions: first to give guidance to other 
judges, lawyers and the general public about what the law is; second, to 
discipline thejudge's deliberative process with a public account of his or her 
decision, thus deterring error and corruption; and third, to persuade the 
court's audience that the court did the right thing. 
The first stage of thejudgement - the 'facts' stage - involves the judge 
surnmarising all the events both of the trial and of the stories told in the trial 
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by both sides and highlighting evidence basic to the judgement. Such a 
summary of the trial involves narrative both of the present case and of the 
events outside the courtroom which gave rise to the litigation. The narrative 
theory of the trial as we have seen was originated by Bennet and Fieldman 
(1981) and has been validated by my lawyer respondent and also Maley 
(1994) who erroneously ascribes the theory to Jackson (1988a). In his 
narrative the judge gives a version 'not only of the events that have given rise 
to the legal proceedings in the first place but as well narrative of the 
proceedings of the trial just completed, that is, facts from the examinations 
and views of the counsel in their speeches. ' As indeed Jackson (1988) sees it, 
'there is involved in the notion of trial as story not only the story-in- the-trial 
but the story-of-the-trial' In re-telling these stories, 'the judge exercises his 
right to view the case in his own way. ' Maley (1994 p. 47). The function or 
purpose of the facts stage is therefore to summarise the case and inform the 
courts which versions of the stories are, to him, believable on what basis. For 
example he will show the completeness of the stories, the contradictions in 
them and so on. 
The rest of the stages, finding the rule supposedly contravened by the 
accused, reasoning and concluding, function to further infonn the court on 
the decision made by the magistrate to either find the accused guilty or not 
guilty by showing the reasoning behind his finding. In this way, the judges 
ruling or order is given authority by the justification in the body of the 
judgement. Then the judge refers to the penal code for stipulated sentencing. 
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6.6 Analysis of Judgements 
This part of the discussion ofjudgements in the court of law analyses the 
texts ofjudges', speeches against the backdrop of the theories advanced by 
the various researchers on courtroom processes, notably Bennet and 
Fieldman (1981) Maley (1994) and Jackson (1988). The narrative theory 
holds well when matched with the actual judgement texts of this study. A 
typical beginning of the text is the introduction of the story-in-the-trial. That 
is the stories constructed through examinations of various witnesses. The 
magistrate actually tells the court the story as he has picked it up from the 
trial proceedings. 
Excerptl 
Magistrate: The accused person is said to have on the 22d of April 1999, 
along the road fro Francistown, at Mmamashia, been involved in a road 
accident. The alcohol in his blood measured 3.1 mg per litre of breath. And 
on a second count the accused on the 2d of April this year at 11.30 am. 
Came driving a Toyota Corolla registered B... failed to stop at roadblock at 
Mmamashia. Among the officers manning the roadblock was X. He was the 
one talking to the accused to ask him for a road licence, sensed a strong smell 
of alcohol in his breath. He told the accused of his suspicion that he may 
have been driving whilst unfit due to consumption of alcohol. (Tape no. 7 
Case no. 22 15-08-99) 
Thus the magistrate pieces together the fragments of the narratives of the trial 
and presents it in one well structured account. 
Excerpt 2 
Magistrate: The witness said in his evidence that the (inaudible) and he 
flicked his lights signalling it to stop. However the vehicle did not stop. 
Sergeant PW 2 and Sergeant said they chased and caught up with the 
offending vehicle at another set of traffic lights PW 2ordered the driver of 
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the vehicle to go back to where the two officers first saw him, at which place 
the driver cautioned and then charged by PW 3 Sub-inspector X. (Tape no. 
161999) 
Through this type of storytelling the facts of the case stage of the judgement 
genre is achieved and the story-in-the-trial gives way to another story-type, 
that is, the story-of-the trial in which the magistrate now highlights the 
evidence and the way it was given by different characters in the story. The 
story-of the -trial allows the magistrate to give his opinion and argument on 
the credibility of the stories-in-the trial, assessing the completeness and 
consistency of the events as narrated by different witnesses. At this stage also 
the magistrate must respond to the submissions made by counsel in their 
closing speeches and in the various objections sustained through out the 
course of the trial. The following excerpts demonstrate the use of narrative 
for argumentation by the magistrates. 
Excerpt 3 
1. Magistrate: At the close of the case after his rights and options were 
clearly and carefully explained to the accused person they elected to have it 
closed and called no other witnesses. (2). With regard to count one the 
accused person said that when he entered Lobatse road the lights were green 
(3). With regard to count two the accused person said he did in fact see PWI 
but unfortunately there was no way he could stop as he was on a highway 
and it was no stopping zone. (4). Now of the three prosecution witnesses, 
PWI Sergeant X who testified the accused vehicle lights ... when 
he was 
asked how he was able to say that the accused drove against the lights he said 
he was on the line of vision of the traffic lights along Lobatse road and that 
those lights were green and that he took it that those regulating the traffic 
must have been red, in other words he deduced from the colour of the lights 
along Old Lobatse Road that the colour of the lamps regulating the... must 
be red. ( 5). However I must say that the traffic authorities in Botswana and 
other jurisdictions that one is not (inaudible) He says that, and I quote, if the 
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(inaudible) in which the accused did not intend to stop at a traffic light the 
cop is not entitled to assume that when the colour of the lights of the robot 
facing one direction is green, the light indication of the robot at right angle to 
the to the former is red. (6). For authority of this point in this jurisdiction one 
would be advised to look at the case of X. of the Botswana Law Report 1988 
at page a hundred and two. (7) It is therefore clear that the prosecution 
cannot (inaudible) (Tape no. 16 1999). 
The magistrate then goes into the story-of-the trial of the second count. And 
makes a ruling for the counts: 
Excerpt 4 
In conclusion and out of the boundaries of both, I will say that the accused is 
found not guilty in regard to count one and is acquitted and discharged but is 
found guilty on count two and is convicted thereof. (Tape no. 16 1999) 
An Analysis of the above narrative soon reveals that evaluation of the stories 
told is the most significant part ofjudgement narratives. The story has its 
Abstract (Labov 1972) or Orientation (flarris200 I), surnmarising or giving 
the circumstance surrounding the narrative account, thus the magistrate 
begins his story as quoted above with the words: 
At the close of the case, after his right and options were clearly and carefully 
explained to the accused person they elected to have it closed and called no 
other witnesses. 
He then goes into the core narrative which represents the story of the trial as 
it unfolded with its various characters, being witnesses. When in clause(5) 
the magistrate begins his clause with 'However' he is introducing the 
'Evaluation' part of the narrative commenting on various aspects of the story 
such as the characters' interpretations of the events they were involved in. He 
uses this evaluation to argue that the event (here that of passing when the 
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traffic light was supposedly red), was not wronglful as the witness cannot be 
sure that the light Nvas in fact red. The magistrate then tells the 'Point' (Harris 
2001). The point of the story is to make a judgement of the case which in this 
trial is finding the defendant not guilty in regard to count one and guilty on 
count two. 
Tle functions of the story-in-the-trial and the story-of-the-trial are then to 
infonn and remind the audience for the first, and both to infonn and to argue 
his points and convince the audience of the reasonableness of his judgements 
for the second. 
The otherjudgement text proceeds on basically the same line of telling the 
story and reasoning it out with the audience. But it also contains another 
point worthy of discussion, that is, the idea of persuasion occurring at many 
points in the trial and building up the points won and banking them for both 
the submissions stage and the judgement stage. The following text contains 
this element of the trial being made up of little separate arguments and points 
of persuasion won and lost by both sides of the case. 
Excerpt 5 
Magistrate: The certificate of calibration was rejected by this court on the 
basis that it was hearsay. However, in the case of X (quotes precedent) I do 
not see how it cannot be hearsay. On the other hand I do not believe the 
statement by defense counsel that the machine (inaudible) to be hearsay. I 
believe that the witness had firsthand information and can testify. The same 
applies, I believe to the question of whether the machine could have been 
working well ... anybody who has some knowledge accumulated over a 
period of weeks of using the machine can tell whether it is in working order. 
The officer therefore acquired the expertise ... Therefore there is an element of doubt as to whether there was... the second test is a reliable one. I 
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therefore find that the state has failed to state the case beyond reasonable 
doubt. Therefore the accused is acquitted and discharged. 
Thisjudgement uses as a basis for its argument, various points made in other 
stages of the trial, for example the reference to a successful submission 
during examination-in-chief made by defense counsel against production of 
the certificate of calibration by prosecution. Defense counsel argued that the 
certificate Nvas not first hand information, that is, it was hearsay. In his 
argument, the magistrate upholds the defense counsel's submission. But he 
rejects another submission made by the same counsel for the defense about 
the witness's competence in operating the alcometer. In the first point of 
argument the magistrate uses a precedent case to support his argument. In the 
second and third points where he rejects defense counsel's submission he 
appeals to commonsense logic. 
The fact that a trial contains a number of series of arguments and attempts at 
persuasion of the audience, primarily the magistrate in this study, is very 
clearly attested to by teachers of trial tactics themselves. The University of 
Botswana lecturer I interviewed on the place of persuasion in the trial had 
this to say: 
Excerpt 6 
Respondent: Yah, in fact a case can have numerous rulings. Like for 
example, there are small rules relating to how to ask a question. Like if I call 
you as my witness you can" ehhm, I can't tell you an answer if I am your 
lawyer. When I ask a question and I say, 'Did you go to MogoditshaneT I 
have to ask you 'Where did you goT So immediately when you say, 'Did 
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you go to MogoditshaneT I stand up as a lawyer for the other side before the 
answer comes in and say 'Objection! ' The court will ask me 'Why are you 
objecting? ' I persuade him that no, 'I'm objecting because this is a leading 
question. It is going to tell the witness the answer and the lawyer is now 
giving evidence himselfl' That is also an argument. So if I win that argument 
he'll make the ruling that 'Objection sustained! ' There's lots and lots of 
arguments throughout the trial in between. (Validation Interview 200 1) 
This serves to re-emphasise the centrality of the art of persuasion in the trial 
at all its substantive stages - the examinations stage and the closing 
arguments and judgements stages. 
6.6.1 The language of the judgement 
I have, previously discussed the generic structure of thejudgement as a 
courtroom genre. I wish here then to examine the language of the judgement 
rather than its textual structure. The judgement, as we] I as being a genre, is 
also a register. It can be described in terms of field, tenor and mode. We 
know by now that the field of the judgement as a text is the legal processes of 
adjudication and conflict resolution in a formal setting. The field contributes 
to the courtroom language the particular characteristics of legal language. As 
far as tenor is concerned, Maley (1994 p. 44), points out that, individual 
styles vary considerably in judgements, but that, 'because of the social 
gravity of the occasion or speech event, a consistently lofty and formal tenor 
is typical. ' The mode of the judgement is initially, a text written to be 
presented orally and is usually delivered in the first person mode. The basic 
grammar of the judgement is the past tense wherein the judge tells the stories 
both of the trial and the events of the charge against the defendant. It is also 
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reported speech and includes quotations of previous judges arguments and 
rulings. 
Another very discursively'prominent feature ofjudge's language is in the 
move toward sentencing. Here the interactants are the judge and the 
defendant. It is an exchange initiated and concluded by the judge. This is 
found mostly in cases of short duration and comes after the reading of facts 
when the judges asks the defendant whether he or she has understood what 
has been said concerning him before pronouncing the judgement. 
Excerpt 7. 
Magistrate: Have you understood what has been said? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Magistrate: Is it correct that you were given up to the fourth of this month to 
remain in the country? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Magistrate: And is it correct that you nevertheless decided to stay in the 
country until the 27th when you were arrested? 
Defendant: Yes Your Worship. 
Magistrate: All right. You will be convicted on the charge according to your 
plea. Now, his record? 
Prosecutor: No previous record Your Worship. 
Magistrate: Before the court sentences you, do you have anything to say? 
Defendant: I didn't know that if I remain in the country I would be charged. 
Magistrate: The maximum penalty for the offence of over-staying in 
Botswana is Ten Pula for each day you over-stay. So you will pay Five Pula 
for each day over-stayed and my calculation is Forty Pula fine to pay today 
or a month in prison. (Tape no. 15 1999) 
This exchange is typical of short cases. It also exemplifies a point often made 
in studies of power, that is, the judicial discretion. This judge on this day 
fined several offenders against the immigration laws of Botswana and 
consistently fined them less than the maximum charge, showing basically the 
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clemency of thejudge when handling case whose duration is short and 
therefore discoursally uncomplicated. The discourse is intriguingly simple 
made of question and answer routines that do not involve the power stances 
often criticised as coercive and degrading in the literature of courtroom 
questioning. The question 'Is it trueT although it requires a Yes or No 
answer does not have the tinges of aggression which similar questions by 
opposing counsel often displays. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The literature on speeches in the courtroom generally separates the 
discussion of counsel opening and closing speeches from judgements. 
Opening and closing speeches have received some attention as in Goldberg 
(1985) and judgement genres have been treated to discussion by Maley 
(1994). The narrative theory of the trial has received a great deal of attention 
from both sociologists and sernioticians (Bennett and Fieldman and Jackson) 
as well as from lawyers themselves as in Brooks and Gerwitz (1996) This 
study has been greatly enhanced by Brooks and Gerwitz establishing the link 
between narrative and rhetoric, the art of persuasion, in the law. The putting 
together of the discussion of all courtroom speeches and narrative in an 
attempt to explicate how they are related to the art of persuasion was an 
initial intuition on my part but has found good support in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUBSTANTIVE PROCESSES 2: The dialogues of 
Examinations. 
We pointed out at the beginning of the discussion of the substantive 
courtroom processes that they are distinguishable into monologues and 
dialogues and that the dialogues would be analysed by a different model 
from the narrative and genre analysis models used on the other processes. 
This is the model of discourse analysis first developed in what is now called 
the Birmingham model. This model is chosen for its productivity in revealing 
issues of social significance with which this thesis is concerned. These are in 
particular the tenor of examinations viz. the social relationships obtaining 
between legal professional members and the layman defendants and 
witnesses. The two types of exchange structures observed in direct and cross- 
examinations are the tools by which these issues are revealed. I shall 
therefore proceed to analyse the examinations with reference to the model 
chosen. 
7.1 The model 
The analytical model adopted for analysis of the examinations genre of this 
study is Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975) model of discourse analysis. 
Malcolm Coulthard and John Sinclair first developed what was to become 
the Birmingham school of discourse analysis in 1975. They say that they 
decided to use rank scale for their descriptive model because of its flexibility 
and that 'the major advantage of describing new data using a rank scale is 
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that no rank has any more importance than any other and thus if, as we did, 
one discovers new patterns, it is a fairly simple process to create a new rank, 
to handle it' (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 20). They wam us here, though, of 
'the ever present temptation of creating new ranks to cope with every little 
problem. 'This advantage has been utilised by researchers subsequent to 
Sinclair and Coulthard. For example Harris (1980) added a new rank to the 
scale, which she called 'sequence, ' and Berry (in Coulthard and Montgomery 
1981: 124) concurs that 'we need an approach which will allow us to account 
for newly observed patterns of organisation in discourse alongside those 
which have already been accounted for. ' 
What is this rank scale and how does it operate? 'The assumption of a rank 
scale is that a unit of a given rank, for example a word, is made up of one or 
more units of the rank before it, the morpheme and combines with one or 
more units at the same rank to make a unit at the rank above, group. (Sinclair 
and Coulthard 1975 p. 20 cite Halliday 1961 Categories ofthe theory of 
Grammar for the concept of rank scale) Discourse is seen to be made up of a 
hierarchy of elements the highest of which is the Transaction and the lowest 
the Act. In between these elements are, starting from the bottom, the Move 
and the Exchange. The relationships of this hierarchy of elements is 
illustrated in the following diagram: 






7.1.1 The Transaction 
According to Sinclair and Coulthard (1975 p. 25) The Transaction as a level 
of discourse is made up of three elements being the Preliminary move (P), 
the medial moves (M) and the terminal move, (T). The structure of the 
transaction is PM (M2 ... M2) (T) where everything 
in brackets is optional 
(Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 25). 1 find Sinclair and Coulthard's description 
of this model of discourse a little problematic in that terms like exchange and 
move are sometimes used interchangeably, for example, after clearly 
describing the ranks from act, move, exchange and transaction we get a 
statement like, there must be a preliminary move in each transaction and a 
medial move and terminal move and immediately after this assertion Sinclair 
and Coulthard, state that. 'The preliminary and terminal exchange, it is 
claimed, are selected from a class of moves called 'Boundary'moves. Use of 
terms in this way causes considerable problems for someone trying to 
distinguish between the ranks for analysing a particular discourse. However, 
several researchers, including Harris (1980), Coulthard. and Montgomery 
(1981) Deidre Burton (1981) and Robert Mead (1985), have applied this 
model to various discourses (courtroom discourse by Harris and Mead, 
spoken discourse by Burton, doctor/patient, committee meetings and 
broadcast discussions by Coulthard and Montgomery) without being held 
back by this apparent contradiction in terms and variously developed the 
model to account for the characteristics of their particular types of discourse 
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and their data. I shall not venture into discussion of all the modifications of 
the Sinclair/Coulthard model such as Berry (198 1)'s information exchange 
model involving the flow of information from primary to secondary knower, 
otherwise termed the KI model set out in Coulthard. and Montgomery (19 8 1) 
and several more recent models which have added a sophistication (mainly 
in terms of delicacy) to the original model for application to various contexts. 
This is basically for the reason that courtroom discourse, especially in the 
examinations genre, is much less complex and can be adequately described 
with little modification to the original models such as the addition of the rank 
of sequence (Harris 1980) and the redefinition of the follow-up move 
Coulthard. and Montgomery (1981). 
The usefulness of the construct, 'transaction' in describing courtroom 
discourse has been shown by Harris (1980) in her observation of one 
particular type of court, the Arears and Maintenance Court. She outlines the 
transactions to be found in the discourse as the Preliminary Transaction, the 
Infonnation gathering Transaction, the Ordering Transaction and the Closing 
Transaction. (p. 63). In the courtroom of this study, which is a criminal court, 
there are seven Transactions. These are (1) the Mentions Transaction, which 
is concerned with making preparations for the trial like setting dates of trial; 
(2) the The Reading of Charge Sheet Transaction, in which the charge sheet 
is read to the defendant; (3) the Direct Examinations Transactions; (4) the 
Cross-Examinations Transactions; (5) the Submissions Transactions; (6) the 
Reading of Facts Transaction and (7) the Judgement or Ruling Transaction. 
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These transactions have been discussed in Chapter 4 describing the 
courtroom processes. 
The Direct Examination Transactions which, along with Cross Examinations, 
are the sub . ect of this chapter, begin with the preliminary exchange which is 9 
realised by the swearing in of the witness beginning with the question put to 
the witness by the court clerk, 'Do you believe in God? ' Whereupon if the 
witness answers 'Yes' he/she is directed by the court clerk to put his/her left 
hand on the bible and lift up his/her right hand with his/her palm facing 
outward and say the words after the clerk, 'I so and so, do hereby swear that I 
will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing else but the truth so help me 
GoV 
The Initiations and Responses (concept to be discussed later in this chapter at 
the section discussing exchange structure) of this Preliminary exchange give 
way to a series of medial exchanges aimed at eliciting information regarding 
the series of events leading to the charge being levelled at the accused 
person. For the purpose of dividing the discourse into acts, moves and 
exchanges, I will proceed now to define these levels of discourse structure 




The act is the bottommost level of discourse structure. Their definition is not 
quite clear from Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) as they go directly from 
mentioning them to listing them. They recognize, in teacher pupil interaction, 
twenty-two acts, which space does not allow to be listed here, but I shall 
mention only those which appear in courtroom discourse without any 
particular order. These are markers, which Sinclair and Coulthard. suggest are 
realised by a close system of items like 'well, ' 'ok' 'now, ' 'good, ' 'right, ' 
and 'alrighL' The type of marker used by prosecutors examining witnesses in 
the present data are in fact realised by 'Yes, " made at the head of each of the 
prosecutor's eliciting moves. 
Excerpt 1. Tape no. 8 Case no. 23 15-08-99. 
Prosecutor Do you know the accused? 
Interpreter: Gatwe ao itse mosekisiwa. 
Witness: Erra kea mo itse. 
(Yes, sir, I know him. ) 
Prosecutor Yes, can you tell this honourable court how you came to know 
the accused? 
Excerpt 2 Tape no. 8 case no. 23 15-08-99. 
Prosecutor Where did you say the accident happened? 
Witness: Gone mo Broadhurst ha, o hapaanya strata se se tswelang ko... 
(Here in Broadhurst when you come to cross the street which goes out to... 
Prosecutor: Could you tell this court what happened? 
Witness: Nna erile hela, ke ke tsamay mo strighting hela ha ke labile go ema 
ke, bone koloi engwe e tshweu e tswa ko pele game mme e ebe e tswa 
motong ga, tsela. Ha e tswhantse ke go hapaana le yone mo lebogong laaka 
(Me while I was driving along the streetjust about to stop I saw a white car 
coming from the opposite direction and then it got out of the When I was just 
about to cross keeping to my side of the road... 
Prosecutor: Yes to which direction was this motor vehicle which collided 
with you? 
Witness: E ne e tswa ko ... (inaudible) (It was coming from... (inaudible) 
Prosecutor Yes Can you describe the particulars of the motor 
vehicle ... (inaudible) Witness: (inaudible) 
Prosecutor Did you get the chance to see the registration number? 
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Witness: Ga ke ise ke nne le chance ya go leba registration numbers ka, ke ne 
ke shokegile. 
(I did not get the chance to look at the registration numbers because I was 
shocked. ) 
Prosecutor Yes were you alone? 
It may be argued that the 'yes' prefacing each question is a feed back or 
follow up move (F), but it is generally the case that in the IRF structure of 
exchange, the Feed back relates to what has been said in the previous 
response e. g. 
1. Can you think of anything that would be put on. Would theyjust bewritten 
or painted on the sand? 
R- They might be on the rocks. 
F. Yes they were mainly carved on rocks. 
(Sinclair and Coulthard 1975 p. 71) 
We can see in this example that 'Yes' is a feedback move indicating that 
what was said in the Response by the pupil was a correct answer. The 
prosecutors 'Yes' in the excerpts just given above does not seem to link to 
the previous response in any noticeable way. I therefore consider it to be an 
Act, a mark-er of the beginning of each exchange. This is testable by 
reference to the intonation of the Feedback move in Sinclair and Coulthard, s 
example and the intonation in the 'Yes' of this data. The prosecutor's 'Yes' 
has a low tone while the teacher's will probably have a level tone. 
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Another act observed by Sinclair and Coulthard in teacher/pupil interaction is 
the elicitation (el) realised by questions functioning to request a linguistic 
response. This is the most prominent act in the moves of the examination 
transaction. The whole of the transaction of any length in the examination. 
transaction is a series of elicitation acts, from the beginning to end of the 
medial exchanges. 
The informative (i) act in the courtroom is found in several of the courtroom 
transaction, namely, submissions, readings of facts of the case before 
judgement and the judgement itselL But unlike the informative act in the 
teaching transaction, which Sinclair and Coulthard describe as 'realised by 
statements whose sole aim is to provide information and which only requires 
an acknowledgement of attention and understanding from the pupil (Sinclair 
and Coulthard 1975 p. 40), the courtroom informative act is much more j ust 
passing on information. It is a complex and multifunctional act, for example 
in rulings and submissions this act is used to also to persuade, by reasoning, 
either the magistrate, in the case of a submission or the defendant and his 
counsel in the case of a judgement. The acknowledging act comes into play 
when the defendants have to acknowledge their names and other particulars 
as they appear in the charge sheet and facts read at the penultimate 
transaction of criminal court. Defendants are sometimes required to reply to 
questions put to them by the magistrate like 'Do you understandT after the 
charges have been read to them, realised by 'yes' or 'no, ' or reply to the 
question 'do you plead guilty or not guilty? ' which, in Setswana the language 
of which most charge sheets are read to the defendant, is responded to by 'I 
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find myself guilty' (Ga ke ipone molato) or 'I do not find myself guilty. ' I 
quote the plea made in Setswana because it may sound like a stronger, self- 
incriminating in English whereas in Setswana it is just a way of showing 
humility before the law. 
These are the acts most characteristically found in the criminal court 
discourse that is the subject of this study. 
Acts Sinclair and Realisations in the Examples 
Coulthard present courtroom 
Realisation data 
Markers Realised by a S/C closed class Magistrate: All 
closed class of needs to be opened right, I'll take you 
items -'well, ' up to include a new in my confidence 
'OK, ' now, ' marker discovered and grant you bail 
'good, ' 'right' in this data and that for one thousand 
'alright. ' Their is, ' Yes. ' Pula. 
function is to mark Prosecutor: Yes. 
boundaries in To what direction 
discourse. was the motor 
vehicle which 
collided with you? 
Prosecutor: Yes 
can you describe 
the particulars of 
the motor vehicle? 
Elicitation Realised by In this data also by Prosecutor: Do you 
questions. Its commands. know the accused 
function is to person? 
request a linguistic Pros: Go on and 
response. tell us. 
Magistrate: Tell us 
the story. 
Directive Realised by Same as Sinclair Clerk: Stand up 
commands. Its and Coulthard accused. 
function is to Clerk: go to the 
request a non- witness stand. 
linguistic response. 
Informative Realised by Informative needs Counsel: Your 
statements. Its sole broader definition Worship ehm the 
function is to for courtroom case my leaned 
provide discourse to colleague the 
information. The include suasives prosecutor refers to 
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only response is an i. e. reasoning is one in which 
acknowledgement. whose aim is to there was clearly 
persuade. abuse of process... 
It is pertinent to 
note that... 
However, Your 
Worship there are 
vital elements... 
Reply Realised by Same but perhaps Magistrate: Do you 
statements and not nods in this understand what 
questions and non- highly verbal has been said? 
verbal surrogates context. Defendant: Yes. 
such as nods. Must Magistrate: Do you 
give a response that have anything to 
is appropriate to say accused? 
the elicitation. Accused: Ke gore 
ke ne ke batlile 
charge sheet yaaka. 
Mapodisi ba ganne 
ka yone. (Its just 
that I had asked for 
my charge sheet 
but the police 
refused with it. 
Table 9 Acts in courtroom discourse 
7.1.3 Moves 
The next level up from act in the discourse hierarchy is the level of moves, 
'which are made up of acts and occupy places in the structure of exchanges. ' 
Sinclair and Coulthard recognise five classes of move asframing and 
focusing, which realise BoundaTy exchanges; and opening answering and 
follow up moves. The function of an opening move is to cause others to 
participate in an exchange by for example 'passing on information, directing 
action or eliciting a fact, ' (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975 p. 45). Answering 
moves are 'predetermined' because their function is to be appropriate 
responses in the terms laid down by the opening moves. ' As prosecutors and 
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counsel have the onus of opening the examination and asking questions, they 
are placed in positions of power over witnesses in the process of information 
gathering. The fact of their access to opening moves gives them power to 
control topics in the discourse and the onus to ask questions goes further to 
reinforce this power as, in natural language, a question demands an answer 
and so by extension the prosecutor and counsel are given the right to demand 
answers to their questions. Counsel are made even more powerful as it is 
their 'right' to pose questions that impeach the evidence already adduced by 
prosecutors. This is the distribution of power in the courtroom, which is most 
negatively criticised by researchers of language in legal settings. The moves 
of the prosecutors in direct examinations, however show that this criticism 
may is unbalanced as it relates to only one type of questioning in the 
courtroom. The following table sets out the co-operative moves of the direct 
examination. 
Moves Acts Examples 
Initiation/Opening Elicitation Prosecutor: Do you know 
the accused person? 
Response/Answering Reply Defendant: Yes I know 
the accused person. 
Initiation /Opening Elicitation Prosecutor: Will you 
please tell this honourable 
court how you came to 
know the accused person? 
Response/Answering Reply I came to know the 
accused person I met him 
along Machel Road he 
was driving past the 
robots. On the 14th of 
November 1998 1 was on 
patrol in a police vehicle 
driven by Constable 
Tsholo. It happened that 
while we were along the 
road there was a Toyota 
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Corolla in front of us... 
Initiation Elicitation Prosecutor: At what time? 
Response/Answering Reply It was around 0 1.15 
Initiation Directive Hours 
Response Continuation Prosecutor: Go on. 
Witness: and when he 
came to the show ground 
his Toyota Corolla turned 
to the ri t etc. 
Table 10 Moves in the direct examination 
7.1.4 The exchange 
Michael Stubbs (1983 p. 104) defines the exchange as' the minimal 
interaction unit comprising at least an initiation (1) from one participant and a 
response (R) from another. ' He goes on to describe the structure of the 
exchange by positing that the 'simplest structure for an exchange is IR and 
the most obvious example of such exchange is the question and answer pair. ' 
He goes on to elaborate (p. 109) that exchange comprises an initiation where 
the possibilities are open- ended followed by utterances (moves), which are 
preclassifted and therefore restricted. If the possibilities are opened up again 
this marks a new exchange or at least a bound exchange. Or, alternatively the 
exchange can be regarded as an information unit the propositional frame of 
which is defined by the initiation. Any utterances which function to complete 
the proposition ... fonn. part of the same exchange, ' thus the 'syntactic' and 
'semantic' definitions of exchange. Stubbs also points out that 'It is possible 
for a proposition to be distributed across several turns, ' for example 
A: I am going to London 
B: When? 
A Tomorrow 
B: By train? 
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A: Yes. 
(p.! 1 0) 
These definitions and the exemplification are good guides to dividing up the 
direct examinations into their component exchanges and I will now proceed 
to do so. 
The Direct Examination transaction in the data from this courtroom is 
preponderantly made up of series of Initiations and Responses with no 
occurrence of the feedback or follows up moves at all. This is a particularly 
interesting structure and has been commented on by researchers who have 
made use of the Sinclair Coulthard model of analysis of discourse such as 
Margaret Berry and Deirdre Burton who refer to each other's work in 
Coulthard. and Montgomery (1981). Berry (1981 p. 123) observes that Burton 
(1978 p. 139) 'dispenses with feedback altogether on the grounds that it 
hardly ever occurs outside the classroom, ' and says that Burton is 'surely 
wrong about this, and that her own observations suggest that 'optional 
feedback occurs very frequently in non-classroom forms of discourse, ' and 
'obligatory feedback occurs more often than one might at first think, - not 
only in such obviously likely forms of discourse as radio and television quiz 
programmes but also in adult leisure conversation. ' She cites 'family 
crossword solving sessions; parties - informal dinner parties as well as more 
organised occasions often seem to include puzzle-solving sessions. ' Berry (in 
Coulthard. and Montgomery 1981 p. 123). Berry also notes the way 
Coulthard and Brazil (1979) handled this problematic move, which they 
'preferred (later) to call follow-up', and the way Stubbs (in Coulthard and 
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Montgomery 1981) attempts to 'distinguish between a structure with three 
obligatory elements and a structure with two obligatory elements. ' However 
Berry also points out that Stubbs provides no 'way of specifying the 
circumstances under which each would occur. ' This brings me to my point 
that there does definitely seem to be two types of exchange structure when 
we recognise that both Sinclair and Coulthard and Margaret Berry recognise 
the existence of the feedback move in their various data and Burton 
dispenses with it in her data. Mine is the data that does not include the 
feedback move at all as I shall presently demonstrate. The direct examination 
transaction of the criminal court trial is consistently made up of two moves; 
the Initiation and the Response bundled around a level of structure, which 
seems to be above the exchange rank level. The following excerpts from the 
data demonstrate these two points, the IR nature of the direct examination 
and the level of structure between the Exchange and the Transaction. 
The third move in exchange structure, i. e. the Feedback move need not be 
definitive of exchange. For instance, Stubbs (19 83) says of the Exchange that 
'. A will define an exchange as the minimal interactive unit, comprising at 
least an initiation (1) from one speaker and a response (R) from another. The 
simplest structure for an exchange is therefore IR' and 'The most obvious of 
example of such an exchange is probably the question and answer pair, with 
the structure QA. ' This definition is adequately demonstrated by the direct 
examinations data from this courtroom. The structure of the direct 
examination exchange then is IR and the whole examination transaction is 
made up Sequences of IR. The following excerpts exemplify this point. 
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Excerpt one. 
Tape Number three. Case number 18 
I. Prosecutor: Do you know the accused person? 
2. Witness: I know the accused person. 
3. Prosecutor: How do you know the accused person? 
4. Witness: (inaudible) 
Excerpt 2 (from the same source) 
I. Prosecutor: Do you know the accused person? 
2. Witness: Yes, I know the accused person. 
3. Prosecutor Will you please tell this honourable court how you came to 
know the accused person? 
4. Witness: I came to know the accused person I met him along Machel road 
he was driving past the robots. On the 14'h of November 1998 1 was on patrol 
in a police vehicle, which was driven by Constable Tsholo. It happened that 
while we along the road there was a Toyota Corolla in front of us 
5. Prosecutor: At what time? 
6. Witness: It was around 0 1.15 hours. 
7. Prosecutor: Go On. 
Excerpt 3 
Tape Number 9 Case Number 23 
I. Prosecutor Do you know the accused person? 
2. Witness: I know the accused person. 
3. Prosecutor- Yes can you tell this honourable court how you came to know 
the accused person? 
4. Witness: I came to know the accused person on the 15th of March at about 
9.15 prn when he was involved in a car accident. 
5. Prosecutor: Where was this accident. 
6. Witness: The accident was along Segoditshane Way near the traffic circle. 
7. Prosecutor: Yes can you tell this court the number of vehicles involved in 
the accident? 
8. Witness: Yes there were two vehicles. 
9. Prosecutor: Can you tell the court how the accident happened? 
10. Witness: According to the statements I took, the driver of B786ACI was 
driving south and the accused was driving north. The lady says the accused 
got out of his lane and knocked his car. 
I. Prosecutor: Did you find both drivers at the scene of the accident? 
2. Witness: Yes I found both drivers at the scene of the accident. 
3. Prosecutor: And what happened? 
4. Witness: On arrival at the scene ... (Continues with the response) Excerpt 4 
Tape Number 9 Case Number 24 
I. Prosecutor Do you know the accused person? 
2. Witness: Yes. 
3. Prosecutor: Tell this court how you came to know the accused person. 
4. Witness: I came to know the accused person in June 1999 when we were 
on patrol on Nelson Mandela Road. 
5. Prosecutor: What time was it? 
6Witness: It was around 11.50 pm. 
I Prosecutor: Yes what attracted you to the accused's vehicle? 
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2. Witness: We were proceeding in the same direction his vehicle was going 
in a zigzag manner ... (witness proceeds with a narrative and 
description of 
the events that lead to the charges being levelled at the accused person. ) 
Excerpt5 
Supplementary data tape Number 2 Case Number 3. 
l. Prosecutor: Yes Do you know the accused person? 
2. Witness: Yes my Lord. 
3. Prosecutor: Yes Can you tell this honourable court how you came to know 
the accused person? 
(h 4. Witness: Yes Your Worship. On the 24 day of September 1999 ... (witness 
proceeds with narrative of the events leading to the charges being levelled at 
the accused. ) 
The preceding excerpts have been lined up to indicate the regularity with 
which the IR is used in the direct examinations data. They also demonstrate 
the absence of the Feedback move in this type of examination thus 
illustrating Stubbs' assertion that there are both three slot structures and two 
slot structures and that the exchange is defined by at least two obligatory 
element slots. 
It has been argued in this chapter, under the discussion of Acts, that the 'Yes' 
preceding the prosecutors' questions is a marker, that is an Act, rather than a 
move - Feedback. The other point demonstrated by this data is the existence 
of a Ievel higher in the hierarchy of discourse than the Exchange. This the 
element is demonstrated independently by this data, but it is not itself a new 
discovery as it has been recognised and argued for by Harris (1980 p. 74). 
She says, upon discovery of this level, that '... it was felt necessary to 
introduce a rank between Exchanges and Transactions which would be 
clearly definable by discourse alone, especially as the infonnation Gathering 
Transaction in every instance can be broken down into smaller units which 
are larger than Exchanges. ' She labels these units 'Sequences' and is then 
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left with the problem of 'ordering these smaller units. ' About which she 
suggests that 'there seem to be two possibilities here: either to bring in the 
notion of topic carrying Exchanges with the Sequence being maintained until 
a further topic is introduced; or to define on more formal grounds the build 
up of similar types of Exchange types which is such an obvious feature of 
interaction in magistrates' courts. ' I find no problem with the semantic 
definition of Sequence as a series of topic carrying exchanges, in line with 
Stubbs (1983). 
The part of the direct examination from which these excerpts are taken is the 
first of the medial exchanges introduced when we first introduced the 
Sinclair Coulthard model of discourse analysis, the preliminary exchange in 
this courtroom discourse being the swearing in of witnesses. The beginning 
of the exchange typically comprises four turns - IRIR - with the prosecutor 
restricting the first R with a Yes/No question - 'Do you know the accused? ' 
He then asks the first open-ended question 'How did you come to know the 
accused person' or 'Could you please tell this honourable court how you 
came to know the accused, ' which is responded to with texts of various 
length being either fmgmented testimony or narrative testimony. The 
following table sets out the level of structure termed sequence by Harris 
(1980) as it is found in the direct examination of this data. 
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Sequence Realisation Example text 
Initiation Question Yes/No Closed Do you know the accused? 
Response Answer Yes. I know the accused. 
Initiation Question: Wh Open Can you tell this court how 
you came to know the 
accused Person? 
Response Answer: Narration I came to know the 
accused person when I met 
him along Machel Road. 
He was driving past the 
robots. 
Table 11 Sequence in Direct Examinations 
7.1.4 Types of exchanges 
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975 p. 49) recognise, in their classroom interaction 
two major classes of exchange - Boundary and Teaching exchanges. The 
boundary exchangc functions to 'signal the bcginning or cnd of what the 
teacher believes to be a stage in the lesson. It comprises two moves the 
framing and focusing moves. Teaching exchanges are the individual steps by 
which the lesson progresses. The teaching exchange is then observed to have 
eleven subcategories, six of which arefree exchanges and five Bound 
exchanges. Of the bound exchanges, four are bound to the teacher elicits and 
one to the teacher inform exchanges. 
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There are four main functions of free exchanges. These are informing, 
directing, eliciting and checking. The function of the transaction under 
analysis, that is, the direct examination is that of information gathering. It is 
therefore, typically realised by the Eliciting Exchanges and, just like in the 
teaching transaction, the prosecutor uses series of Eliciting Exchanges to 
move the witness step by step to a conclusion of the transaction. (Sinclair and 
Coulthard 1975p. 51). 
When a teacher gets no response to an elicitation, he can start again using the 
same or rephrase of the question or use one or more of the acts-prompt, 
nomination, clue-to re-initiate. (Sinclair and Coulthard p. 53). Re-initiation is 
a very distinctive move in examination, although it is for different reasons in 
direct than in cross -examination. In direct examination Re-initiation is used 
in a fiiendly manner to build up confidence in the witness and to tell the 
4story' in support of the accuser. In cross- examination the re-initiation is 
often used in an unfriendly and coercive manner to try to force an admission 
of either unreliability of the direct examination testimony or to endorse 
counsel's own viewpoint. For example 
Excerpt I Case no. 2 of supplementary data 
Defense Counsel: I arn going to ask you a few questions so that what you 
have said to the court is the truth as far as you know. Now, you said Thabang 
was knocked at the zebra crossing did you say it? 
Wit: I don't understand the question. 
Defense Counsel: Was he knocked at the zebra crossing or not? 
Interpreter: Ao utwile sentle? Ao ne a le fa zebra crossing. 
Witness: 0 ne al (inaudible) 
(He was... 
Defense Counsel: Was Thabang knocked at the zebra crossing or not? 
Witness: Silence 
Defense Counsel: Yes or No was he knocked at the zebra crossing or was he 
not knocked at the zebra crossing? 
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Witness: I didn't see. 
Defense Counsel: So when the car knocked him he was at the zebra crossing. 
So if somebody could come and give evidence which says that Thabang was 
not knocked at the zebra crossing but away from the zebra crossing that 
informationwould be incorrect? 
Here we see that counsel has deliberately asked a question which would be 
difficult for the defendant to answer and insisted on an answer so that he can 
make his point of casting doubt on the witnessed testimony given under 
direct examination. However we will for the present continue with discussion 
of the direct examination. 
The Eliciting Exchanges that follow the first sequence of IR Exchanges 
(Mich we may label Opening Exchanges), then are Exchanges aimed at 
eliciting the details of the events leading to the charge like the time, place 
and people involved in the event of the accidents or other traffic offences. 
The questions immediately following the final R of the Opening Exchanges 
seem to be in the nature of filling the gaps of information left by this R. For 
example 
Witness: About half past one I was patrolling 
Prosecutor: [Were you alone? 
Or 
Witness: It happened that eh while we were along this road, there was a 
Toyota Corolla in front of us. 
Prosecutor: At what time? 
Or 
Witness: On the third day of October 1998 a road traffic accident was 
reported to me by (inaudible) along the Tlokweng /Zeerust road. 
Prosecutor: What time was the accident reported to you? 
And 
Witness: I came to know the accused in June 1999 when we were on patrol 
on Nelson Mandela Road... 
Prosecutor: What time was it? 
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The rest of the Transaction is made up of a series of topic Exchanges 
involving questions and answers aimed at drawing out necessary details of 
the events leading to the charges. The closing of the direct examinations 
transaction is signalled by a pre-closing final IR exchange. This usually 
states the final action taken by the police who were called to attend the scene 
of the accident in traffic offences. It is made up of the final QA pair. 
1. Prosecutor: After you served the accused Nvith the print out what did you 
then do? 
R. Witness: I warned and cautioned him of the charges of driving whilst unfit 
due to drinks. 
Or 
I. Prosecutor: Was he Nvamed of any charge? 
R. Witness: He was warned of the charge of driving whilst unfit due to the 
influence of alcohol. 
The prosecutor then announces to the magistrate that 'that is all, Your 
Worship, 'or thanks the magistrate- 'thank you Your Worship. ' Recording 
errors made by me involved switching off the recorder before the next 
witness was called in. For this reason it is difficult to say what actually was 
said to call the next witness in the same cases. But after the next witness is 
called in, the next direct examination begins with the Preliminary Exchange 
of swearing in and follows exactly the process just described i. e. the 
sequence of IM and then the medial exchanges aimed at eliciting the story 
of the prosecution 
7.2 Routine in daily work situations 
Examination of the question and answer exchanges of Direct Examinations 
soon reveals its routine nature. It is clear that the prosecutor knows the 
answers to the questions he asks, or at least he has a general expectation of 
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what the answers will be. A question like 'Was he warned of any chargeT 
surely presupposes that the answer will be positive. A negative answer from 
the witness would definitely be embarrassing for the prosecution. Take 
another Question, 'Did he see the resultsT (Said in a falling tone which 
indicates that a compliant response is expected). A negative answer would be 
damaging for the prosecution. 
This view that the prosecutor has a general expectation of what the answers 
to his questions should be is demonstrated very amply by the occurrence of 
one such a negative response to his question. The prosecutor, as usual at this 
juncture, asked his question - 
Prosecutor. Do you know the accused person? 
Witness: Nnyaa Rra ga ke mo itse. (No sir, I don't know him) 
Chaos ensued; showing clearly that the answer was an unexpected, 
'dispreffered' second part to the 'adjacency pair. ' All the court participants 
immediately and rapidly take steps to 'repair' the discourse disruption 
created by the unexpected answer. Instead of the 'turn' going back to the 
prosecutor who normally and routinely would ask the second IR of the first 
sequence of exchanges i. e. 'Would you please tell this honourable court how 
you came to know the accused? ' it's the magistrate who immediately asks, 
'Have you never seen himT and the interpreter quite non-nally interprets the 
magistrate's question to the accused. 'Ga o ise o mmone gopeT 
But then instead of leaving the prosecutor and the witness interact as usual, 
the interpreter asks his own question, ' Ke santlha o mmonaT (Is it your first 
time to see himT 
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Witness: Silence. 
The witness's first answer threw the court into chaos basically because it is a 
'dispreferred' second part to the adjacency pair. It is also unacceptable to the 
court i. e. it contravenes Grice's (1976) maxim of co-operation conduct of 
conversation because, although 'informative' it does not give the expected 
response. 
Eventually the Prosecutor takes back the rightful turn and asks, 
Prosecutor: Do you know why you have been brought to court? 
Witness: E Rra ke a itse. (Yes, sir, I know) 
Prosecutor: Can you tell this court why? 
Witness: Ke tlile go fa bosupi. (I have come to give evidence) 
Instead of the turn going back to the prosecutor, the magistrate again 
interrupts the exchange between prosecutor and witness. 
Magistrate: Can you tell the story? 
This is a very disrupted Direct Examination, with the formal discourse falling 
down to the level of ordinary, multiparty, conversation. We note that once 
the repair work has been done, the routine sets in again with the exchange 
being between the prosecutor and the witness. Unfortunately the repair work 
has not been very successful as the witness continues to be recalcitrant. He is 
inaudible and inarticulate in 'telling the story' as the magistrate has exhorted 
him. 
The foregoing narration of the story of the failed testimony just goes to prove 
the dependence of successful everyday work on routine. Sharrock and 
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Andersen (in Button and Lee 1987 p. 244) discuss this nature of everyday 
work and observe that 'it is precisely this routinisation that makes everyday 
business possible. ' In the paediatric clinic of their research they describe 
'two obvious features: first the consultation is composed of a number of 
concatenated episodes. A form is signed; the child is examined; the mother 
asks a few questions about possible symptoms etc. Secondly, and equally 
obviously, all the activities to be done are, for the doctor at least, part and 
parcel ofjust another working day. ' (p. 249) I am interested in the second 
observation here, that is the fact that professionals develop their everyday 
activities so that they become second nature to them. This is in turn 
influences the types of language they use. Sharrock and Andersen also 
observe from their readings in Conversational Analysis that 'Two stock ideas 
are now almost emblematic of studies in CA. One is the idea of there being 
'a detailed orderliness' to the organisation and operation of what is called 
"speech exchange systems, " and they say that 'these systems are to be seen 
in the characteristic forms of talk found in ordinary conversation, judicial 
proceedings, classroom teaching telephone calls, therapy sessions and the 
like. ' The idea is 'the proposal that this orderliness' is oriented to by 
participants in talk and that their orientation is visible in the talk itself The 
claim is that the duplets, triplets and even more elaborated structures which 
analysts have documented are both the resource for, and the product of, the 
activities which the co-participants in the talk engage in. '(p. 250) They also 
point out that Conversational Analysis has, by addressing its materials, 
documented the specifics of a working solution to the problem of social 
organisation as the outcome of the routine features of daily life. ' It seems to 
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me, however that the more formal the occasion the more routinised its 
language becomes, that is there are ways of saying associated with specific 
occasions and courtroom examining, especially direct examination, is very 
highly routinsed. Yet it may not seem so to participants simply because, as 
Sharrock and Andersen put it, 'the structures observable in the transcripts, 
are routinely matters of course for participants. ' (Sharrock and Andersen in 
Button and Lee 1987 p. 48) It seems that often the more formal a situation is, 
the more routinised and predictable it is. 
Workplace routines are definitely matters of course for the professionals like 
doctors in their surgeries and prosecutors and magistrates in their courts. But 
what of the participants for whom the activities and their linguistic 
manifestations are new and strange? The literature abounds in the legal 
setting that attempt to see things from the layman's perspective. Mertz 
(1992) cites two studies which organize themselves around this perspective, 
that of O'Barr and Con] ey (19 82) and Merry (1990). She says that both 
studies 'deal with the understanding and discourse of 'ordinary people. " She 
says of O'Baff and Conley's study that, 'The book talks about the ways in 
which ordinary people relate to the legal system' and the ways people who 
bring personal problems to the courts think about and understand the law and 
the way people who work in the courts deal with thern. ' And that Merry's 
case deals 'especially with the working class people. ' (p. 428). These and 
other studies, are highly critical of institutional practices and the ways they 
cause 'linguistic blackout' for the layman. (O'Barr 1982, Goodrich 1984 
and 1990, Harris 1981 and 1994 and Danet and Bogoch 1980 and Danet 
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1979). My study, however organises itself around the genres of the law i. e. 
usages of the court and although it does touch or! power and ideology, it has 
less of the political agendas often seen in critical discourse analysis - CDA. 
7.3 Types of testimony in the direct examinations: NARRATIVE and 
FRAGMENTED testimonies. 
The role of narratives in the evidentiary stage of the trial has been examined 
by many researchers. There are at least three different views regarding the 
place of narrative in the trial. One is that by Bennet and Fieldman (1981) 
which relates the whole trial to the narrative mode including examinations, 
submissions and judgements. The other view is that by O'Barr (1982) who 
saw narrative in a narrower sense as relating to types of testimony and Harris 
(2001) examines narrative in the examinations with a different perspective on 
it from that of O'Baff (1982). She points out the limitation of O'Barr's 
theory as ignoring 'the sense in which all courtroom testimony is necessarily 
fragmented by virtue of being conducted through question and answer 
sequences... ' (p. 55). I shall first introduce O'Barr's theory and then go on to 
Harris's. 
O'Barr (1982 p. 77) observes that an important 'discourse variable' present in 
the speech of witnesses giving testimony is the narrative versus fragmented 
testimony style, ' first observed by O'Baff (1982 p. 76). He asserts that 
'ethnographic observation of courtroom interaction revealed considerable 
variation in the length of witnesses' responses to questions asked by 
lawyers. ' Berk-Seligson (1990 p. 2 1) describes these more clearly - 
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'Persons testifying in narrative style will answer questions in with a 
relatively long answer, whereas persons using fragmented style will answer 
in brief, non-elaborated responses. ' O'Baff (19 82 p. 76) attribute these styles 
to lawyers own preferences and techniques. For example he says that, 'At 
times it appeared that the examining lawyer wanted the witness to speak long 
and fully. On other occasions it seemed that brief, incisive, non-elaborative 
responses were desired. ' And says that 'For convenience we refer to these 
two styles with the terms NARRATIVE and FRAGMENTEW He gives two 
excerpts to illustrate the difference: 
Narrative Style 
Q. Now calling your attention to the twenty-first of November, a Saturday, 
what were your working hours that day? 
A. Well, I was working from, uh, 7 A. M. to 3 P. M. I arrived at the store at 
6.30 and opened the store at 7. 
Fragmented Style 
Q. Now, calling your attention to the twenty-first of November, a Saturday, 
hat were your working hours that day? 
A. Well, I was working from 7 to 3. 
Q. Was that 7 A. M.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you arrive at the store? 
A. 6.30. 
Q. And did, uh, you open the store at 7o'clock? 
A. Yes, it has to be opened by then. 
O'Barr observes that in the first excerpt, 'the witness volunteers a long 
answer to the question. In the second, the witness is less responsive, making 
it necessary for the lawyer to pose additional questions to elicit the same 
information volunteered in the first answer. ' 
It is by reason of this evidence that I propose to attribute the styles of 
testimonies as much to the responsiveness of the witness as to the purposes 
of the lawyer. Here, as in the data I shall present, there are two types of 
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answers given to the same initial question, 'What were your working hoursT 
but O'Barr posits a theory of these styles as lawyer-controlled. The excerpts 
tendered in illustration certainly do not support this theory. His theory as 
based on the assumption that 'since courtroom examination is organised so 
that lawyers ask the questions and witnesses answer them, ultimate control of 
these exchanges is vested in the lawyer. ' Granted the lawyer's position is a 
powerful one in which he can control the content of the testimony but I do 
not believe that he has major control on the style of testimony, he must elicit 
the information he wants only in the way the witness responds. O'Barr 
himself admits this when he says that 'It appeared, in observations of the 
court, that long narrative answers by witnesses is possible only when the 
lawyers relinquish some control, allowing more leeway to witnesses in 
answering questions. ' But he also makes the qualification that, 'When such 
opportunity is 'offered, ' it is by no means always accepted. ' I believe it 
important to note the force of this qualification as it does mean that the 
lawyer is not, ultimately, as powerful as he is made out to be. I mean by this 
that the witness has some power to resist the lawyer's coercive tendencies. 
He can be as unresponsive as he can before it is, possibly, labelled 'contempt 
of court, ' as indeed O'Barr strongly suggests this when he says that 'it seems 
virtually impossible to be assumed, (the resistance) without open conflict 
except when the opportunity for narrative answer is offered. ' To resolve this 
argument of the 'power' of lawyer we need to recognise that lawyers play 
different roles in examinations. If they are performing the direct examination 
they are much less likely to assume a powerful stance with the witness than if 
they are doing cross-exwninations. 
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Some examples from my data show how these testimony styles come about 
follow. 
Narrative Style 
Prosecutor Getting to Borakanelo Police Station what did you do? 
Witness: When I got to Borakanelo Police Station, I went with the accused 
person into the testing room. I breath tested him using the Lion Intoxiliser 
1400 and I issued him with the slip which was produced by the machine. 
(Excerpt from case number 18) 
Fragmented Style 
Prosecutor: Where was Sergeant Chami taking the accused person's vehicle? 
Witness: He drove to Borakanelo Police station. 
Prosecutor: And what happened? 
At Borakanelo Police station Sergeant Charna asked the accused person to 
provide a sarnple of breath. 
Prosecutor: Were you present by then? 
Witness: I was present. 
Prosecutor: Then what happened? 
Witness: The accused person provided the breath. 
(Excerpt from case number 18. The same prosecutor examining a different 
-svitness) 
The prosecutor's question 'And what happened' is asked t%rice. And each 
time it meets with a brief, single move. When the prosecutor asks the witness 
'Were you present by thenT he is really asking the witness to respond with 
more expansively since he was present at the event. But all the responses he 
gets from the witness are brief non-elaborative, utilising only a single move 
each time. 
Compare the responses in the second excerpt with the following excerpt from 
an examination by a different prosecutor examining a different witness. 
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Prosecutor: Did you find both drivers at the scene of the accident? 
Witness: I found both drivers at the scene of the accident. 
Prosecutor: And what happened? 
Witness: On arrival to the scene, I drew a sketch plan in the presence of both 
drivers and after finishing drawing the sketch plan I showed it to both drivers 
and the driver of B786ACI told me that he agreed with what I had drawn 
then I told her to append her signature on the sketch plan but the accused told 
me that he didn't agree with the sketch plan and he refused to sign. 
This narrative is helpful to the examiner in two ways. First it is difficult to 
think just what series of questions would be needed to elicit the details 
supplied, voluntarily, by the witness. Second, and discussed by some 
theorists of narrative genre, narrative has the power to influence and 
convince and therefore works in favour of the examining prosecutor or 
counsel. Witten (in Mumby 1993 p. 105), Narrative and Social Control, 
makes the claim that 'through narrative discourse, speakers can make strong 
assertions that are masked from examination and challenge. ' And O'Barr 
speaking of narrative in judicial settings also points out that 'The general 
advice offered in trial practice manuals is that lawyers should allow their 
own witnesses some opportunity for narrative answers, and should restrict 
opposition witnesses to brief answers as much as possible. '(O'Baff 1982 p. 
77) And says that 'This advice appears to be based on the implicit 
assumption that narrative answers are better received than fragmented ones. 
Berk-Seligson (1990 p. 22), reports that 'using this assumption as the 
hypothesis of an experimental study, O'Barr (1982) found that the hypothesis 
does in fact bear out: witnesses testifying in narrative style were rated as 
being more competent and socially dynamic than were witnesses who 
testified in fragmented style. ' 
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The power of narratives derives from human beings predilection for the 
story as an art form. Everyone loves a good story and stories seem so much 
easier to remember than other discourse genres. Lawyers in this Botswana 
court are not unaware of the power of the story. This was very impressively 
enacted in one case, Case number three of 10-0 1-2000 SUPplementary data. 
The prosecutorjust asked the usual opening series of Questions. 'Do you 
know the accused personT The answer came from the police witness- 'Yes 
my lord, ' apparently addressing his answer to the magistrate. Upon the 
second question of the series, 'Can you tell this honourable court how you 
came to know the accused personT the witness went into a lengthy narration: 
Witness: Your Worship, on the 20' day of September 1999,1 had a case to 
attend at Gaborone West Your Worship. I had to be there at around 0830 
Hours. At around 0810.1 took a police vehicle and drove along Lemmenyane 
Drive. I was following a queue of motor vehicles from which some were 
joining Nelson Mandela Drive and some were joining turning right. And I 
was going to turn right. My vehicle was the third one from the accused's 
motor vehicle, which was in front. As soon as the accused's motor vehicle 
has passed along the bus stop, turning to the west, his motor vehicle went 
extremely left off the road to gravel side. It increased speed and hit a no 
stopping sign. His vehicle went on facing Taung BHC houses and later the 
vehicle slowed down and returned back to the road to the tarred road. As he 
had joined the tarred road, I thought he would find a place to stop but 
unfortunately he just kept on driving. I wondered as to why the driver did not 
stop as he had knocked an official stop sign... 
The story goes on for another single spaced page to the end when the 
prosecutor then asks just one other question, 'Yes, can you tell this court the 
registration number of the accused person's motor vehicle? The whole 
examination was covered by just five turns at speaking between the 
prosecutor and the -witness. This kind of co-operation between prosecutor 
and witness does give the strong impression that the witness has been 
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prepared by the prosecution just as much as counsel would prepare his 
witness to answer questions in direct examinations and probably also in 
responding to questions under hostile cross examination. (also Harris 2001 
p. 68) 
Harris (200 1) reports that in her data extensive narrative sequences are in fact 
very rare. On this point, however, it would seem as if the data we work with 
sometimes limit the sort of thing we can theorise about. In my data, as has 
been demonstrated, narrative (even in the definition adopted and adapted by 
Harris from Labov1972) is unlike in Harris's data (p. 58), quite easy to 
identify as it is obviously extended monologue and has the features of 
narrative established by Labov and Harris herself and is a very recognisable 
feature of direct examination data of this study. 
Harris proposes a model of analysis of evidentiary narratives, which includes 
four main elements as against Labov's five. These are: 
Orientation - the circumstances which surround the narrative account. 
Core narrative - the account itself, i. e. what happened, including often what 
was said and seen as well as what was done. 
[Elaboration] - [provides further details, clarification, explication, etc. of the 
core narrative 
Point - significance of the narrative account for the larger trial narrative, i. e. 
usually the guilt or innocence of the defendant, addressed to the jury. 
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These elements are then applied on a number of excerpts of Harris's trial 
data. It would be an informative exercise to make an analysis of the 
evidentiary narratives of this courtroom applying the Labovian model but it 
would be too lengthy a task to attempt here where the focus of the thesis is 
not on this aspect of the trial alone. 
The final argument relates to the place of narratives in the trial. Bridging the 
agreement gap between O'Baff (1982)'s account of narrative and fragmented 
evidence and Harris' (200 1)'s argument that all courtroom narratives are 
fragmented, Gerwitz (1996) very succinctly makes the explanation that a trial 
consists of fragmented narratives and narrative multiplicity. And that 
To be sure, the skilful lawyer is always shaping the fragments and, at 
least implicitly, pointing to the whole. But not until the very end of the 
trial, with the lawyers' summations, does either side have a chance to 
put the pieces together and to present a flowing, uninterrupted 
narrative to the decision maker. In addition, one side's narrative is 
always being met by the other side's counternarrative (or sidestepping 
narrative) so that 'reality' is always disassembled into multiple, 
conflicting and partly overlapping versions ... It 
is the fragmentation 
and contending multiplicities of narratives, regulated by special rules 
of narrative form and shaping, that mark the central distinctiveness of 
narratives at trial - along with ... the 
high stakes in how the narrative 
combat is resolved (Gerwitz 1996 p. 8). 
7.4 Analysis of Cross Examinations 
Cross Examinations transactions differ in marked ways by having a different 
type of exchange structure and being retrospective, as we shall see. The first 
cross examination I analyse is particularly interesting in that it followed on 
the last direct examination described (under the narratives section above). 
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Following the prosecution witness's long and confidently executed narrative, 
the same witnesses is cross-examined. The cross examination proceeds to 
traverse the path made by direct examination, systematically calling into 
doubt every point in the witness's narration. First, in a sarcastic manner, the 
counsel for the defense refers back to the narrative - 'Now, you have 
described to this court eloquently as to how this accident happened, ' and then 
deals the first blow to the evidence by asking the question 'Would I be right 
to say that when the car moved out of the road, you couldn't see clearly as to 
what the cause wasT The witness is caused, expertly, 'to start backtracking 
on his evidence, 'I couldn't see clearly what was there. ' 
The moves made by counsel here are completely different, structurally, from 
the QA of the direct examination. The first Initiation move of the defense 
lawyer begins with a statement rather than a question. The effect of this 
structure is to comment on the preceding direct examination exchange. The 
statement is followed in the same turn by a question, which, is itself not a real 
question but an assertion - you couldn't see clearly the cause of the accident 
- embedded in a question 'would I be right ... ? The Response from the 
witness is to admit that he could not see the cause of the accident, which he 
has just 'eloquently' described. The next move is in fact a third part, a 
Feedback move. So here, unlike in the direct examination, we have the three- 
part structure similar to Sinclair and Coulthard's original classroom 
exchange i. e. Initiation Response Feedback, IRF. 
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Excerpt 1 Case number 3 10-01-2000 Supplementary Data 
Defense Counsel: Now, you have described eloquently to this court as to 
how the accident happened. Would I be correct if I say that when the car 
moved out of the road, you couldn't clearly see as to what the cause was? 
Witness: I couldn't see clearly what was there. 
Defense Counsel: Yes, because there was another car in front of you. 
Excerpt 2 case number 3 10-10-2000 
Defense Counsel: Now, all the way up to when the cars in front of you did 
you see any other anything unusual in the traffic? 
Witness: No. 
Defense Counsel: You didn't. So the only thing that you saw in the traffic 
was the hitting of the no stopping sign? 
Excerpt 3 case number 3 10-01-200 Supplementary Data. 
Defense Counsel: I am not interested in the turning now you gave the 
evidence about one of the observations you made. That gave you the 
suspicion that he was drunk. You said you saw when you looked at him as he 
was talking to you saw eh blood spots in his eyes, his eyes were red? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defense Counsel: I put it to you that his eyes have those blood shot that you 
have been talking about. Can you dispute that? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defense Counsel: It was your first time to see him. 
Witness: That was my first time to see the accused. 
Defense Counsel: Yes You didn't know him. 
Excerpt 4. Case number 3 10-01-200 
Defense Counsel: Take a closer look at his eyes. Are his eyes red? 
Witness: Yes, they are. 
Defense Counsel: They are. Does this suggest that he is drunk? 
The following table displays the structure of the cross-examination exchange 
with its three slots, to be contrasted with the table of the direct examination 
sequence. 
171 
Move Realisation Example 
Initiation Statement +Question: Now, you have described 
Closed eloquently to this court as 
to how the accident 
happened. Would I be 
correct if I say that when 
the car moved out of the 
road, you did not see 
clearly as to what was the 
cause? 
Response Answer Yes 
Feedback Statement: reinforcing the Yes, because there was 
admission another car in front of you. 
Table 12 The IRF structure of the cross-examination. 
What does this IRF structure of the cross examination imply about the 
relationship of the attorney and the witness? Maybe the domineering attitude 
of the attorney towards witnesses, much like a teacher dealing with pupils? 
And perhaps the witness expects feedback on his responses even though 
feedback is only damaging his story? ) Bulow-Moller (1990 p. 52) observes 
that the third turn is frequent in institutional discourse. ' For instance in 
medical interviews, 'the third turn is non-committal ("Aha", "OK"), as the 
doctor's aim is to extract the fullest possible statement from the patient; in 
teaching situations, on the other hand, the third turn is used to evaluate 
("Yes, good"). As we saw in the direct examination of this study, however, 
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'the third turn is not nonnally described as part of the adjacency pair in 
interrogations. ' That is why Heritage (1985 p. 98) assumes that it is 
4massively absent. ' In Bulow Moller's (1990) trial data, however, 'the 
examining counsel routinely uses the non-committal third turn to signal that 
an answer is acceptable ("'yes", "ok") etc. The third turn in the data of the 
present research cannot really be said to be non-committal. It is perhaps 
partly evaluative, rather like a teacher's; but it has another, rather subtle 
intention, that is, to put the witness at a disadvantage by repeating his 
admissions and putting them on record, explicitly, probably for the 
magistrate. The contains faintly violent overtones as it mostly underscores 
(for prosecution), undesirable repudiations of the former testimony. 
The defense counsel continues in this way to question every statement made 
by the witness in the direct examinatiom The question may be asked why 
these exchanges are so dissimilar in structure. The answer may lie in the 
different purposes of the questions in the examinations and in the different 
attitudes of the prosecutors and counsel towards the witnesses. 
7.5 Power in the tenor of examination discourse 
Tenor refers to who is taking part in the discourse: their statuses and role 
relationships The question of power does not come out clearly in the tenor of 
direct examinations. This is because normally the direct examination is a 
situation where the prosecution and the witness act co-operatively to build up 
the story in support of prosecution. So there is no tendency, in direct 
examination, for the questioner to want to control and dominate or otherwise 
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coerce his witness. This is even more so in this courtroom as the prosecutor 
and the witness (in traffic offences) are both police officers acting in tandem 
and are of equal status. The sharing of power is most clearly revealed when 
the prosecutor allows the witness lengthy turns at speaking, usually narration 
of events proving the guilt of the accused. As Bulow-Moller (1990 p. 45) 
puts it the prosecutor uses open-ended questions when he wants 'an account 
in witnesses' own words, in order to establish credibility ... In handbooks as 
well as in the linguistic literature, it is assumed that open questions are found 
almost exclusively in examination-in-chief, it would be counter-productive to 
give a hostile witness too much of an open chance to explain himself' 
The defense counsel, on the other hand, tends to assume very powerful 
positions in their relationship with the prosecution witnesses. They are 
almost openly hostile and coercive in their use of linguistic devices of 
questioning and in their insistent repetition of questions that are aimed at 
discrediting the witnesses' earlier statements made under direct examination. 
(See the excerpt under types of exchanges when counsel repeats the same 
question three times, insisting on a Yes or No answer) 
Also in the following excerpt we see the defense counsel using repetition of 
same question to force out an admission from the witness. 
Counsel: Now you say that the results obtained some 3 hours after driving is 
a true reflection of the amount of alcohol in the suspect at the material time? 
Witness: Your Worship it might have gone down. 
Counsel: It might have gone down it might have gone up it doesn't matter. 
What I am saying is would it be a true reflection of the amount of alcohol at 
the time of driving? 
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This tendency for examining counsel to demand the answer desired by them 
is very characteristic of cross-examining counsel. The important question to 
ask is where does this right originate? There are at least two sources of origin 
of this power. These are legal training, and the linguistic advantage of the 
onus to ask questions resting with legal counsel. I shall begin discussion of 
these sources with the training aspect. Although we have seen in our 
discussion of legal education's neglect of courtroom practice, for example, 
courtroom speech making we have also noted that much of what lawyers do 
in the courtroom is learnt from trial manuals, many of which perpetuate the 
ideology of unequal power relations between counsel and witnesses, which is 
vehemently criticised by the writers of the critical perspective. See for 
instance Goodrich (1984), Witten (1993), Thompson (1984) and Harris 
(1994). These critics all point out the fact that power relations cannot be 
understood outside the context of ideology and culture. Witten (in Mumby 
1993 p. 104) theorises that 'Control is effected through culture when 
capacities that benefit the organisation are 'organised in'... while alternatives 
are orgamsed out. ' Witten does however see the future of critical theory in a 
much more circumspect light when she says that, 'the challenge of post- 
structuralism suggests that critical theory will only survive in a much 
attenuated state, if indeed at all, ' and that 'others maintain that it is still 
possible to maintain some of the goals of critical theory scaled down to an 
appropriate scope. ' (p. 104) 
Thompson (19 84, p. 9) suggests that '... ideology can be analysed 
specifically and concretely in expressions which are uttered in the course of 
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everyday life. ' The ideology of the legal profession comes out very clearly in 
trial manuals. Walker (in Kedarl981 p. 61) quotes Morrill(1971 p. 61), in a 
text on trial tactics, as saying that 'the examiner should immediately take 
measures to correct the situation (where a witness has not given the desired 
response). He must be incomplete control at all times. ' Summit(1978p. 
129) is quoted as saying that, 'Witnesses occasionally will answer a question 
with a question. The examiner should not become involved in the 
explanation of the facts or the points he is trying to make. He should explain 
to the witness that it is not appropriate for the examiner to answer questions. ' 
Walker writes that in the course of her data collection she asked lawyers if 
they would allow a witness to ask them a question their replies are 
informative: 
1. "No, I'd tell him 'I'm not here to answer your questions... 
2. " I'd say, 'I'll ask the questions and you are here to answer. ' That's when you 
have to take control and intimidate" 
3. "A witness can't elicit a response from an attorney. " 
(Walker in Kedar 1983 p. 6 1. ) 
So the idea that counsel must maintain a position of power vis-A-vis the 
witness is an open secret and, as Walker says, 'Power as I have noted 
repeatedly is equated with control of the witness, and one kind of control is 
exerted through leading the witness to the desired answer. ' It seems to me 
that lawyers on opposing sides, i. e. prosecutors and defense counsel, exercise 
this power very differently. I have noted before that the prosecutor treats his 
own witnesses as equals, acting in co-operation, but defense counsel treat 
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prosecution witnesses very harshly, coercing answers from them and 
generally intimidating them. 
However, before we completely condemn counsel, we must recognise that 
they are attorneys at law. The witness is not fighting the battle alone. He 
usually has his own attorney to advise and prepare him or her for the ordeal 
of the trial. If this were not so, courtroom relations would be completely 
insupportable. The relations most often criticised are those between the 
examining counsel and opposition witness. But I want to observe that this is 
not the only power matrix in court. There are also power relations between 
attorney and attorney in submissions, which are much less documented and 
this is the point of departure for this particular research into courtroom 
language, representing largely untraversed territory in studies of courtroom 
language - the battle between giants, full of hyperbole, sarcasm, deprecation, 
derision, etc. 
The second source of the power of counsel over witnesses in the evidentiary 
portion of the trial is the control they are accorded by having the onus to ask 
questions. This power arises from the fact that 'a question is a powerful 
thing' (Walker 1987p. 59). A question demands an answer and by asking 
questions counsel are exerting a natural force on witnesses. Walker argues 
that question types differ in their coerciveness. 
Yes/No questions are said to be more coercive than Wh questions and within 
the category of Wh questions the imperative question like 'give me your 
name is 'both less polite and more blatantly an exhibition of role power than 
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the mediated cooperative question form 'would you give me your name. ' 
(p7l). Phillips (1987) reports from her research on the use of questioning in 
the courtroom that the approach6 to the use of question in the courtroom 
have been concerned with the expression of power relations. 
In the literature, different questions are carefully distinguished, and 
viewed as varying in the degree of control the questioner attempts to 
exert over the intended respondent. In general, Yes-No questions have 
been characterised as expressing the intent of greater specificity and 
narrowness of response than Wh questions. Declarative Yes-No 
questions, particularly those with tags such as "You were at the bar 
that night, weren't you? ", are perceived as more controlling and 
coercive than Inverted Yes-No questions because they presuppose the 
answer as well as limiting it to yes or no. (Phillips 1980 p. 84) 
Researchers such as Danet et al (1980) Danet and Bogoch (1979) and 
Woodbury (1984) are reported to have found higher frequencies of 
Declarative Yes-No Questions in Cross-examinations than in direct 
examinations in American trial data. Phillips (1985) concurs with Walker 
09 85) that 'cross-examinations are defined by lawyers (and rules of 
evidence) functionally as calling for more aggressive tactics as one attempts 
to break down and undermine the witness's confided credibility' 
(Phillips1995 p. 85). 
7.6 Control and resistance to control 
The important question to ask here is this. Considering the enormous power 
vested in lawyers as representatives of the law, the right to coerce desired 
answers from defendants and witnesses, what can the witnesses do to 
maintain their own position in the trial without being totally victimised by 
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legal culture? Atkinson and Drew (1979) and Drew (1985) suggest that 
witnesses ( police witnesses) can and do challenge counsels' competing 
clainis about their actions by producing justification and excuses for their 
actions in relation to the charges. They can also do this by producing 
alternative accounts to counsels accounts as borne, out by my data. Witness 
coercion by counsel comes out very strongly in this data. I have given 
examples of them doing this by re-initiations and insistent repetition of the 
same question: 
Counsel Now, you said 11abang was knocked at the zebra crossing? 
The witness dodges answering the question by claiming incomprehension 
Witness: I don't understand the question 
And counsel repeats the question: 
Was he knocked at the zebra crossing or was he not knocked at the zebra 
crossing? 
Witness buying time keeps silent and counsel repeats: 
Counsel: Yes or no, was he knocked at the zebra crossing or was he not 
knocked at the zebra crossing? 
Witness: I didn't see. 
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The question is on the surface not particularly difficult to answer, so why 
does it take several promptings for the witness to address it? One possible 
interpretation is that the witness is buying time in order to decipher the 
possible implication of the question and consider the possible implication of 
her answer even though there is nothing in either the question of the eventual 
answer to indicate what she might have thought the import of the question 
was. But in the next exchange the witness answers the question in a manner 
that shows that she is anticipating blame on her part by the counsel for the 
defense: 
Defense Counsel: Now you said it was nine o'clock at night? 
Witness: The lights were on. 
Here the witness responds by making a qualification of counsel's question so 
that whatever it is intended to do to her evidence, it will have been mitigated 
by her answer. This cross examination involve a lay person witness. Police 
witnesses sometimes openly challenge counsels' assertions. 
Defense Counsel: So I wouldn't be wrong to if I said it was around 10.30 
P. M.? 
And the witness makes a blatant rebuttal: 
Witness: If it wasn't you would be wrong 
Defense Counsel: But that was the time written in this statement. 
Witness: Yes in fact it is the time 
Defense Counsel: Which is a period of more than three and a half hours. 
Witness: Yes Your Worship. 
Defense Counsel: So why did it take so long in subjecting the defendant to a 
breath test? 
Witness: As I said earlier, the witness was co-operating in that he was taking 
a long time to understand all what I was saying to him. 
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In two places in this exchange the police witness produces answers which are 
dispreferred second pair parts. First he almost rudely answers 'If it wasn't, 
you'd be wrong' and then accepts that he had in fact written that the time 
was as counsel for the defense stated- This is open hostility on the part of the 
witness. In the second instance, the witness tells counsel that he had already 
answered a question to the effect by stating, 'As I said earlier... ' 
Open combat also happens when the witness and the prosecutor use strong 
language that is indicative of accusation: 
Witness: I am here to tell the court the trutIL The vehicle got out of the road 
and hit the sign, turned ... and Counsel interrupts: Counsel: I am not 
interested in the turning ... 
Here we see counsel insisting on following a line of thought he is developing 
and insisting on the witness producing only answers to his stated question 
and no elaboration from thevvitness. The witness on the other hand seems to 
suggest that counsel is doing more thanjust attempting to elicit the truth. 
Such interchanges indicate that witnesses sometimes react consciously to the 
strongly coercive tactics of counsel so they do not have their hands tied 




In the analysis of the dialogues of examinations in this chapter, I have made 
a number of interpretations. In their order these are (1) the power of legal 
professionals over laymen in the courtroom. This asymmetry in the relations 
between professional and laymen needs explanation. However I have also 
shown that litigants do try to contest this dornination. Other interpretations 
are those of the role of routine in the everyday processes of institutions and 
the role of narratives in examinations especially the different uses of 
narratives in direct as against cross-examinations. All these are made 
possible by the use of discourse analysis methodologies. 
Another important linguistic aspect of this courtroom is its bilingual nature. 
Therefore we will now turn to discussion of bilingualism evidenced in both 
kinds of examination but also in other transactions like the Reading of charge 
Sheets and the magistrates' turns at speaking. This is the subject of the next 
chapter, Chapter 8. 
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SECTION D: BILINGUALISM IN THE COURTROOM 
183 
Introduction 
Bilingualism is a characteristic of this court's communication processes and 
it is linked especially to the dialogues of examinations and the administrative 
processes of the reading of charge sheets and readings of facts. This is so 
because these processes involve the litigants who may or may not be 
bilingual in English, which is the language of the magistrates' courts in 
Botswana, and Setswana, which is the national language. To accommodate 
these people in the processes of the court various types of language 
alternation, mainly code switching and interpreting, are found in the 
communicative processes in the courtroom. Interpreting is formally provided 
for statutorily, as I shall outline in chapter 9, but other bilingual discourses 
occur as natural language phenomena and are less governed by statutory 
requirements. I shall begin discussion of this phenomenon with code 
switching because it follows on from the discussion of the dialogues of 
examinations. Then I shall discuss, in a separate chapter, interpreting and 
interpreted proceedings. 
CHAPTER 8. Code Switching 
8.1 Previous writing on bilingualism and code-switching 
Code switching is one of a multiplicity of phenomena of language contact 
and its concomitant bilingualism. Auer (1998 p: 32) asserts that there are 
many phenomena of language contact other than code switching - 
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borrowing, transfer, interference, intergration, mixed codes and others. There 
is a vast literature on code switching representing code switching between 
many languages of the world. I shall not here attempt to review this literature 
but only abstract from it the common ground and the major theoretical 
constructs developed. 
8.1.2 Code Switching defined 
The discussion of code switching starts with Weinriech (1953) as the first to 
recognise the phenomenon but who, gave it only a passing consideration in 
Languages in Contact in this one paragraph: 
The ideal bilingual switches from one language to another according to 
appropriate changes in the speech situation, but not in a single unchanged 
speech situation, and certainly not within a single sentence. If he does 
include expressions from another language, he marks them off explicitly as 
'quotations' using quotation marks in writing and special voice modification 
in speech... '. 
He proceeds to suggest that switching codes in any other way may represent 
a language problem. Milroy and Muysken (1995) offer an explanation for 
this 'invisibility of code switching' to seminal figures like Weinriech. They 
attribute their lack of awareness of code switching to four factors. The first is 
their focus on the 'langue' of the bilingual language system and not the 
'parole' or actual bilingual use. The second factor is the structuralist idea 
about the integrity of grammatical systems, within which code switching or 
code mixing were seen as potential disturbances. Thirdly, the lack of 
sophisticated unobtrusive recording, because obtrusive recording yielded 
bilingual data which contained much less code switching and code mixing. 
Fourthly, there was a lack of stable bilingual communities, studies of which 
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became the focus in the 1970s when Spanish/English and Hindi/English 
bilingualism were studied and code switching came to the fore. 
Confinning the existence of code switching as 'a central part of bilingual 
discourse' (Romaine 1989p: 118), Bell (1983) enthusiastically asserted that: 
Code switching is an active, creative process of incorporating material from 
both languages into communicative acts. It involves rapid and momenwy 
shifting from one language to another within a single conversation and is not 
uncommon within single sentences. 
Dulay et al (1982) also went further in clearing misconceptions to make way 
for objective discussions of code switching by pointing out that: ý 
The rapidity and automaticity with which such alternations take place often 
give the impression that the speaker lacks control of the structural systems of 
the two languages and is mixing them indiscriminately. However, quite the 
contrary is true. Those bilinguals who are most proficient in both their 
languages often engage in code switching. (Ibid p. 115) 
Gumperz (1982 p. 55) observed in code switching that, 
'Speakers communicate fluently, maintaining an even flow of talk. No 
hesitation pauses changes in sentence rhythm, pitch level or intonation 
contour mark the shift in code. There is nothing in the speech to indicate that 
speakers don't understand each other. 
And Grosjean (1982) asserts that code switching is an extremely common 
characteristic of bilingual speech and that some bilingual writers and poets 
reflect this in their works. He gives this poem by the Mexican American 
Pedro Ortiz Vasquez, which I think illustrates how conscious use of code 
switching (as most writing is conscious manipulation of language) can 
achieve its aesthetic, literary effects: 
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It's so strange in here 
todo lo que pasa 
is so strange 
y nadie puede entender 
que le pasa aqui 
isn't any different de lo que pasa alla 
there everybody is trying to get out, etc 
lost in our own awareness 
of where we are 
and where we want to be 
and wondering why 
It's so strange to be here 
(p. 147) 
Hundreds of examples of code switched utterances in hundreds of the 
world's languages exist, so much so that now examples are no longer 
intriguing in themselves. 
8.1.3 Analytical models of code switching 
Code switching, being such a complex linguistic phenomenon, has now led 
writers and researchers to the postulation of very many models on various 
aspects of bilingual usage. Below I shall present the latest of these and to 
create a backdrop of theory in which the analysis of the data I have of code 
switching in the Botswana court can be understood. 
8.1.3.1 The situational approach 
According to Li Wei (1998 p: 156): ' with few exceptions, sociolinguists 
who studied code switching before the 1980s directed attention to extra- 
linguistic factors such as topic, setting, relationships between participants, 
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community norms and values etc., all of which were said to influence 
speakers choices of language in conversation. ' All these studies followed the 
situational code switching approach suggested by Weinriech (1953) who 
argued that 'the rapid alternation of languages in a single, unchanged 
situation' did not happen and that 'the ideal bilingual switches from one 
language to another according to appropriate changes in the speech situation' 
(inter-locutors, topics, domains have since been identified as situations of 
code switching). 
Gumperz (1982 p. 60) very lucidly describes the situational usage of code 
switching in relation to diglossia, the existence of different varieties of one 
language or the use of different languages in different situations and 
domains. He states that 'in diglossia code alternation is largely of the 
situational type. Distinct varieties are used in certain settings, (such as home, 
school and work) that are associated with separated, bounded activities 
(public speaking, formal negotiations, special ceremonials, etc) or spoken 
with different categories of speaker (friends, family members, strangers 
social inferiors government officials, etc). ' These are the setting, domains 
and interlocutors dimensions of code switching. Guniperz (ibid p. 6 1) 
suggests that situational code switching happens mostly in formal situations 
such as the diglossia just described and that conversational code switching 
presents quite a different set of problems in that it does not happens with any 
perceptible change in situations and if it does the 'relationship to language 
usage to social context is much more complex. ' 
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Against this conventional view of code switching, Auer (1984), in Bilingual 
Conversatim raised challenges to this view of the functions of code 
switching. The concept of Situation itself was challenged on the grounds that 
it is not 'a predetermined set of norms functioning solely as a constraint on 
linguistic perfonnance. ' Rather, Auer saw situation as 'an interactively 
achieved phenomenon... ' He argued that 'participants of conversational 
interaction continuously produced frames for subsequent activities which in 
turn created new frames' (restated in Auer 1998). Auer proposed a 
conversational analysis approach to code switching, and following this 
proposal Li Wei (in Auer 1998 p: 159) points out that: 
'In conversational interaction, either bilingual or monolingual, speakers are 
faced with the fact that the situation is simply not defined unambiguously 
... and even if the situation was fairly clear, to the co-participants, they 
simply do not have time to examine the current case for common features 
with similar precedent cases. Instead, their attention is paid, first and 
foremost, to the new case itself and each and every new move by their co- 
interactants. ' 
But if we invoke innateness of language processing procedures, perhaps the 
decision to switch to a different code takes as infinitesimal a time dimension 
as it does in a monolingual speech mode where focus is on 'each and every 
move by co-interactants. ' This is so because as Gumperz puts it, even in 
conversational code switching, the interlocutors' main concern is 'with the 
communicative effect of what they are saying' and that 'selection of 
linguistic alternants is automatic and not readily subject to conscious recall. ' 
(ibid p6l) My argument is that bilingual processing is as natural and as 
automatic as monolingual processing. Unlike Li Wei here on conversational 
code switching which he believes is not situation based, Gumperz sees 
conversational code switching as part of communicative competence and 
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suggests that 'the social nonns and rules which govern language use (in code 
switching), at first glance at least, seem to function much like grammatical 
rules. ' He therefore proposes that, 
'Rather than claiming that speakers use language in response to a fixed, 
predetermined set of prescriptions, it seems more reasonable to assume that 
they build on their own and their audience's abstract understanding of 
situational norm, to communicate metaphoric information about how they 
wish their words to be understood. ' (Gumperz 19 82 p. 6 1) 
So Auer's suggestion that conversational switching cannot be stituationally 
defined does not take cognizance of this earlier formulation of the 
communicative competence of the bilingual. 
8.1.3.2 The Imarkedness' approach 
Similar to the situational approach of earlier studies is Myers-Scotton's 
'markedness' approach, which suggests that code choices are indexical of the 
rigbt and obligations set (RO sets) between participants in a given interaction 
(which Li Wei sees as an abstraction derived from situational factors). 
Myers-Scotton. argues that interactional types are 'to a large extent 
conventionalised in all communities and carry relatively fixed schemata 
about the roles, relations and norms of appropriate social behaviour including 
language behaviour. ' Myers-Scotton (1998) explains markedness in these 
terms: 'the use of a particular code is viewed in terms of the unmarked versus 
marked oppositions in reference to the extent its use 'matches' community 
expectations for the interaction type or genre where it is used: what 
community norms would predict is unmarked; what is not predicted is 
marked. ' (p. 5) She qualifies this statement by pointing out that these codes 
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fall in a continuum from more or less marked rather than being categorical. 
Myers -Scotton has produced various models and formulations attempting to 
account for code switching. These include the matrix language model, IýE 
(1995), which is an explanation and analysis of the grammar of code 
switching and the Rational Choice Model, RC (2001), which explains the 
cognitively based social functions of code switching. These models signify 
the continuing struggle to pin down important elements of code switching 
8.1.33 The sequential approach 
The sequential approach is embedded in the CA approach to discourse 
analysis. Auer (1995 p: 117), proposing the approach begins with the 
question 'Do bilinguals participants see and use code switching? ' which 
refocuses studies of code switching from "two structural systems referring to 
each other' to 'the speakers, ' He says that 'this implies a shift from the 
structural to the interpretive approach. ' Auer prefaces his discussion by 
making the claim that his theory of conversational code alternation 'should 
be applicable to a wide range of conversational phenomena ... and to very 
different bilingual communities and settings. ' 
Auer (1995 p: 16) explains that sequential means the determining of a given 
code switched utterance by a preceding turn in the conversation and that 
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'sequentiality of code alternation refers to both preceding and subsequent 
utterances, that is, the language chosen for a speech activity should be seen 
against the background of language choice in the preceding utterance. ' I 
understand this to mean that an explanation of the functions of code 
switching should consider what happens in one turn that leads to a switching 
of code in the next turn and back to the language of the conversation in the 
next turn or the sustaining of the language switched to in several turns. If this 
can be determined, then we can hazard a guess as to the function of code 
switching in the particular instance. Auer insists that 'code switching can 
have conversational meaning even if used in a particular conversation only 
once. ' This means to me that we do not need a large corpus of code switched 
utterances in order to get at the functional analysis of code switching in the 
courtroom. Even used sparingly and occasionally, as it appears in my data, it 
can still be a subject of interpretive analysis. 
8.2 My model 
Code switching performs a wide range of functions and appears to be 
amenable to interpretation by various approaches. One approach is to be 
eclectic in explanation of the t)rpes of code switching and its functions. In 
fact one discussion that makes eclecticism possible and fruitful is Grosjean's 
(1982) comprehensive abstraction of the factors influencing code switching 
which allows varying focus on a particular instance of code switching. He 
lists four main classes of factors being - Participant, situation, content of 
discourse and function of interaction. 
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The following table economically displays the factors influencing language 
choice. 








Language Location/Setting Topic To raise 
proficiency Presence of Type of status 
Language monolinguals vocabulary To create 
preference Degree of social 
Socio-economic formality distance 
status Degree of To include 
Age intimacy or 
Sex exclude 
Occupation someone 
Education To request 











Outside pressure I I I 
Table 13 Grosjean (1982) Factors influencing language choice 
Grosjean (1982) points out that any one factor may account for choosing one 
language over another, but usually it is a combination of several factors that 
explains language choice. In my analysis of language alternation in the data 
of this study and effort will be made to search for the particular constellation 
of factors explaining a particular code switched utterance. 
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Some comparison between the code switching of litigants with that of 
magistrates will be made. Also code switching in the turns of police 
prosecutors and witnesses in examinations, a productive area for the type of 
code switching called language preference of co-participants in a 
conversation; the pattern described by Auer (1995 p: 125) as Al B2, will be 
examined. Here speaker I uses language A and speaker 2 use language B, 
that is, different speakers prefer to speak to each other in different languages 
understood by both speakers. 
In my research, one magistrate who code switches said that he has his own 
style of presiding. Later this style (also documented by Meeuwis (1998 p: 
80) was demonstrated when, occasionally, in a very relaxed way he switched 
to Setswana when speaking to litigants. I interpreted this as serving to create 
a relaxed atmosphere in the court and putting a human face on the law when 
he includes the non English speaking litigants rather than excluding them 
from the proceedings by using a language they do not understand all the 
time. All the language alternations of various kinds seem to do just this. It 
means that the litigant is free to speak his own language and be listened to 
first hand, without interpretation and then be interpreted to when English is 
used in issues that relate directly to him such as in charge sheets, 
examinations, summaries of the facts of the case and in judgements. 
Submissions made by prosecutors and counsel to the magistrate, are not 
interpreted to the litigant because although they concern the litigant, they are 
addressed to the magistrate not to the litigants. 
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But before we introduce the analysis of the Botswana courtroom data it is 
helpful to the reader to indicate the context of Botswana that relates to the 
uses of languages in the courts. 
83 The courtroom context for Bilingualism 
I shall discuss bilingualism in the Botswana courtroom in the context of other 
known bilingual courtrooms viz. the United States courtrooms as discussed 
by Susan Berk-Seligson in her book named The Bilingual Courtroom (1990) 
and the Malaysian courtrooms as discussed by Mead (1985) in his 
monograph Courtroom Discourse, English Language Research. 
The Botswana magistrate's court is bilingual in ways other than only in 
allowing for interpretation. There are at least two languages used in the 
courtrooms' everyday proceedings. These are English, the official language, 
and Setswana, the national language. (Later, with analysis of tape-recorded 
proceedings of the court supplying the data, I shall show how these 
languages are used. ) 
The general language context of the United States, at least the most studied 
context, is one where the speakers of other languages other than English are 
minority populations. So it appears as if the only way to recognise the 
existence of other languages in the courtroom is through providing for 
interpretation. The language situation of Malaysia, which is officially 
bilingual, is significantly different. Mead (19 85) showed in his survey of 
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Malaysian courts that 'courts are evenly balanced in their choice of language. 
Many courts use both languages within a single case, switching from one to 
another in deference to the racial identity of a Nvitness. ' The Botswana 
situation is yet another type of language situation. Here the law does not 
allow for use of other languages except through interpreting, but the 
empirical situation will be seen to be suff iciently different as to warrant 
description and typological analysis. The lack of study of this situation may 
make it seem as if the policy is one in which languages are not in contact in 
any significant way. For example what would the law do if it found out that 
the language statute was not rigidly adhered to by relevant parties to court? 
Would it consider the situation unacceptable or would it legislate in keeping 
with the real, sociologically documented language reality? It is a third type of 
language situation in that the language of the court is also a minority 
language unlike the United States' situation where the language of the court 
is the language of the majority, which makes it sufficient to merely provide 
for interpretation for defendants and witnesses who do not understand and 
speak English. A situation in which the minority, magistrates, prosecutors 
and counsel, are bilingual in both English and Setswana and most of the 
people they serve speak only one of their languages (Setswana) is bound to 
be have special characteristics of its own. These are the characteristics this 
study of bilingualism and the use of languages in a court of law in Gaborone 
in Botswana seeks to analyse and describe, hopefully to contribute to the 
literature on bilingual usage in the courtroom domain. 
8.4 Analysis of bilingual courtroom data 
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I will now examine and interpret the bilingual data from this courtroom from 
the perspective I have outlined in 8.2 focusing not only on the grammar of 
code switching but also on its functions.. 
First, we want to note that the bilingualism of the Botswana courtroom is 
pervasive and can be seen in the various courtroom processes. It comes up in 
the examinations transactions, the readings of charge sheets in court, 
readings of the facts of the case before judgements and in the speech of both 
courtroom officials like magistrates and interpreters and in litigants' speech. 
The kinds of bilingual usages of various courtroom processes and persona 
are very interesting and may even be specific to Botswana, therefore 
providing us with a new terrain to traverse in the theory of bilingualism. To 
discuss this particular instance of bilingualism is to experience the power of 
language in use. 
From observation in the field and from transcription of courtroom 
proceedings it soon becomes clear that two languages are in use by different 
court participants. We can begin with the question of who uses which 
language in the courtroom and then go on to the various courtroom processes 
in which two languages are used. 
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8.4.1 Who speaks which language? 
First, many litigants use Setswana but often understand English enough to 
respond to it without translation. This creates the kind of bilingual use 
described by Li Wei (1994: 152-153) as Level B, when speakers use different 
languages in consecutive turns. This type of code switching may be called 
'language preference switching. ' Li Wei theorises that this kind of switching 
is found in conversation involving participants of different language abilities 
and attitudes. In his data code switching is overwhelmingly at this level. In 
this courtroom data this theory seems to hold. It seems to me that the reason 
why a litigant will consistently respond to a statement (in the courtroom data 
normally a question) in a different language from that in which the question 
was phrased must have to do with the fact that the language of the question is 
understood well enough, but perhaps not spoken well enough to attempt to 
respond in it. This was the case in one whole direct examination in which the 
prosecutor put all his questions in English and the witness answered all these 
questions in Setswana. To go back to the model I have selected to use, what 
factors seem involved here? From the PARTICIPANT FACTORS 
COLUMN, it seems reasonable to invoke the language proficiency, language 
preference, socio-economic status and the education factors as the 
constellation of factors that explain the following type of code switching. 
SITUATION factors do not seem activated as the location/setting and 
degrees of formality or intimacy do not seem capable of explaining this 
particular appearance of code switching. We would expect the 
location/setting and degrees of formality and intimacy factors to preclude 
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code switching in the court context, which is characterised by a formal tenor, 
but code switching occurs in this setting. In fact all other factors seem 
irrelevant to the appearance of this code switching. So this data establishes 
the fact that code switching occurs in a range of situations from casual 
conversation to formal contexts like courtroom examinations depending on 
the particulars of participants like their proficiency, preference, socio- 
economic status and levels of education. From observation, I would describe 
the woman who answered all the questions put to her in English in her own 
first language, Setswana as educated ( English is only acquired in Botswana 
through schooling), as proficient enough in English to understand fully the 
questions put to her in English but as preferring to answer them in Setswana. 
Her socio-economic status is middle class (she owns and drives a car). The 
following excerpt is from a direct examination that was conducted wholly in 
this mode. 
Excerpt 1. 
A. Prosecutor: Where did you say the accident happened? 
B. Witness: Gone mo Broadhurst fa o hapaanya strata se se tswelang 
ko ... (inaudible) (Here in Broadhurst when you come to cross that street which goes out to 
(inaudible) 
A. Prosecutor: Could you tell this court what happened? 
B. Witness: Nna erile ke tsamaya mo streiting hela ke labile go go ema ke 
bone koloi e nngwe e tshweu e tswa kwa pele ga me ebe e tswa mo teng 
ga tsela. 
(Me while I was driving along the street just about to stop I saw a white car 
coming from the opposite direction and then it got out of the road. 
A. Prosecutor: Yes. To what direction was this motor vehicle which collided 
with you? 
B. Witness: E ne e tswa (inaudible) 
(It was coming from(inaudible) 
A. Prosecutor: Did you have the chance to see the registration number? 
B. Witness: Ga ke ise ke nne le chanse ya go leba registration number ka 
nne ke shokegile. 
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(I did not get the chance to look at the registration number because I was 
shocked. ) 
A. Prosecutor: Yes. Were you alone? 
B. Witness: Nne ke na ke rre M. M. 
(I was with Mr M. M. ) 
A. Prosecutor: Can you tell this court what could have caused the accident? 
B. Witness: accidente e kane e causitswe ke gore rre erile ha koloi e sena 
go ab a t1a ko gonna ... Mme o ne a lebega a thetheekela a nole bojalwa. (The accident may have been caused by that this gentleman after the collision 
came to me and said its you who caused the accident ... but he was 
staggering as if he was drunk. ) 
A. Prosecutor: Why do you say the accused person was drunk? 
B. Witness: Nne bo nkga mo go ene ebile o ne a nkatumetse ha a nthaya a 
re ke mothudile. 
(I sensed a smell of alcohol on him as he Nvas close to me when he told me 
that I had hit him. ) 
The whole examination is conducted in this mode up to the end, with 
questions put in English and answered in Setswana. As can be seen from my 
translation, the answers are appropriate to the questions. The witness 
understands English but does not elect to speak it in this case. So, going back 
to the point about who speaks what language, we see here that the prosecutor 
speaks English as English is the language of the magistrate's court in 
Botswana, but the litigant speaks Setswana. This is a bilingual situation in 
which two languages are in use not only through interpretation. But the 
situation is even more complex in that the other participants - the magistrate 
and various counsel - listen to interchanges involving both languages and 
make their record of both contributions in English. What the magistrates 
actually record would be very interesting to analyse if we could find an 
examination, which ties well with the record. Data collection was not, 
however, sensitive to this aspect of the proceedings and therefore there is no 
data to exemplify the phenomenon of listening to one language and recording 
in another. What record we do have is that of a magistrate recording of 
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narration by a witness, (which came as part of one magistrate's written 
judgement of a case which I was offered) This record sounds like a near 
literal recording of a narration which may have been originally in Setswana. 
The narration as recorded by the magistrate goes like this: 
I was at the lands sitting on the shade under a tree within the yard. 
My yard is not very far from the kmal. I saw police officers kraaling 
The goats and closing the kraal and I saw them go away to fetch our 
goats. I 
I saw them kraaling them. I did not count the goats which they kraaled 
first. I 
Saw them kraaling our goats, they were many. 
The cross examination then continues with one statement by the defence 
counsel and an answer which are recorded as such: 
Q. I put it to you that you are misleading the court by stating that some 
goats 
Were taken from Rraniri's farm. 
A. I am not misleading the court in anyway. 
Mead (1985 p. 14) observed a similar phenomenon in the courts in Malaysia. 
He says that 'it is normal for a magistrate's notes of evidence to be 
represented in first person narrative form. ' And also that 'the witness spoke 
in Malay but the evidence was interpreted and both it and the subsequent 
judgement were recorded in English. ' The effect of not requiring Setswana to 
be interpreted into English for the court is to make the atmosphere of the 
court friendly for the litigant. It makes court proceedings relaxed and less 
strenuous. It has been suggested or even 'established, ' however, that 
institutional written records such as that of police interviews of suspects, is 
not always above board (Coulthard 1996, 'The official version'pp. 165-178). 
So the windfall of being able to speak in your own language and be listened 
to by others who speak more languages that you may be tempered with this 
possibility of misrepresentatiorL Not withstanding Coulthard (1996), 
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however, where he argues that courts did collude with the police, both as 
institutional members, (as for instance when he says that '... the police and 
the Courts collaborated in the pretence that police officers could remember 
what had been said in an interview or even during a house search and arrest 
so accurately that they could be relied upon to write up a verbatim record 
hours after the event' (p. 169)), it is difficult to see why the magistrates and 
counsel would knowingly produce a false record of the proceedings. The 
two situations are also different because the police wrote their records 
several hours after the event and the magistrate and counsel write theirs 
simultaneously and can always hold the proceedings on wait while they are 
writing. 
Still on the question of who speaks what language in this courtroom, we find 
that all participants are not equally constrained as to which language they 
should speak. Prosecutors are the most constrained linguistically in this 
courtroom. Although Setswana is universally (in this courtroom) listened to, 
it is legally spoken only by the litigant. The prosecutor is sternly enjoined to 
speak English by the magistrate when he or she is tempted to express things 
in Setswana. The prosecutor does not even code-switch to Sets"vana. This is 
a valid observation borne out by data-coding; prosecutors speak only English 
in the courtroom, yet counsel can get away with an occasional switch for 
clarification to the litigant but only very briefly. An example is one case 
involving an old man who often ventured to speak English even when 
sometimes it confused the court. It was a case of stock theft, which is 
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normally dealt with better in Setswana language kgotla (customary court). 
The defense counsel at one point had to ask this prosecution witness: 
Defense Counsel: Ao kile wa duelwa madi mangwe ke defendant ka ga 
kgomo, ena? 
(Were you ever payed any money by the defendant relating to this cow? 
Witness: No 
At another juncture defense counsel requested the old man: 
Defense Counsel: Can you say that in Setswana to get it clear? 
Witness: Re ne ra omana. Ke be ke mo raya ke re ka tsone dilo tse tsotlhe ke 
go isa court(e) ka tsone. 
(We quarrelled and I told him, 'for all these things I am taking you to court). 
8.4.2 The language of the presiding officer: The Magistrate 
The case of the magistrate however is very different. He is the least 
constrained linguistically. But before I seem to be making the claim that 
magistrates in this court speak Setswana at will, that is without regard for the 
Magistrates Court Act, it is necessary to describe the place of the magistrate 
in this linguistically complex domain. He or she presides in a multilingual 
courtroom and there are pragmatic implications for this role. He must hear 
most people in the language they choose to speak in (mostly Setswana which 
he or she, in this court, understands and can use. ) It is not surprising 
therefore that he will occasionally address the litigant in this language. In this 
data it has been only in addressing the litigant that the magistrate has used 
Setswana, never to the prosecutors or to counsel. However even magistrates 
differ in the language they use to conduct a trial. There were four magistrates 
whose proceedings were tape-recorded. Two were woman magistrates. One 
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code-switched intrasententially, the other aided her clerk in translating the 
charge sheet from English to Setswana'simultaneously' in court. Of the two 
men magistrates, one never used Setswana even when addressing the litigant. 
Excerpt 1 case number twenty 
Magistrate: Do you have anything to say accused? 
Interpreter Gatwe a go na, le se o batlang go se bua? 
(It is said do you have anything to say) 
Accused: Nnyaa rra, ga, seyo. 
(No sir, there's nothing) 
Magistrate: Tell him to come on the 11"' of March. 
The other Magistrate(man), however was not averse to addressing the 
defendant directly and in Setswana. 
Excerpt 2 case number 106-08-99. 
A: Accused: Ke kopa go ntsha, submissione fa pele ga lekgotla. 
(I request to make a submission before the court. ) 
B Magistrate: Why do you want to submit today? 
C. Interpreter: Ke eng o batla gontsha, submission es letsatsi la tsheko? 
A. Accused: Ke gore ke ne ke ithaya ke re (inaudible) Go mo toronkong mo 
ke a sotlega. Ga ke robale sentle gape ke robatswa k-e k-e bewa fa gare, ga 
batho, ba ba lwalang. Yo mongwe o lwala hela malwetse a dintho o mongwe 
o bolawa ke T. B. Ke robatsvva ha gare ga batho ba ene re pitlagane. 
(It's because I thought (inaudible) at the jail there I am suffering. I don't 
sleep well. I sleep between people who have diseases the other one suffers 
from diseases of sores and the other suffers from T. B. I am made to sleep 
between these people and we are packed close together. ) 
B. Magistrate: Jaanong o batla go hudusetswa ko main prison? 
(So you want to be transferred to the main prison? ) 
A. Accused: Ha lekgotla le mpona molato. 
(If the court finds me guilty. ) 
B. Magistrate: Jaanong ko main prison gone Ra goa pitlagana? 
(Is the main prison not crowded? ) 
A. Accused: (silence) 
B. Magistrate: Report to this court in 21 days. I will call upon the prosecutor 
to help you solve your problems. 
This interchange can be analysed by an adaptation of Li Wei's (1998: 166) 
schema. He analyses speaker, language and function in the same ways I do 
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here but I include the function of interpretation, accused person's silence and 
magistrate's closing. 
Speaker Language Function 
A: accused Setswana Request 
B: magistrate English Question 
C: interpreter Setswana Interpreting to 
accused 
A: accused Setswana Answer 
B: magistrate Setswana Question 
A: accused Setswana Answer 
B: magistrate Setswana, Question 
A: accused Silence Uncertainty 
B: magistrate English Closing: 
Command and 
reassurance 
Table 14 Language choices and functions in an exchange between a 
magistrate and a defendant 
The first exchange in this interchange involves three participants, the middle 
participant being the interpreter. But in the second exchange the magistrate 
dispenses with interpretation and speaks to the accused directly in his own 
language. The purpose seems to be that the magistrates wants to give the 
accused the chance to speak but at the same time to upbraid him for having 
205 
put himself in a situation where he has to be in prison at all. He closes the 
interchange a command in English, seemingly re-distancing himself from the 
litigant by speaking in the language of the court, thus reverting to the correct 
tenor of the courtroom's formal role relations. This is the administrative 
'style' of one magistrate who intimated to me that he has his own style of 
presiding. It included using two languages effectively and judicially. 
We move now from focusing on who speaks what language to where in the 
judicial proccess different languages are used together. This area also has its 
own uniqueness to this courtroom. 
8.43 Functions and tYpes of code switching. 
Code switching is said to serve several functions by various researchers. 
Appel and Muysken (1987) offer several functions that they say are built up 
from the 'extensive' discussion of the question in sociolinguistic literature. 
They discuss the question of why people switch languages in their interaction 
from the functional perspective. 
In their analysis, the first function of code switching is the referential 
function. This is the type of code witching that bilinguals are most 
conscious of They give the reason for switching as arising from lack of 
knowledge of a word for a thing or an idea in the language they are currently 
speaking or that the language they switch to is more appropriate for talking 
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about the particular subject. Myers-Scotton (1979) gives an example from a 
university student in Kenya who switches between Kikuyu and English. 
Ati kiri ANGLE niati HAS ina DEGREE EIGHY nayo, THIS ONE ina 
mirongo itatu kuguori, IF THE TOTAL SUM OF THE TRIANGLE ni ONE 
EIGHTY ri IT MEANS THE REMAINING ANGLE in ndigirii mirongo 
mugwanya. (cited in Appel and Muysken 1987 pp. 118-119) 
This function may be the reason why some litigants (in my data) switch to 
English from Setswana for expressions like 'ga ke minde. 'The concept in 
Setswana does not exactly match the English concept. The litigant could say 
the concept nearest in meaning to 'I don't mind, ' which is 'Ga ke 
tshwenyege. ' Which means 'It does not bother me. ' 
Poplack (1980) in particular suggested the expressive function of code 
switching, which comes into play when code switching is engaged in simply 
to indicate the identity of people who use two languages (cited in Appel and 
Muysken 1999 p. 119). This seems to be the motivation of some BatsNvana 
who write code switched columns for newspapers. It has also been observed 
in this courtroom by this researcher when the magistrate occasionally 
switches to Setswana during the proceedings. I have said before that it seems 
to remove the magistrate from the heights of the role he plays in court to the 
level of ordinary mortals and helps him identify with and may be even 
empower the non-English speaking litigants by putting a human face on the 
law. 
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Several other functions are discussed by Appel and Muysken (1999), which I 
do not think are relevant in a formal context like the courtroom. These are 
the phatic or metaphorical function, which serves to indicate a change of tone 
in conversation and the metalinguistic, which involves commenting on the 
language, used just to show off linguistic skill and the poetic function. 
To turn now to the Botswana courtroom, it is important to note that code 
switching in this courtroom is engaged in by those participants who are least 
constrained to speak only one language, that is, litigants and some 
magistrates. As the literature on code switching has established, code 
switching is a legitimate communication strategy among bilinguals. It is seen 
as 'a central part of bilingual discourse' (Romaine 19 89 p. 118) and quite 
enthusiastically described as such by Bell (1983) and Dulay (1982). It is not 
surprising, therefore that whenever people know that they both speak the 
same two languages they switch between those languages when they speak to 
each other. This is very well exemplified by the speech of the one magistrate 
whose presiding style included deliberate or 'rational' language choice 
(Myers-Scotton 2001). 
Prosecutor: I am applying for the case to be withdrawn. 
Magistrate: Why is that? 
Prosecutor: eh an error in the print out... sample deficient. 
Magistrate: What is that? 
Prosecutor: Let me explain, Your Worship, the breathaliser says the sample 
was deficient. 
Magistrate: But e kgonne go ntsha printoutejang e le defficiente? 
(But how did it manage to give out the print out if it was deficient? ) 
Prosecutor: It said the sample was not above 1000ml... that's how the 
machine works. 
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Magistrate: Stand up accused. 
Accused: (stands up) 
Magistrate: Ba re ha ne ha go akela. So you will be discharged. 
(They say they Nvere lying about you). (Note that the use of strong tenns like 
lying is not unusual in courtroom discourse. Lawyers use them all the time) 
In this instance the magistrate addresses both the prosecutor and the litigant 
in a code -switching mode. The purpose for the svdtching seems to be rather 
in favour of the Tswana spealcing defendant, a way of empowering the 
litigant while rather castigating the prosecutor who, though he is addressed in 
SetsNvana, is not expected to respond in the language. Here the magistrate is 
seen to be rather identifying with the defendant against whom the charge is 
withdrawn and whom he discharges, while he is expressing impatience with 
prosecutors who do not do adequate preparation of their cases. 
In another instance of code switching by the same magistrate, he is 
addressing the witness. He asks him a question in English and then asks 
another, clarifying what he is asking for: 
Magistrate: Where do you stay? (The witness hesitates to answer the 
question and the magistrate follows on by asking the same question in 
Setswana, not exactly the same question as asked in English but a rephrase 
meant to clarify the meaning of the question. ) 0 Isoga kae ha re huajaana? 
(In translation this means 'Where have you woken up from as we are 
speaking? ' (A question usually asked in the population census and whose 
meaning most Batswana, normally meaning that where you slept is where 
you stay, very well know) 
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After the witness answers the question, the magistrate continues in Setswana. 
'Mm, tswelela. (Yes, continue) The witness asks whether he can speak in 
Setswana and the Magistrate answers, 'Yes, hua ka Setswana Rra. ' (Speak in 
Setswana, sir. ) 
The transcript from which this excerpt comes from features the speech of a 
self- defending, accused person under sworn evidence. He speaks a mixture 
of Setswana, and EnIgish and the magistrate finds no problem with this. 
Accused: I C. K. M. do hereby swear that the evidence I shall give shall be 
the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth. So help me God. 
Magistrate: You have stated two place where do you stay? 
Accused: Hesitation 
Magistrate: 0 tsoga kae ha re buajaana? 
(Where have you woken up as we speak? ) 
Accused: In Gaborone I stay at Gaborone Village. 
Magistrate: Ee, tswella. (Ye go on) 
Accused. Can I speak in Setswana 
Magistrate: Yes sir bua Setswana rra. (Speak Setswana, sir. ) 
This magistrate's code switching seems to be a statement about the place of 
English in the courtroom. English occupies a purely utilitarian place. It is not 
sacrosanct, although having the language of the court being officially only 
one helps a great deal in this multingual speech community context. 
It is apparent here that the magistrate speaks two languages and code 
switches them purposefully. He realises that the litigant speaks some English 
but probably not proficiently enough to sustain an English only speech mode. 
So he encourages him to speak the language he is really more proficient in by 
using it himself It is here that one can evoke Myers-Scottons' indexical, 
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function of code switching, that is code switching functioning to indicate role 
relationships. The magistrate reduces the social distance created by the 
hierachical power relations of the courtoom. This interpretation of the social 
function of code switching can be justified with reference to this magistrate's 
other linguistic behavior. There are at least two other instances when he 
seems to employ other social distance reduction discourse markers. In one 
case after quizzing the prosecutor about the reason why the police remaded a 
young defendant in prison, the magistrate addresses the accused person: 
Magistrate: Alright, I'll take you in my confidence and grant you bail for one 
thousand Pula. 
And to another he says: Alright, listen careftilly to the reading of the facts. 
Adjourning one case he complained of tiredness and said, 
'I work like a slave. This case will be adjoumed to later this aftemoon. ' 
All these remarks mark the magistrate's style. My ethnographic observations 
are that this style is at least as authoritative as that of the magistrate who 
never switched to Setswana and even doubly distanced himself by using the 
interpreter to relay ordinary information such as the setting of the next date 
of hearings by commanding the interpreter: 'Tell him to come on the 
eleventh of March. ' The less distant magistrate negotiates the setting of the 
date of the next hearing: Wright, how about the 1e of MarchT and the 
prosecutor and defense counsel can indicate if the date is suitable and 
respectfully acquiesce: 'As it pleases the court. ' 
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8.4.4 A developmental perspective on code switching 
Before we lose the trend of code switching as exemplified by this magistrate 
perhaps we may introduce here the type of code switching, which he may or 
may not share with the litigants. First we recognise that the magistrate is a 
bilingual with a high proficiency in both languages, - English and Setswana. 
So the question may be asked whether there is a difference between the 
codes switching of different types of bilinguals? This question may be 
informative and even bring about a different perspective of code switching as 
I have experienced and indulged in as a bilingual in Setswana, and English. 
The interesting question in this regard would be, 'Are there any stages of 
development in the language development of bilinguals? ' If we go by my 
intuition as a bilingual, it would seem to me that there are certain periods of 
the development of the second language in which bilinguals are prone to 
switching between languages. This does not mean they are necessarily 
unable to communicate with only one language because it has been 
experienced by me and by my interlocutors that we do not switch codes in 
conversation with monolinguals of either language. On the other hand, I have 
found it difficult not to code switch when I know that my interlocutors will 
not be unsettled by my speech mode. This happened earlier on in my 
language development especially at the university level of an English as a 
second language context. I would sometimes deplore my speech mode but 
was somehow compelled willy nilly to switch codes. I would ask myself 
'don't I know English enough or Setswana enough to have completed that 
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utterance in only one languageT This wholesale code switching seems to be 
a stage in bilingual language development. The bilingual compelled to speak 
in two languages only because he or she knows the languages not out of 
deliberate planning. This is why observers of code switching have said things 
like: 
The rapidity and automaticity with which such alternations take place 
may give the impression that the speaker lacks control of of the 
structural systems of the two languages and is mixing them 
indiscriminately. (Dulay et al 1982) 
I can sympathise with this attitude. To someone who knows only one of the 
languages of the code switcher the rapidity and automaticity of code 
switching may be unnerving. But to put their minds at rest about this 
phenomenon, one can point out that automaticity and rapidity of use of any 
language known by the speaker is a purely natural phenomenon, whether it 
involves a single language or several languages. If it were not natural it 
would be very difficult to account for it. As to the question of conscious 
control one would point out again that it is a rare speaker who plans fully 
before making an utterance in the language he or she knows. The languages 
are mixed mainly because they are mixable not because of any conscious 
decision to use both languages. at least not all the time. 
However, all said and done, the kind of code switching that happens with this 
magistrate is to be seen as deliberate as the institutional context to some 
extent proscribes it. It is used sparingly and with calculated effect. It is as if 
the speaker has the maxim that the law was made for man, not man for the 
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law. This is the synchronic position of the use of different languages in one 
context, the ongoing state of languages in the specific context. They are 
sometimes used together, in various ways, by court participants. Below I 
shall attempt a description of this mixture of languages showing the grammar 
of the mixed codes, which is mostly at the level of phonology and 
morphology. 
8.4.5 Similarities and differences between the code switching of litigants 
and that of the magistrate 
Linguistically, the code switching of both magistrates and litigants falls into 
two classes - the syntactical switching and lexical switching. Syntactical 
switching is of two types. One is the situation where in the turn of one 
speaker, one sentence is in one language and the next is in a different 
language, that is, inter-sentential switching. According to Romaine (1989 p. 
122) inter-sentential code switching involves a switch at clause and sentence 
boundaries where each sentence is in one language or the other. It may also 
occur between speakers turns as in a question made in one language and 
answered in the other language by the other interlocutor as in the example 
given in the earlier section of this chapter - 'Who speaks what languageT 
There is also intrasentential switching where a clause exhibits the grammar 
of two languages. A very informative example comes from the speech of one 
magistrate: 
Magistrate: But e kgonne go ntshaprintoutejang e le difficiente? 
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This specimen of language is particularly important as it represents what I 
may call the community norm of code switching. A lot of the cods-witching 
between Setswana and English is of this type. The utterance begins in 
English, 'But' and then it is completed in a typical mixture of Setswana with 
English words phonologically integrated into Setswana phonology. 'E 
kgonne go ntshapfintoutejang, eIe defficiente? is the Setswana frame of 
the grammatical structure. The bold italics represent the phonologically 
integrated English words. ne sentence in English is 'But how could it 
release the printout if it (the sample of breath) is deficientT The 'but' at the 
beginning of the question signals the fact that some of the words will be in 
English- I will also show how an utterance can be basically Setswana in 
grammar but contain English words, when I analyse the code switching of 
litigants. What the code switching of the magistrate shares in common with 
that of the litigant is the fact of inserting phonologically integrated English 
words into Setswana sentence frames. The English words are 'Tswanalysed' 
as the Batswana say of such language. The penultimate syllable of the words 
4printoute' and 'defficiente' is constructed in accordance with Setswana 
phonology. Cole (1955 p. 67) in his Introduction to Tswana Grammar 
describes this characteristic of Setswana phonology. He says that 
'Stabilizers are prefixal or suffixal elements which have no intrinsic 
significance or concordial function, their sole purpose is to provide an 
additional syllable for words which generally speaking would otherwise be 
monosyllabic. and thus to accommodate the characteristic penultimate 
accent. ' In this example of Tswanalised English words, the Vat the ends of 
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the words 'Prinfouteand 'defficiente' is accentual, ie it gives the words their 
Setswana pronunciation. The reason for the use of these Tswana/English 
words is that it must be clear which elements of the question relate to those 
in the prior utterance. There is as yet no Setswana terminology for most of 
computer technological terms, like 'printout' but there is a Setswana 
equivalent for 'deficient. ' So it seems that the use of the Tswanalysed term is 
triggered by the use of the previous technological term. 
As I have pointed out before, the magistrate uses code switching sparingly. 
But when he does his language is the same as that of any Motswana using 
English words in Setswana frames, i. e. it follows the community norms for 
code switching. The following examples come from the code switching of 
one lady witness. 
Excerpt I Tape no. 8 Case no. 23 15-08-99 
Prosecutor: Did you have the chance to see the registration number? 
Witness: Ga ke ise ke bone chancee ya go bona registration number ka ke ne 
ke shokegile. (I did not get the chance to see the registration number because 
I was shocked. ) 
Excerpt 2 Tape no. 8 case no. 23 15-08-99 
Prosecutor: Can you tell this court what could have caused the accident? 
Witness: Accidente e kane e causitswe ke gore rre erile ha a etc. (The 
accident may have been caused by that this gentleman ... etc) 
Excerpt 3 Tape 8. case no. 23.15-08-99 
Prosecutor: Yes. And did the police come to the scene of the accident? 
Witness: Ee, mapodisi a ne a t1a. (Yes the police came. ) 
Prosecutor And what did they do? 
Witness: Ba ne ba measury dikoloi ba bo ba re tseela ko , police station. (They measured the cars and then took us to the police station. ) 
Prosecutor And what happened at the police station? 
Witness: Ko police statione ha ne ba Isaya statemente ha be ba mpollelela 
gore ba nkhupisa tame ke he ke ha bolelela gore ga ke minde go hupa tame 
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ka gore ga ke a nwa bojalwa (At they police station they took the statement 
and told me that they would breath- test me. I told them that I don't mind 
being breathe tested as I had not consumed any alcoholic drink. ) 
The kind of code switching exemplified by these excerpts from this speaker 
is that of lexical insertion. With English words being inserted into Setswana 
grammatical frameswith phonological and/or morphological integration. 
Exwnples: 
1. Gake ise ke bone chanse The English word 'chance' is pronounced with a 
Setswana accent which adds the stabilizer, 'e' to the the English syllable 's' 
2. Ke ne ke shokegaile. The English adjective 'shocked' is integrated into 
Setswana morphology with the addition of the Seswana inflection for the 
past tense '-ile-' 
3. A ccidente e kane e caucasitswe ke gore... The English noun 'accident' is 
pronounced with a Setswana accent with the stabiizer 'e. 'added to the 
voiceless plosive 't, ' and the English verb, 'caused' is morphologically 
integrated by the replacement of the English past tense morpheme with the 
Setswana past tense morpheme '-itswe-' 
4. Ba ne ha 'measura, dikoloi. The English verb 'measured' is both 
phonologically and morphologically integrated. The Setswana past tense 
morpheme -ne- replaces the English past tense inflection '-ed-'(note that 
the Setswana morpheme is not part of the verb, ie. It is not an inflection but a 
freestanding morpheme. With this kind of past tense creation, the English 
verb 'measure' is then only phonologically integrated with the stabilizer 'a', 
which added to a word ending with the voiced sibilant 'djz. ' 
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5. KoXglice statione he ne bafela ha Isaya statement ke be ke ha bolelela gore 
ga ke minde do hupa tame... (at the police station they took down the 
statement ... and I told them that I 
don't mind being breath tested as I have 
not ... ) The English expression 'don't mind' 
becomes the Setswana. 'ga ke 
minde. ' 
The last example 'statement' and 'don't mind' are the only instance of 
lexical insertion that is necessitated by a lack of a parallel concept or word in 
Setswana. All the other insertions are not caused by any absence of a 
Setswana word. The word for 'accident' in Setswana, is 'kotsi, ' and the word 
for 'chance' in Setswana is 'sebaka, ' and the word for 'shocked' is 'tshogile 
thata', 'caused' is 'dirilwe' and 'measure' is 'meta. ' 
The explanation for this switching of codes on the part of this ordinary 
Motswana woman may be that she knows the words in English but does not 
have enough grammar of English to construct the sentences fully in English. 
So she is using Setswana syntax with English vocabulary. This is allowed in 
any ordinary bilingual context. So she brings into the courtroom the 
community's norms for bilingual interaction. This is particularly interesting 
if compared to the language of other court participants like the clerk of court 
for example. He or she is the only person who has to speak Setswana but he 
never code switches except for saying the time and dates in English, for 
example, when he interprets the times set for trial to the litigants. In other 
words interpreting is a conscious use of languages and the clerk-cum- 
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interpreter knows that the court context is a formal one determining the 
suitability or otherwise of code switching. 
So far I have discussed three types of code switching in this courtroom. The 
first is the language preference switching which produces different languages 
in consecutive turns (Romaine 1989, Li Wei 1994). The second is syntactical 
switching including intersentential. switching where one sentence by the 
same speaker is in one language and the next is in a different language. The 
third type of switching is intrasentential (Muysken 19 87 p. 118. Romaine 
1989 p. 122, Milroy and Muysken 1995 p. 7, Li Wei 1994 p. 152-153) 
which, in the Sets-vvana/English code switching, is heavily composed of 
lexical insertion. 
The final type of language alternation in this courtroom is the one in which 
the witness uses both English and Setswana in answer to different questions 
at different intervals in the same inter-change with the smne counsel. 
Excerpt 4 Case no. 2 Supplementary data January 2000 
Defense Counsel: I am going to ask you a few questions so that what you've 
just said to the court is the truth as far as you know. Now you said Thabang 
was knocked at the zebra crossing did you say it? 
Witness: I don't understand the question. 
Defense Counsel: Was he knocked at the zebra crossing or not? 
Interpreter: Ao ut1wile sentle? 0 ne a le fa zebra crossi ? (Have you heard 
properly? Was he at the zebra crossing? ) 
Witness: 0 ne le- (inaudible)(He was... inaudible) 
Defense Counsel: Was Thabang at the zebra crossing or not? 
Witness: (Silence) 
Defence Counsel: Yes or no, was he knocked at the zebra crossing or was he 
not knocked at the zebra crossing? 
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Witness: I didn't see. 
In this excerpt we see the witness answer first in English, 'I don't understand 
the question. ' She then waits for interpretation, 'A o utwile sentleT (Have 
you heard properly? ) then answers in Setswana. Finally, without requiring 
interpretation of the last question in this excerpt, she answers in English. This 
is different from the other woman who responded consistently in Setswana, to 
questions put to her in English by the prosecutor. 
This is a much more complex alternation of languages characterised by a 
witness who speaks both languages at different turns. Sometimes she needs 
interpretation and sometimes not. Some times she responds to English in 
English. This bilingual has not decided what language she will speak in but 
jumps from one language to another. Interestingly enough, this mode causes 
no concern to anybody in the courtroom, in other words, there is no 
communication breakdown because all court officials, comprising the 
magistrate, counsel, prosecutors and the court clerk, understand the two 
languages and it does not matter at all which is being used at a particular 
juncture in the proceedings when it involves those who are not 
constitutionally constrained to speak the language of the court - English. 
8.4.6 Some cross tabulation 
This study of courtroom discourse is largely qualitative in the sense of being 
based on samples of natural language collected from one courtroom. 
However a part of the data came from questionnaires administered to legal 
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personnel eliciting their opinions on the statuses and uses of languages in the 
courtroom. The purpose of collecting this data was to find out the members 
awareness of the language (s) they use in the court. There were two 
questionnaires, one directed at the police prosecutors and one at lawyers. The 
decision to separate lawyers from police prosecutors was based the fact that 
they perform different functions in the courtroom and therefore they may 
offer different perspectives on the issue of language in the courtroom. Each 
set of respondents was asked six questions relating to their awareness of the 
uses of languages in the courtroom. I now discuss the responses and compare 
them with the analysis of bilingual data just completed. The rational for 
placing the analysis of the questionnaire data here is that putting them in 
retrospect allows for some validation of the observations made in the 
bilingual data analysed. 
Question I was directed at the police prosecutors and witnesses. How often 
do people make statements in Sctswana? All policemen and women selected 
the category 'rarely' to this question and one of the policemen explained that 
it is not 'admissible' to write statements in Setswana. The question did not 
include the category 'never' because many people are in fact interviewed in 
Setswana but their responses are written down by the police in English. It 
would be an infonnative exercise to actually study this process of 
interviewing and directly translating into another language. But here the 
purpose of the question was to establish which language is actually used 
more. It would appear that police prosecutors or interviewers are also 
translators operating in two languages all the time. This immediately 
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translates into the observation that English is the language of official, written 
documents. The courtroom itself carries this naturally complex interrelation 
of languages further. The magistrate and other personnel listen to defendant 
and witnesses speaking Setswana and all make their records in English. 
Question I to the lawyers was, 'How often do you represent people who do 
not speak English? Two lawyers answered 'Often' four 'sometimes' and four 
4 rarely. This indicates that lawyers are exposed to a more varied clientele that 
the police but it does also reveal that lawyers operate mostly in English in 
their day-to-day work. So they translate only the legal genre into everyday 
language. 
Question 2 to the police officers was Are the vernaculars of Botswana like 
Sctswana Ikalanga and others ever used in Court? And question three was a 
corollary to 2 requesting qualification of the answer to 2. All answered 'yes' 
and one respondent, who made the explanation in question I explained here 
also that they are used only when the person concerned cannot understand or 
speak English but they are interpreted into English. In my observation, most 
witnesses and defendants spoke Setswana. more than other languages. What 
has been revealed, however, is that the uses of these two languages is more 
complex that the constitution of the magistrates courts stipulates. This is a 
natural linguistic pragmatics and I feel cannot be dispensed with without 
creating serious problems for courtroom process. For example, insisting on 
translation for the court would mean that cases take much longer to process. 
Question 2 to the lawyers was 'During court sessions do you ever use a 
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language other than Setswana? Nine respondents answered No to this 
question. This is in contrast to the observation of the police that lawyers 
sometimes address defendants and witnesses in Setswana. My observation 
was that Lawyers address witnesses in Setswana only rarely, and only when 
the court clerks interpretation is contested. 
Question 4 to the police was whether they would like to see vernaculars used 
more in court. This question was based on the hypothesis that the police, 
being of a lower standard of education than the lawyers would have problems 
with the language clause in the margistrates' courts" constitution. Seven 
respondents answered 'Yes' to this question and three answered 'no. ' Those 
who said 'yes, ' however, believed that this would advantage the witnesses 
who would understand the court and know whetherjustice was done or not. 
My own observation is that the police in fact have no problems with this 
statute. They are the only personnel who use English all the time. This is 
partly because their everyday discourse is also highly routinised as, for 
example in direct examinations. Even then, however, they dispense their 
duties very well in English. Question 5 for lawyers asked them how they 
responded to interpretation if it does not represent their point exactly, 
lawyers say they inteýect and bring the this to the attention of the court; 
some said they offer their own interpretations. Others said they find different 
ways of asking the same question until the right answer is given and said that 
sometimes the magistrate assists with the interpretation. Analysis of this 
court's discourse has shown that the interpreter is never called to interpret 
Setswana to the court and that when they do interpret to the witness (which 
can be circumvented as in the case where the witness answered in Setswana 
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to questions put in English) they are rarely corrected. I believe this is due to 
the fact that the task of interpreting from English to Setswana is not as 
difficult for them as it would be if the had to interpret to the court. They are 
not holders of degrees of education and their spoken English would not be so 
perfect as they do not have opportunity to speak English much in the 
Botswana language situation where English is spoken in very few domains 
outside official communication. The court seems to be satisfied with the level 
of interpretation of the court clerks and in my observation, as will be 
discussed in chapter 9, only one young woman interpreter had obvious 
difficulty in interpreting to Setswana term 'working together in concert, ' 
which both the magistrate and the prosecutor help her with. 
Question 5 to the police 'In what ways do you think the use of vernaculars 
would affect court proceeding? ' Those who were positive about the uses of 
vernaculars in court did not, in my opinion, argue their cases well. Mainly it 
was that it would benefit the witnesses but it is seen in the data that they 
would be interpreted to and that it is them who are allowed to switch codes 
freely. Those who were negative on the issue of use of vernaculars said their 
use would delay court proceedings and that it would not be easy to find 
interpreters. 
Question 6 to the police 'What are the advantages and disadvantages of using 
English in the courtT 
The following are the advantages: 
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For purposes of law reporting 
Most of the law is easily interpreted in English 
People working in the court are well educated to speak English 
The more you speak English the more you get used to it. 
It is advantageous where parties to court do not speak Setswana including 
presiding officers. Proceedings are faster recorded because of one language 
It is easy to understand the law written in English. 
The disadvantages: 
Most BatsNvana don't know English and it is impossible for the to understand 
the proceedings. 
Translation delays court proceedings. 
Some lawyers use jargon and sometimes the message does not go across to 
the intended recipient. 
Question 6 to the lawyers was similar, 'What do you think of the rule that 
English should be the language of the courtsT Positive responses were that 
due to the fact that the literature, the text books law reports, statutes and 
other materials in Botswana and in the region are in English, it is easier to 
address the court in English rather than Setswana or any other language. 
Others said that there are legal phrases, terms and concepts that do not have 
ready word in Setswana and that invariably when the attempts to find 
Sctswana phrases for them result in long, convoluted phrases and sentences. 
This should indicate the difficulties that interpreter are faced with. 
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Negative responses included the fact that the use of English presents serious 
disadvantages to illiterate and even literate persons involved in court cases, 
especially the accused persons. They give the example that 'notions of 
responsibility, guilt, fault, etc are probably better articulated in one's first 
language' the respondents pointed out, however, that these difficulties are 
adequately addressed by accurate translation. 
Summary 
This chapter has touched on a number of notions about the alternation of 
languages in the courtroom. It has concluded that the language situation is a 
complex one in which two main languages are used in different processes of 
the court for example in the evidentiary stages where the litigants are 
examined by prosecutors or counsel and involve a number of types of code 
switching being the A1132 type, syntactic switching and lexical insertion. 
Other processes in which two language are used are the reading of charge 
sheets and readings of fact. Theoretical issues raised involve the definition of 
the Botswana language courtroom as a bilingual situation, which may be 
contested by legalists (those who believe that there is only one, official 
language and other languages are involved only through interpretation). The 
data has shown that interpretation is only one of the ways languages alternate 
in this courtroom. The next chapter in this thesis deals with this aspect of 
court proceedings - courtroom interpreting. 
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CHAPTER 9 COURTROOM INTERPRETING 
This chapter on courtroom interpreting will introduce the Botswana context of 
courtroom interpreting as can be observed from legislation on this issue. It will 
then go on to a discussion of previous writing on courtroom interprefing and end 
with the analysis of interpreted process in the courtroom of this study. 
9.1 Description of the data: Dialogues and Monologues 
The data relating to interpreting comprises three transcripts of direct 
examinations, two cross-examinations and several charge sheets and readings of 
facts. The small size of this section of the data is explained by the fact that most 
cases involved police witnesses and the police, whether acting as prosecutors or 
witnesses, are the most constrained to speak English in giving testimony. The 
heavy involvement of police witnesses in this data is due to the type of offences 
involved. Most are traffic offences in which in which the police officers who 
attended the scene of the offence become witnesses for the state. The witnesses 
are used by the prosecution to give evidence, which usually involved relating the 
story of what happened at the scene of the offence in question and what steps 
they took to address the problem. Of the two cross-examinations, one is by 
defense counsel and one by a defendant representing himself. The latter cross- 
examination is conducted in Setswana. It turns out to be a very chaotic 
interchange, which borders on a quarrel It is one courtroom text which suggests 
that English is really the language more suited to the adversary legal system of 
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the Botswana 'non-customary, ' magistrates' courts. There is then one prosecutor 
cross-examining a defense witness. 
9.2 Legislation and statutory provision for bilingualism in the courtroom 
In the Botswana Magistrates' Court Act Chapter 04: 04, the only mention of 
language in the courtroom is made in Section 5 of the Act stipulating the 
language to be employed in the court. It reads: 
The language to be employed in the court shall be English and the evidence and 
all records of proceedings in the court shall be in that language. 
(2) If any of the parties or witnesses in a proceeding before the court does not 
understand the English language, the proceedings shall be interpreted from 
English into the language understood by the parties or witnesses concerned 
and vice-versa. Provided that in civil proceedings the parties may be called upon 
by the presiding magistrate to bear part or the whole of the cost of such 
interpretation where the language understood by the parties is not one of the 
languages commonly spoken within the area ofjurisdiction of the court 
(Republic of Botswana Magistrates' Courts Act 04: 04). 
The effect of this statute is to render the courtroom bilingual by recognising the 
possible existence of other languages within the courtroom. This situation may 
be compared to with other situations such as those of the United States, Malaysia 
and Australia. In the United States, legislation goes even further to provide for 
availability of qualified court interpreters although, as Berk-Sel igson (1990) 
points out, 'in courts located in linguistically homogeneous areas of The United 
States, the use of interpreter is unheard of. ' She points out that ' when the need 
for an interpreter arises ... judges make use of any bilingual available. ' In 
Botswana, as in Malaysia, (Mead 1985), the court clerk doubles as interpreter. 
When required. Ia small survey of lawyers" opinions, in January 1999 in 
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Botswana showed that lawyers are sometimes unhappy about the lack of 
linguistic qualification of court clerks, pointing out that they are not really 
trained for the job. However, one law did intimate that there are plans underway 
to train court intcrpreters. 
In Australia, Carroll (1995) reported a very low percentage of interpreted 
proceedings in courts and tribunals, this in spite of the fact of very large 
numbers of non-English speaking litigants in the courts. He also reports on the 
statutory provision made for interpreting for non-English speakers in the courts. 
He says that, 'in most jurisdictions, the common law principles which apply, 
give the courts the discretion to allow the use of an interpreter' and that 
'common law recognises the need to provide the accused a fair trial and 
accordingly, the need to ensure that -vvhat the witness has to say is put before the 
court as fully and accurately as circumstances permit, especially where the 
witness is also the accused' (p. 68). He reports that 'the Commonwealth 
Government ... Evidence Bill of 1993, when enacted, will provide all witnesses 
with the entitlement to give evidence through an interpreter unless they are able 
to understand and express themselves in English sufficiently to understand 
questions and give adequate replies. ' However Carroll (1995) argues that ' 
provision for legal entitlement is still patchy in most jurisdictions This is so 
because, while it might be supposed that the courts and tribunals will provide 
interpreters when necessary, and that, therefore, there is no need for legislation, 
the available evidence does not support this supposition' (p. 68). 
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The reluctance of courts (at least in the Australia and US) to make adequate 
provision for interpreting, however, may have some practical basis. For instance, 
many believe that interpreting, when it is not absolutely necessary, may unduly 
slow down court proceedings. Shuy (1986 p. 54) points out that 'the use of 
language interpreter in the courtroom has been (and in many cases continues to 
be) a haphazard affair, ' and that 'in the past interpreters were not appointed by 
the courts, primarily because their use tended to slow down the trial process. ' 
Moreover, if the court interpreter is not full trained for the job, this may in fact 
create other more serious problems (Hale and Gibbons 1999), The Botswana 
provision is much less controversial as court interpreters are firm members of 
the court personnel as they are always present in the courts as court clerks. 
93 Previous writing on courtroom interpreting 
9.3.1 The role of the interpreter in the courtroom and problems of 
interpreting 
The first point worthy of note is the fact of the complexity of interpreting in the 
court context. Hale (1997) reporting from Australid, makes this observation 
when she proposes that the complexity of courtroom interpreting is a result of 
the varying 'world perspectives' brought into the courtroom by different actors, 
being professional in the court and lay persons. She argues that the different 
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world perspectives are 'expressed in the form of disparate discourses. ' The 
interpreter is brought into this already complex situation by the involvement in 
the courtroom, of a lay person who not only brings in the ordinary 'everyday 
naffative practices which stand in conflict with the judicial assumptions of what 
is relevant in legal narrative' but also a different language from that of the 
courtroom. This language may be doubly removed from that of the court in the 
sense that it is not shared, at least partly, by the court and the litigant. (As in 
cases where the litigant speaks the same language as the court but has no access 
to the genre of the court). So, as Hale (1997 p 19 8) puts it, 'when a client or a 
witness is from a non-English speaking background, they will present not only a 
lay person's view of the world but also a culturally different one from that of the 
host country. ' The situation is further complicated by the use of an interpreter 
who brings in yet another Nvorldview. There exists in the courtroom, therefore, 
an interdiscursivity that results from the conflict amongst these different 
worldviews. The interpreter's role is to bridge this language gap and enable 
mutual comprehension amongst the courtroom participants. He is assumed to be 
able to do this because 'although he is neither a legal practitioner nor a lay 
person, he is conversant with both worlds. (Hale 997 p. 198). 
The interpreter's role is a difficult one to play for several reasons. Hale and 
Gibbons (1999) outline and discuss some of these problems. They argue that 
over and above the difficulties of the translation process, interpreter face several 
obstacles when working in the courtroom. ' The legal world's igno0rance Of the 
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complexity of the translation process and the consequent unrealistic demands on 
the interpreter, the interpreter's ignorance about the language of the courtroom 
and the law's assumption of relevance (p206), are cited as the common 
difficulties in courtroom interpretation. The statement of the formerjudge of the 
Supreme Court of Australia exemplifies the first problem. He is quoted as 
saying, 
It cannot be over emphasised that the interpreter should interpret every single 
word that the witness utters, exactly as it is said, whether it makes sense or 
whether it is obviously nonsense, whether the witness has plainly not heard or 
whether, if he has heard, has no understood. The interpreter must look upon 
himself rather as an electric transformer, what is fed into him is to be fed out 
again duly transformed. 
Hale and Gibbons consider this to represent the legal world's ignorance of the 
translation processes. It is commonsense understanding that literal translation is 
not necessarily the best or the most correct rendering of concepts from one 
language to another. Hale(l 997b p. 198) suggests this in her attempts to 
demonstrate when and how the interpreter tries to bridge the discursive gap 
lawyer and lay person by altering the tenor of the original language. in 
interpretation. She says that when interpreting into English, the interpreter will 
render a version that resembles the discursive practices of the legal practitioner, 
and when interpreting into Spanish, they will imitate the practices of the witness. 
This observation of what the interpreter does is in fact supported by a theory of 
interpretation developed by Vermeer (1983) cited in Pocchacker (1992), which 
argues that the discourse must 'first and foremost conform to the standard of 
intratextual coherence, i. e. it must make sense within its language and culture 
and only in the second place must there be intertextual coherence, i. e. some 
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relation of fidelity to the original (p. 213). Padilla and IMartin (1999) also 
subscribe to this theory in their argument that the 'the interpreter can and should 
adapt the target language version to the decodifying capacity of the listeners... ' 
(p. 198). They further argue that: 
In consecutive interpretation, the interpreter can, to a large extent, reorganise the 
terms of the statement in a way that will make its message more immediately 
comprehensible to his audience... he can and, I contend, be must take as much 
liberty with the original text as necessary to convey to his audience the meaning 
(Padilla and Martin quoting Namy from Harris 1981 p2O I). 
It is clear from these translation and interpretation theorists and teachers that 
preserving the meaning of the original meaning of the spoken text in the target 
language is best done by focusing on the hearer and how he/she will understand 
the message, not on textual equivalence. So the following discussion of effects 
of interpretation on evidence is made with this proviso in mind. 
93.2 Effects of interpretation on evidence 
Recent research into courtroom interpreting (Berk-Seligson 1990, Hale 1997 and 
Hale and Gibbons 1999), has revealed the fact that interpreters do in fact alter 
various aspects of the 'courtroom reality' (Hale and Gibbons 1999). They point 
out that 'the strategic use of language for the purpose of persuasion or attack and 
the importance of language style in witness testimony for the evaluation of 
credibility, are aspects of courtroom language that most interpreter disregard. 
This happens when interpreters concentrate on the representation of only the 
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propositional content and fail to represent the pragmatics of lawyer and 
courtroom talk. 
Hale and Gibbons (1999) have discovered many ways in which interpreters alter 
the presentation of evidence. One way is what they call 'the disappearing 
courtroom' (p. 209). This is when the interpreter between Spanish and English in 
the Sydney courtrooms in Australia, frequently delete the courtroom reality by 
deleting references to the court in the speech of court personnel. They say the 
court 'literally goes missing when the interpreter leaves out of the interpretation, 
systematically, the word 'court' from the English source' (p, 209). Using data 
from several courtrooms they establish, statistically, the absence of translation of 
the word court by many interpreters. They show twelve deletions of references 
to the court by three different interpreters. The courtroom reality is also not 
represented in interpretations that leave out phrases like 'can you tell. ' When 
this happens, the fact that the lawyer requires the witness to tell 'his version' of 
the story rather than the only version of the story, is lost. This is a central 
concept of litigation as the trial is basically a forum for the litigants to tell their 
own versions of the 'external reality. ' It is for the judge to decide which version 
is to be upheld, but the interpreter does not make this known to the witness of 
the defendant. When the interpreter does not interpret to the witness or the 
defendant the fact of the courtroom culture, I believe it is a problem if lack of 
awareness of a very important aspect of register, that is, 'field' (Halliday 1985, 
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89). It is the field of the discourse that supplies the cultural terminology of the 
court that interpreters seem to be unconscious of 
When Hale and Gibbons show, along with Berk-Seligson (1990), that the 
courtroom reality is much more likely to be deleted than the secondary reality, 
that is the plane of the outside world event that gave rise to the court processes, 
they are in fact pointing to the interpreters' ignorance of the separate plane of the 
courtroom reality. In other words, there is a lack of fit between the language of 
the courtroom and everyday discourse processes. 
Other changes that Hale and Gibbons' data reveal include tenor changes and 
changes in question fonns introduced by interpreters. Tenor changes involve 
changes in politeness of statements or questions such as when the interpreter 
interprets indirect questions as direct questions; changes in references to persons 
such as the pronoun 'you' and omissions of titles and surnames. These are 
significant changes because, as Hale and Gibbons put it, 'tenor manifests 
relations of status and relations of affect, ' both of which may be modified by 
inaccurate translation (p210-21 1). 
However, I consider the lack of involvement of witnesses and defendants in the 
discourse practices of the court by interpreters who fail to represent faithfully the 
courtroom reality to the litigants, is potentially less dangerous in general than the 
reverse, the representation of the witness and defendant to the j udge, j ury or 
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magistrate. This is so for various reasons. The first is that the court, especially 
the jury, who may be made up of laymen in the field of law, is very strongly 
influenced in their assessment of the credibility of the witness, by externals like 
their appearance and demeanor as well as their discourse styles. That these exert 
strong influence on the jury has been proven, for instance by the psychological 
experiments carried out in the USA by O'Barr and his associates at the Duke 
Law Project, By Charrow and Charrow (1979) and by Berk-Seligson (1990). 
They all agree that the way testimony is presented is as important as the facts it 
contains (Hale 1997 p. 20 1). The results of the Duke Law Project's controlled 
experiments showed 'very clearly that style variations in witness testimony 
strongly affect the jury's perception of the witness's credibility. ' They revealed 
that the same content presented in slightly different styles elicited different 
reactions from the mockjurors about the credibility and personal qualities of the 
witness' (Hale 1997 p. 20 1). 
How does this relate to courtroom interpreting? It does so in two ways, reported 
by different researchers. One way in which the jury or judge may be influenced 
in their verdict is in the form of interpretation of question put to witnesses by 
counsel. Hale and Gibbons (1999) report that research carried out by many 
researchers has 'demonstrated that the question form, style and wording are of 
extreme importance in the courtroom' and that 'the form in which a question is 
put to a witness exerts a strong influence on the quality of the answer' (p. 250) 
and yet interpreters often do not put the question to the witnesses in exactly the 
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same ways in which it came from examining counsel. Hale and Gibbons argue 
that this is absolutely necessary as small changes in the wording of the question 
can result in dramatically different answers. ' They cite Loftus (1979 p. 90-94) on 
this point. The second way that the judgement of thejury or the judge may be 
affected by interpretation is through translation of evidence of the witness itself. 
Carroll (1995 p. 70) argues that there is enough evidence to prove that the role of 
the interpreter is 'vital in shaping the impression that listeners form of witnesses 
He reports that Berk-Seligson (1990) found that the way in which an interpreter 
translated a witness's evidence could have a marked effect on jurors' perception 
of the witness. ' For example, Nvhen the interpreter added politeness markers like 
'Sir' or 'Madain, jurors were likely to perceive the witness as considerably 
more convincing, competent, intelligent and trustworthy, than those who heard 
the same witness when politeness markers were taken out' (Carroll 1995 p70). 
93.2 Educating court interpreters 
Given so much negative criticism of present practices in courtroom interpreting 
by scholars in the field, what is really required of the interpreter? Hale (1997 
p. 203) makes the suggestion, which she says is borne out by most academics and 
lawyers involved in research into the role of legal interpreters, that the 
interpreter should maintain equivalence at all levels, that is, the interpreted 
version must be as close as possible to the original in content and form, 
maintaining equivalence of register, style, hesitations and pragmatic features. 
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They argue that allowing the interpreter to 'filter the message by omitting 
hesitations, making the answer more relevant and more coherent and using a 
different register, ' would either not be fair to the English speaking witness or 
backfire on the non-English speaker. The idea that the interpreter should 
maintain equivalence at all levels has bee treated with much ambiguity and 
contradiction by researchers themselves. For example Hale and Gibbons (1999) 
maintain that to expect the interpreter to act as a 'conduit, translating word for 
word or as a robotic device undermines both the complexity of and importance 
of the task. ' 
These problems of interpreting in the courtroom can be ameliorated by 
interpreter education which focuses on the role of the interpreter as' not 
translating word by word but concept by concept, without adding or deleting 
anything from the original, ' including tone and register (Rigny 1999 p. 92). 
Considering that this requires knowledge of the cultural contexts of both 
languages, it is a difficult task which requires language education for interpreters 
to include extensive and specific education in the court cultures of the languages 
involved. 
To take the problems of courtroom interpreting with the care necessary for the 
job, interpreters should really be trained for the job. They should be instructed 
on the 'importance of language in the courtroom, ' and in general language 
competence' (Hale 1997 p203). As Caffoll (1995) puts it, 'In a legal setting, a 
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competent interpreter need a high level of linguistic and interpreting skills, an 
understanding of legal procedures and terminology and an awareness of his or 
her role and ethical responsibilities. ' This suggests a much higher standard of 
education than interpreters have around the world, including in Botswana where, 
although the interpreter is also a court clerk attached to the office of the 
magistrate and may be familiar with court procedure, he or she is not trained in 
language or interpreting between English and Setswana. 
9.4 Analysis of interpreted proceedings in this study 
I have indicated how infrequent interpreting between languages, especially 
English and Setswana, is in the courtroom of this study. This is basically 
because the sample of people involved in the court cases studied is bilingual to 
various extents. The fact the most witnesses are police officers who apprehend 
the alleged offenders are also influential. Another reason for the limited 
requirement for interpretation between English and Setswana is the bilingual 
competence of court personnel, that, is magistrates and lawyers. This is the 
reason that makes it unnecessary for the language of witnesses or defendants to 
(mostly Setswana) to be interpreted for the court, thus there is no interpreting 
from Sctswana to English at all. This is the cmpirical situation that may comc 
into conflict with the language clause of the constitution of magistrates' courts. 
Respondents to my validation interviews have pointed it out to me, that this 
situation might not be tenable in other ways than its legality. For instance, when 
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litigants speak Setswana in giving evidence and different court participants - the 
magistrate and different counsel - make their notes in English, individually, the 
fact that there was no single interpretation listened to and to be referred to by 
these parties may result in queries later on relating to who made the correct 
interpretation of the litigant's speech. The respondent who points this out is 
therefore of the opinion that there must be interpretation into English for the 
record. 
The fact that in this study all magistrates and most legal counsel understood 
Setswaria, the language of most litigants, meant that they could monitor the 
interpretation. Therefore I contend that the fact that in most cases no complaints 
were registered regarding interpretation means that all parties deemed the 
interpreter competent. However we shall need to analyse, the interpreted 
proceedings tom find out what it is that was interpreted into Setswana for the 
litigants. 
9.4.1 Interpreted administrative processes 
In the proceedings there were two kinds of discourse that involve interpretation. 
There were the monologues of the written-to-be-read charge sheets and facts of 
the case; and the dialogues of examinations, direct and cross. This section 
discusses the interpreted readings of charge sheets and readings of facts, as 
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administrative processes, first, and the interpreted dialogues as substantive 
processes, last. 
9.4.1.1 Two languages in the reading of charge sheets. 
There are basically two processes in which the use of languages offers what may 
be of theoretical interest. This is the reading of charge sheets and Readings of 
Facts. The charge sheet originates from the prosecution and begins at the police 
station. There again we find a complex situation where the use of language is 
concerned. Litigants come to the police station to make statements. When a 
potential litigant gives the statement, he or she may be allowed to write it him or 
herself if he is literate, othenvise the police officer will take the statement and 
write it down. The language of the charge sheet is English. They are brought to 
court written in this language. What happens in court is another fit of linguistic 
skill. The charge sheet is read by the clerk of court who is attached to the 
magistrate's office and doubles as the interpreter in court. The charge sheet must 
be understood by the defendants, who are going to plead to it, and so it will be 
read to him or her in his or her language. The interesting thing I have observed is 
that the court clerk does not make a written translation of the document. He 
translates it simultaneously as he reads it to the defendant. So, as we saw with 
listening and speaking in the courtroom examinations where two languages 
alternate in the turns of different people, here we see reading and speaking in 
240 
241 
two languages at the same time. However it must be noted that the charge sheet 
itself has such a generic structure that is amenable to this kind of bilingual 
handling. One English charge sheet read in English for a defendant did not 
understand Setswana read: 
You are L. M. You stay at house number- Machoba -- Gweru. You are 
unemployed. You are charged with the offence of giving false information to a 
person employed by the public service contrary to section 13 1A of the penal 
code. It is alleged that etc. 
Another similarly worded charge sheet read to a Setswana, speaking defendant 
read: 
0 KK 0 ngwaga di 33.0 nna ko house number - ko - Gaborone. 0 bereka 
ko Roads. 0 lebisitswe molato wa go utswa ka dikgoka. Nne yare nako ngwe ka 
di 30 tsa October etc. 
Translated the charge sheets reads 
You are K. K- You are 33 years old. You stay at house number- at - in 
Gaborone. You work at Roads. You are faced the charge of armed robbery. On 
the 30 of October etc. 
An experienced interpreter does not have to be looking a sheet written in English 
to produce a Setswana version of the charges. It is for reason of structural 
simplicity and equivalence that one can be looking at English words and 
speaking Setswana. However, the not so expert interpreting a particularly 
complex charge sheet involving several defendants charged within the same 
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charge sheet did not fare so well and had the magistrate and sometimes the 
magistrate and the prosecutor together interrupting to correct the translation. 
Interpreter: Le lebisitwe molato wa go utswa le badiri oo kgatlhanong le 
temana ya bo 271 le temana 277 ya Penal Code. E ne yare magareng ga 
November 1995 le April 1999 ko Old Naledi Industrial Site mo kgaolong ya 
Boseki mo Gaborone, (hesitation over the words) 
Magistrate: Le le ba diri 
Interpreter: Le le ba diri mo Furniture Mart le bereka le le maleibara 
(hesitation over the words) 
Magistrate: Le dira mmogo ka maikaelelo. 
Interpreter: Le dira mmogo ka maikaelelo a le mange fela L utswa Goldstar 
video machine (omits the number of video machines taken) 
Magistrate: Goldstar video machene tse tharo. 
Interpreter: E mma. Goldstar vide machine tse tharo le Panasonic video 
machine tse pedi le Samsung video machine. Tse tsot1he di ne dii ja 105 85 Pula 1 
61 Thebe tsa Furniture mart. 
(My Translation) 
Interpreter: You are facing charges of theft by employees against Section 271 
read with section 277 of the Penal Code. Between the months of November 1995 
and April 1999 at Old Naledi Industrial Site, in the magisterial jurisdiction of 
Gaborone, (hesitates over the words) 
Magistrate: Being employees 
Interpreter: Being employees of Furniture Mart, working as laboures (hesitates 
over the words) 
Magistrate: Acting together in concert. 
Interpreter: Acting together in concert, stole Goldstar video machine (omits 
number of machines stolen. ) 
Magistrate: Three Goldstar video machines 
Interpreter: Yes mam. Three Goldstar video machine and two Panasonic video 
machines and one Samsung video machine all valued at 10585 and 61 Thebe 
belonging to furniture Mart. . 
In this excerpt we see the magistrate interrupt the cour clerk several times to 
help with translation. The interpretation is of phrases like 'being employees, ' 
'acting together in concert, ' and strict adherence to the details of the charge like 
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the number of items stolen. This indicates that simultaneous translation can be 
difficult for the interpreter where phraseology is particular to the genre of legal 
English. The interpreter and the magistrate thus jointly translate the charge sheet 
for the benefit of the defendant. Here the magistrate wants an exact translation o 
the terms and details of the charge. 
The interpreter in this court reads the charge sheet 'simultaneously as she 
translates it (see also Hale and Gibbons 1999 p. 207 and Niska 1995 p. 31 1). The 
interpreter easily mimics the formal style of the writing. This is due to the fact 
that the written source is ritualised and does not involve frequent changes in 
tenor, mannerism and other interpersonal functions, being basically a narration 
of events. 
9.4.1.2 Two languages in the reading of facts 
The reading of facts stage is normally introduced by the prosecutor who, as we 
have seen, functions administratively in court to introduce each case and inform 
the court about the stage the proceedings are at. E. g. 'I appear for the court, 
Your Worship. The matter is for reading of facts. ' The magistrate then initiates 
these through dialogue with the defendant aimed at reminding the defendant of 
the charges against him and his former pleas to them. 
Excerpt I Case number 16 06-08-99 
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1. Magistrate: You will remember that on the 2d of this month you pleaded 
guilty to several counts. 
2. Interpreter: 0 gakologelwa gore erile ka di two tsa kgwedi e, one wa. ipona 
molato mo melatong ele mekawana, (You will remember that on tha 2d of this 
month you pleaded guilty to several counts. 
3. Magistrate: Driving a car dangerously. 
4. Interpreter 0 ipone molato wa go kgweetsa koloi ka mokgwa oo diphatsa. 
(You pleaded guilty to driving a car in a dangerous manner). 
5. Magistrate: Secondly, driving without a Driver's License. 
6. Interpreter: Wa bobedi go kgweetsa, o sens setlankana. ( Secondly driving 
without a license). 
7. Magistrate: Thirdly, driving without due care as well as driving without a 
valid driver's license. 
8. Interpreter: Le wa, go kgweetsa o sena kelello. (And also driving without due 
care). 
9. Magistrate: You remember you pleaded guilty to these charges? 
10. Interpreter: 0 gakologalvva gore o ipone molato? ( You remember you 
pleaded guilty? ) 
11. Accused: Yes 
12 Magistrate: Do you still plead guilty to the charges? 
13 Interpreter: Le tsatsi len o ntse o ipona molato? (Do you still plead guilty 
today? 
14. Accused: Yes 
15. Magistrate: Alright. Listen carefully to the reading of the facts of the case. 
16. Interpreter: 0 reetse ka, kelello. (Listen carefully) 
The interpretation of the magistrate's words to the defendant seems successful 
here. It is not challenged by the magistrate and, in my view, the additions and 
omissions he makes to the original text serve only to couch the magistrate's 
English into accessible Setswana even though he maintains structural 
equivalence. If we focus on lines three and four, we find the magistrate's 
ellipsed utterance is given in full in Setswana by the interpreter. This is an 
addition, which maximises the defendant's comprehension of the utterance. In 
lines 7 and 8 the interpreter omits the enumerator, thirdly, and replaces it with 
&and also. ' This also should course no miscomprehension as the Setswana 
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phrasing is premised on the observation that it is the final charge and therefore it 
should not matter what number it is. In lines 12 and 13, the interpreter omits the 
words 'to the charges', as they are easily retrievable from the context. There are 
these alternating omissions and additions but they are not substantially relevant, 
as they are mainly ellipses. 
Following the magistrate's framing and focusing moves - Alright. Listen 
carefully to the reading of the facts of the case - the prosecutor and the court 
clerk/interpreter proceed to share the administrative processes of the reading of 
the facts and interpreting the reading of facts to the court. 
Excerpt 2 case no 16 06-08 99 
Prosecutor: In his investigation, Constable X found that the accident was cause 
by the accused person who was driving a public service motor vehicle 
B567AAN. 
Interpreter: Gatwe Xo tswa go tlhotlhomisa ab a bona gore kOotsi e bakilwe 
ke wena o kg%veetsa koloi ya B567AAN ee rwalang sechaba. (Translation: It is 
said that X investigated and found that the accident was caused by you driving 
the public service motor vehicle B567 AAN. ) 
Prosecutor: The said public service motor vehicle was driving from the 
westward direction to the eastward direction, being followed by other motor 
vehicles, which were from the east and many other motor vehicles behind 
13248AAL 
Interpreter: Gatwe yonr koloi ye e rwalang sechaba e, ene e salane morago le 
B248AAI e eneng e setswe morago ke tse dingwe. (Translation: It is said that 
the said public service motor vehicle was following B428AAI which was being 
followed by other vehicles. ) 
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In all the turns of the interpreter we find that the interpreter prefixes his 
interpretation with the reporting word 'gatwe' - (It is said). This is done 
consistently with all the interpreting from English into Setswana. In Setswana 
the word is a marker of the passive voice, which introduces greater formality 
than if it were left out. The interpreter could say, for instance, 'the prosecutor 
says' or 'he says' but he uses the passive voice 'It' which removes the sense of 
the agent of the action. This is in contrast to the possible English translation, 
which would not use any reporting phrase like 'he says' when interpreting the 
words of the prosecutor. By using this formalising strategy, I would argue that 
the interpreter gives the witness a sense of the authority of the court over the 
proceedings. 
Another thing that the interpreter does is to leave out the mode of address from 
the English turn of the prosecutor. The prosecutor says' Constable X 
investigated' and the interpreter says 'X investigated. ' I suspect this happens 
simply because does not know the terms for ranks in police cadre. For this 
reason the change that this introduces is not linguistically or discoursally 
significant. In the last two turns, however, the interpreter introduces a significant 
change. He leaves out directions like 'driving from a westward direction to the 
eastern direction, ' and 'driving from the opposite direction. ' He the explanation 
may that the interpreter does not think thewitness needs to have these details as 
they were meant largely for the record by the magistrate. In this way then the 
interpreter is acting as a 'filter' between the courtroom reality' and the 'external 
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reality. ' (Hale and Gibbons 1999). In other words, the court/magistrate in his 
judgement needs to know the exact details like the direction of the motor 
vehicles but the defendant does not as he already knows them from the incident 
in which he was involved. He we find that the interpreter does not interpret 
mechanically but makes decisions about what to represent in the translation. 
This interpretation that leaves out details that are known by the court but that are 
needed by the defendant is allowed to pass by both the magistrate and the 
prosecutor who both understand Setswana and would register their 
dissatisfaction with the interpretation if they deemed it significant. 
We have already seen that interpreting from the charge sheet is a very simple 
matter as the charge sheet has a very simple generic structure and involves 
ritualised language. While the readings of facts are also formal, involving 
narrative and scenic description of the circumstances of the charge, they are 
slightly more complex and involve less ritualised structure. Therefore as we 
have seen they involve more complex interlingual. interpretation than charge 
sheets. 
9.4.1.31nterpreted substantive processes: the dialogues of examinations 
The examination processes in the courtroom are also loci of interpretation. In the 
data,. interpretation is found to occur in two kinds of situations. The first is the 
situation where the witness does not speak any English at all. There are few of 
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these situations because of the type of offender in these data, drawn mainly from 
traffic offences. In Botswana, people who drive cars are likely to be literate and 
therefore are likely and do in fact speak some English. The second is the 
situation where the defendants and witnesses understand English although for 
the most part they do not choose to speak it in court. Because many of the 
offenders spoke some English, interpretation was very ad hoc and inconsistent. 
What happens is that when the prosecutor or the defense counsel initiate the . 
exchange, sometimes the witness hesitates to answer and looks at the interpreter 
who then interprets the prosecutor's pr defense counsel's turn to the witness. 
Within the same examination described above, the same witness who sought 
help with the first question, answers immediately the question asked by the 
prosecutor, thus giving the interpreter no time to chip in and interpret. The 
following excerpt illustrates this variably interpreting needs. 
Excerpt I case no. 23 15-09-99 
Prosecutor: Do you know the accused person? 
Witness: (hesitates) 
Interpreter Gatwe ao itse mosekisiwa? (Translation: It is said do you know 
theaccused person? ) 
Witness: Ee rra, ke a mo itse. (Yes sir, I know him). 
Prosecutor: Yes. Can you tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused person? 
Interpreter 0 mo itsilejang. (How did you come to know him)? 
Accused: (inaudible) 
Prosecutor: Where did the accident happen? 
Accused: Gone mo Broadhurst fa of hapaanya strata se se tswelang ko... 




The witness's hesitation in the first exchange leads to interpretation, which is 
sustained for the next exchange. But interpretation is dispensed with in the third 
exchange. 
Excerpt 2 Case no. 2 January 2000 
Prosecutor: Would you please tell this court your name? 
Interpreter: Maina a gago ke mang. (Translation: What are you names? ) 
Witness: (inaudible) 
Prosecutor: How old are you? 
Interpreter: 0 na le dingwaga dile kae? (Translation: How old are you? ) 
Witness: Ha ke tshwara sentle di 19. (Translation: If I am getting them correct 
they are 19). 
Prosecutor: Are you employed? 
Interpreter: Aoa bereka? (Do you have ajob? ) 
Witness: (inaudible) 
Prosecutor: Where do you stay? 
Interpreter: 0 nna kae? (Translation: Where do you stay? ) 
Witness: (inaudible) 
Prosecutor: Do you know T. T. 
Interpreter: Ao itse T. T. ? (Do yoou know T. T. 
Witness: E rra, ke a mo itse. (Yes sir, I know him. 
ni Prosecutor: Please tell this court what happened to T. T. on the 23 of October 
1998. 
Witness: (comes in with the whole story in Setswana without waiting for 
interpretation of the request). 
In this excerpt it seems that interpretation is required until the last exchange 
when again the witness answers the question before it is interpreted. These two 
excerpts show that in each case the court assumed that the witness required 
interpretation and proceeded to supply it. Very simple questions like 'How old 
are youT and are you Employed are interpreted. But after a few turns the 
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witnesses begin to dispense with interpretation and answer questions 
immediately they are asked. Note here too that the witnesses' answers are not 
interpreted for the court. 
In some instances, the witnesses' hesitations are interpreted as their need for 
interpretation. At other times there is in some turns, a pattern of language 
alternation, which is as interesting as that of the A1 B2 code switching described 
earlier, (Chapter 8.4.1). 
1. Defense Counsel: Now you said it was nine o'clock at night? 
2. Witness: Gone go na le dilighte. (There were street lights) 
3. Defense Counsel: But you told the court it was around nine o'clock! 
4. Interpreter: A ker mme ontse o re ene le ka bo nine! 
5. (Translation: But You said it was around nine o'clock! ) 
6. Witness: It was around five o'clock 
7. Defense Counsel: It was not nine o'clock? 
8. Interpreter: It was not nine o'clock? 
9. Defense Counsel: Do you know what time it was? 
In this case the interpreter intrudes in the dialogue even though he knows, from 
lines I and 2 that the witness understands English even though she answered in 
Setswana. The effect of this bilingual usage is to make the court seem very 
casual about the use of languages in the proceedings (a fact which they may not 
be aware of). When I mentioned the bilingual nature of the courtroom a 
magistrate I was talking to seemed surprised. I did not however get the fortune 
to hear her opinion about this situation of language use as I could not get to 
interview her due to the time factor. This is much regretted, as the interview 
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would have allowed me to build in some member validation of many of my 
interpretations regarding code switching in the courtroom. 
Another respondent told me that this kind of bilingual use in the courtroom 
might be problematised as when it comes to appeals where language may be 
cited as a significant facto to the outcome of the trial. However this is the 
empirical situation of natural language use, which may or may not be responsive 
to prohibitive legislatiorL And, as it seems to facilitate communication in the 
courtroom and seems even to solve a possible administrative problem in a 
multilingual court I would suggest legal endorsement of the natural language 
phenomenon. 
9.4.1.4 Changes in evidence introduced by interpreters in this court. 
We saw in the interpretation of readings of facts some tenor changes introduced 
by the interpreter who let out of the interpretation modes of address like 
'Constable X' and changes in formality and politeness phenomena like changing 
a request for information into a direct question such as when the prosecutor says, 
'Can you tell this court how you came to know the accused and the interpreter 
puts the statement as 'How did you come to know him? ' These changes in the 
tenor of courtroom language are significant because, as Hale and Gibbons point 
out, 'tenor manifests relations of status and affect. ' If interpreting denies the 
litigant the sense in which the court regards him as, for example, being politely 
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requested to Supply the information the court needs, he may perceive friendly 
direct examination in a negative light and fail to see that it is a supportive, co- 
operative exercise. 
Finally, a casc similar thosc citcd by Halc and Gibbons (1999) is found wherc 
phrases such as 'the court' or this honorable court' is deleted from the 
interpretation. The prosecutor's request 'Can you tell this honorable court how 
you came to know the accused person ' is interpreted, rather summarily into a 
direct question' 0 mo itsilejang? ' (How did you come to know himT and the 
defense counsel's statement 'But you just told this court that it was around nine 
o'clock' is interpreted as 'Akere mme ontse o re ke e ne e le ka bo nine' and not 
(but you just told this court ... ) as 
in the original utterance. This seems to 
confirm that deletion of courtroom culture as embodied in the English language, 
is a general occurrence in court interpreting. In the Botswana case, the 
conception of the court as a special rarefied place exists in traditional dispute 
resolution culture but it is not utilised by the court interpreter. For instance, it 
would not have been difficult to translate the above utterances to include 
reference to the court. They could have been translated into 'A kere mme o ntse 
of bolelela lekliotla le gore e ne e le ka bo nine? ' The underlined words stand for 
'this court. ' (But you just told this court that it was around nine o'clock. This 
tendency to exclude or delete courtroom manners is common as indeed Hale and 
Gibbons claim that Berk-Seligson (1990) 'provide ample evidence that this 
phenomenon is not limited to our data. ' They suggest that this deletion of the 
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courtroom reality may arise out of the untrained interpreters lack of appreciation 
of the legal profession's unusual discourse that is rooted in their specific genre. I 
would also argue that the fact that in courtroom culture and manners counsel and 
judges refer to each other as 'my learned friend, ' and call the court 'honorable' 
may have a basis in their conception of their profession but interpreters do not 
seem to share this knowledge and probably do not considered that a passing 
litigant needs to be conscious of it. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This section of the thesis, focusing on bilingual discourse, makes several 
interpretive claims. In chapter 8, my interpretation of the magistrate's code 
switching in a formal, institutional context where it is unexpected, serves to 
create a sense of the humanness of the court process, reducing the highly reffled 
discourse of the courtroom to a friendlier, deliberative environment within a 
language situation where the language of the court is not the language of the 
majority. I refer to this interpretation as, 'putting a human face on the la%v, ' by 
bringing it within the grasp of the ordinary, non-English speaking litigant. 
As a corollary to this interpretation there is another relating to the language of 
the litigant. The case found here is not discussed elsewhere in the literature on 
courtroom bilingualism. This is the situation where the language of the litigant is 
not translated into English because the court understands this language. This 
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situation is one that allows for smooth exchanges of information among the 
parties without the formalising intervention of interpreting. This situation has 
lead to the kind of code switching in which the prosecutor or counsel asks 
questions in English and the defendant or witness responds in Setswana. My 
interpretation is that this is a litigant friendly form of discourse, which the laws 
of Botswana should endorse rather than proscribe. This suggests a kind of 
language policy that takes the real life language practices as legitimate because 
they are natural and communicatively effective. This recommendation fit in well 
with criticism of society's tendency to 'naturalise discursive practices' that 
encapsulate unacceptable power asymmetries' (Fairclough 1989,1992 pp. 91- 
93). In this case of Botswana, it would be a good development to 'naturalise' 
empowering linguistic practices. 
This chapter describing and discussing courtroom interpreting makes several 
interpretations of the process. In this discourse we f ind the kind of language 
alternation referred to by some theorists of bilingual courtroom discourse as 
'language-switching' wherein the interpreter is referred to as a 'language- 
switcher' (Morris 1997 cited in Niska 1995 p. 296). I find this label useful in 
distinguishing between the two language alternations of code switching and 
interpreting. Interpreting is utilised in this courtroom in three ltýrpes of processes 
- the administrative processes of readings of charge sheets to the defendant and 
reading of facts to both the court and the defendant, and the substantive 
processes of examination. I view the reading of the charge sheets as mainly 
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monologues interpreted simultaneously (also Niska 1995 p. 31 1). Readings of 
facts are also monologues by they involve consecutive interpreting. I point out 
that the ease of interpreting these processes is a function of the text types 
involved. They are as I have pointed out in chapter 5, very simple genres with 
clear structuring and, as far as charge sheets are concerned, highly ritualised 
form of language. I distinguished between the more able interpreter and the one 
who had difficulties. The able interpreter reads very easily translating directly 
from the English charge sheet to spoken Setswana for the defendant. However, I 
did point out that the interpreter Nvho had problems reading the charge sheet was 
faced with a rather more complex charge sheet involving several defendants 
charges in the same charge sheet and that her problems included phrases such as 
tacting together in concert. ' Otherwise the court clerks seemed to fit the bill well 
as interpreters for the court and much of their interpreting was not challenged by 
other members of the court. 
In interpreted dialogues a different scenario prevailed. Here, as in the literature, 
the role of the interpreter is more complex and fraught with difficulties. 
Interpreting does affect evidence in ways outlined in the literature such as 
changing the tenor of the court relations when the interpreter deletes references 
to the court in requests such as 'would you tell this court how you came to know 
the accused person' and the interpreter simply asks the direct question' How did 
you come to know himT Here the reference to the court is deleted and the 
request is phrased as a direct question, deleting the politeness markers. In this 
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kind of interpreting the courtroom culture is lost to the litigant, %vho does not get 
the chance to know how the original question was phrased and, therefore, may 
fail to appreciate the discourse context of the court. On this point my data 
corroborates the other researchers' findings and thus renders more generalisable. 
The issues in this chapter, along with those raised in other chapters of this thesis 
are abstracted and consolidated in the next chapter, chapter 10, discussing the 
tools of analysis in this study and the themes they gave rise to. 
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SECTION E: DISCUSSION 
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Chapter 10 Themes: Linguistic analyses and sociological interpretations 
The aim of this section of the thesis is to consolidate topics and themes 
which have emerged from the analyses of the data on the communication 
processes in the court of law and to integrate them vvith the methodologies of 
analysis used in this study. I achieve this aim by relating language to society 
in the way that the various methodologies I have used make possible. This is 
why I entitle this section as linguistic analyses and sociological 
interpretation. So we begin with the methodologies employed in the analysis 
of the various chapters in this thesis. These methodologies are stated here in 
their order of appearance in the thesis. Genre and narrative analysis are used 
for the analysis of the monologues in the courtroom comprising the 
administrative processes of Mentions, Readings of Facts and the substantive 
monologues of Submissions and Judgements as well as for analysis of the 
dialogues of the Readings of Charge Sheets. Discourse analysis is used in the 
analysis of the dialogues of Examinations. Bilingual language usage is also a 
charactcristic of this courtroom that has bccn analyscd. Thcsc analyscs have 
systematically revealed social issues such as social relationships in the 
courtroom. For example, the IRF model of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) 
brings to light the social relationships of participants in the courtroom 
encounters, especially the power of legal professionals vis a vis layman 
litigants; and the various bilingual models used reveal issues of 
empowerment of litigants through language choice. 
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10.1 Linguistic Analyses 
The choices of methodology in this study are not accidental but are firmly 
based on sociolinguistic tradition. As Van Dijk (1997) in his survey of 
discourse studies has put it, the sociolingistic approaches are not 'satisfied 
with a formal account of discourse structures, but emphasise the necessity to 
study actual languages in their socially and culturally variable contexts. ' This 
study has elected to follow a sociolinguistic approach to discourse studies 
from amongst many other approaches. The other approaches to the study of 
discourse are, to mention a few, ethnomethodology and its focus on everyday 
conversation with its turn-taking structures; ethnography and its accounts of 
&communicative events' or ways of speaking in their cultural contexts; 
discourse grammar with its focus on 'semantic and functional relations 
between sentences' (Van Dijk 1997 p. 26). This approach also differs from 
forensic linguistics, which is practically oriented to the role of the linguist in 
the courtroom, usually as expert witness for the defense. It bears some 
similarities to Critical Discourse Analysis but is less politically and 
ideologically oriented. Van Dijk (1997 p. 22) represents CDA scholars as 
those who 'make their social and political position explicit' and 'take sides 
and actively participate in order to uncover, demystify or otherwise challenge 
dominance with their discourse analyses. ' They focus on 'relevant social 
problems' and 'their work is more issue-oriented than theory-oriented. ' Van 
Dijk goes on to explain that 'Critical scholars of discourse do not merely 
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observe such linkages between languageand societal structures, but aim to be 
agents ofthange and do so in solidarity with those who need such change the 
most' (p. 23). While I do not dispute that discourse analysis can reveal 
insupportable social structural relations, it is my contention that in legal 
contexts, if the accused person is guilty as charged, he still needs all the help 
to state his case clearly, which is Nvhy we have lawyers as advocates. On the 
other hand the plaintiff may actually have been wronged. He or she too is the 
victim of the social structures that create the possibility of the wrong done to 
him or to her by the defendant. In other words my approach is not social 
problem oriented like the CDA approachjust described. It is pluralistic as it 
recognises that many different kinds of people pass through the court process 
in their lifetimes, not only the disadvantaged. I would argue for a more 
objective, less strongly affective stance in discourse analysis. Scholars 
should indeed involve themselves in social issues but their criticism can be 
constructive and objective and also ethical in the sense of being honest with 
their sample population, allowing member validation within their analyses of 
the data to which they have been given access by professional members or 
other society members. It is possible to be critical without a political agenda. 
It is also possible for descriptive and explanatory efforts of scholars like 
linguists and discourse analysts to effect change without militancy (on the 
part of scholars. ) 
So I go back to the methodology adopted by this study. It is first of all, 
discourse analysis in the sociolinguistic tradition. Stubbs (1983 p. 7) outlines 
the relationship of discourse analysis to sociolinguistic theory and shows 
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how analyses of how conversation works - how talk between people is 
organised - relate to sociological concepts such as roles. He says that 
csociolinguistics will ultimately have to be based, at least partly, on analyses 
of how people actually talk to each other in everyday settings, such as streets, 
pubs, shops, restauTant§, buses, trains, schools, doctor's surgeries factories 
and homes (Stubbs 1983 p. 7). Add to this list, courtrooms. With this method, 
texts are related to their purposes, which are elements of their contexts of 
situations. 
10.1.1 Legal texts and their 'contexts of situation' 
In tracing the relationship of legal discourse to its social context, it is useful 
to encompass the very enabling methodology promulgated by Halliday 
(especially 1985,89), relating a text to its context of situation through the 
construct of register. He says that 'the notion of register proposes a very 
intimate relationship of text and its context of situation. '(p. 3 8) My 
subscription to this notion is due to the belief that it enables the statement of 
the concrete relationship of legal texts to their contexts of situation i. e. a 
linking of texts of the courtroom genre to the social structure of the 
courtroom and to the social purposes of their producers. Linkages of texts to 
purposes are seen, for example, in cross-examination texts, which are linked 
to the purpose of information gathering by coercive means. Thejudgement 
texts and the closing speeches of counsel with their narrative structure are 
linked to these courtroom members' purposes of persuasion and resolution of 
conflict. Other texts in the courtroom discourse, such as charge sheets, 
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mentions and readings of facts can equally well be linked to their social 
purpose that is largely administrative i. e. enabling the smooth running of the 
trial process. 
In this methodology, texts can be related to their contexts of situation mainly 
through register analysis. Halliday (1985,1989) describes the features of 
context of situation as the three elements of register - field, tenor and mode. 
Field of discourse refers to what is happening, to the social action that is 
taking place. Field is linked to language through the experiential 
metafunction. of language and in courtroom discourse, field is clearly the 
legal processes of dispute resolution through the processes of establishing the 
facts and interpreting the facts in the various opposing ways until one 
interpretation is held up as the correct one in the judgement stage of the trial. 
The other feature of situation that can be related to language is that of the 
tenor of discourse. Tenor maps onto the interpersonal metafunction of 
language. Tenor refers to who is taking part in the discourse: their statuses 
and role relationships. The tenor of the courtroom has been seen to be one of 
asymmetrical power relations, mainly the dominance of members of the legal 
profession over the lay people in the courtroom but also in the power of the 
4court' over the professional participants. 
The third feature of the context of situation is the mode of discourse. Mode 
refers to what part the language is playing - the symbolic organisation. of the 
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text (language); the status that it has (social purpose), and its function in the 
context including channel, (is it spoken or written or some combination of 
the two? ) and the rhetorical mode (what is being achieved by the text in 
terms of such categories as persuasive, expository, didactic and so forth) 
(Halliday 1985,1989 p. 12). 
There are several modes in courtroom discourse. First in terms of channel, 
we have spoken and written modes as -well as written to be spoken modes. 
Examinations represent spoken modes entirely and judgements are written to 
be spoken but also end up in the written mode for court reports that form 
case la%v. Many other texts are written-to-be-spoken such as the charge sheet, 
readings of facts and counsel's closing speeches. These modes are what give 
courtroom discourse its flavour of being formal, semi-formal and partly 
rehearsed. The rhetorical mode is represented in courtroom discourse by the 
strongly persuasive languages of counsel throughout, the trial culminating in 
the very characteristic processes of submissions or closing statements. 
Halliday (1985,1989) makes the observation that mode is typically reflected 
in the lexico-grammatical features that are identified as carrying the textual 
meanings. This element of language came up clearly in the various sections 
of chapter 6 on the analysis of submissions and judgements (6.5.2.1, and 
6.7.1) 
10.1.2 Discourse Analysis: The IRF model and power 
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Another discourse analysis model that has been employed in this study is that 
of Sinclair and Coulthard (1975). Through the examination of exchange 
structure, we have been able to reveal the social relationships or 'tenor, ' in 
courtroom discourse. We noted that participants relate to each other in 
different ways. For example we have seen the co-operative equality of 
prosecution and the witnesses (especially in these proceedings where they are 
in fact colleagues, being traffic police). Here the structure of the exchange is 
a two-part structure with only the two-part, IR structure. We have also seen 
the skewed power relations between counsel and witnesses in cross- 
examination. The re-appearance of the Feedback move in the cross- 
examination signals counsels' condescension toward laymen in the 
courtroom, treating them to a third move that appears much like the teacher's 
in the classroom. We have seen that this power stance of advocates in the 
courtroom originates in their trial manuals. It is a deliberate culture of 
coercion. Whether courtroom questioning can be effective (for example elicit 
relevant evidence) without this tendency towards control of the discourse is 
, worth researching. Much research has been conducted on about coercion in 
the courtroom but none have offered any explanation of this phenomenon. 
Scholars, at least discourse analysts, do not seem to have asked the question, 
'%vhy? ' If anyone did we might actually come to a better understanding of the 
laws of evidence and the education of lawyers. 
On the other hand the realisation of power in combativeness such as that 
found between opposing counsel in their opening and closing speeches has, I 
think-, not received as much attention from discourse analysts as the problem 
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of coercion in courtroom's fact gathering transactions. One study by Danet 
and Bogoch (1980) addresses this issue of combativeness in counsel/counsel 
discourse. We saw in our analysis of closing speeches that lawyers can take 
combative stances to each other and attack each other verbally in efforts to 
destroy each other's arguments. The power revealed here is at least as blatant 
as that applied by counsel to the opposition's witnesses. I have also stated 
that my belief is that witnesses are prepared for this stressful situation by 
their counsel (but see also Wodak (1985 p. 183) who points out in her 
description of the mode of discourse in the inquisitorial system in Austrian 
courts that, 'choices of .. text types depend (among other things) on the 
speakers preparations by their lawyers). Combativeness in the courtroom 
actually is part of the courtroom culture. Danet and Bogoch (1980 p. 4 1) in 
their discussion come to the conclusion that 'to work properly, the adversary 
model ofjusticc requires attorneys representing each side to be highly 
combative and, moreover to be evenly matched in combativeness. ' Exercise 
of power is part of lawyers' training in court'practice and can be seen in their 
manuals. This is not to say that cultural or social relational norms like these 
must be accepted uncritically but rather that they need not be overplayed in 
the literature to the extent of distorting the picture of another professions 
genre. Criticism that is not practical will not bring about the change so 
desired by scholars of the critical school discourse analysis as the criticism 
can be resisted. Critics of legal language sometimes address themselves to 
the legal profession suggesting to them some adaptations that need to be 
made in legal language. Other discourse analysts suggest the education of 
those-disadvantaged in their participation in and their relations to institutional 
266 
authority (e. g. Kress 1993), as well as the re-education of professional 
members. 
10.13 Narrative Analysis 
One of the methodologies used in this study is that of analysis of narrative 
genre. We have seen how narrative is the organising principle of the trial as a 
whole. The manner of adducing evidence is basically telling the stories of 
different participants especially the stories relating the events that gave rise 
to the litigation. Stories are also told in the submissions by counsel, mainly 
as we have seen, the story of the trial itself - what different witnesses have 
said - and counsels' opinions about how these stories are to be interpreted 
and their opinion as to which story is to be upheld, whether the story of the 
prosecution or that of the defense. 
The place of narrative in institutional discourse has received a lot of different 
interpretations. Many researchers (Mishler, Hyden, Hall, Sarangi and 
Slembrouck, all in Gunnarson 1997) have produced different views of the 
role of narrative, Mishler in medical encounters, Hyden and Hall, Sarangi 
and Slembrouck in Social Work. Mishler's study establish the fact of the 
joint creation of the story by the medical practitioner and the patient and 
questions older text-based models of storytelling that assume that the story 
can be the 'singular possession of the storyteller and not the result of 
dynamic interactional processes' (Gunnarson et al 1997 p. 9 see also Munbyý 
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1993 p. 3). This observation is especially salient to the creation of stories in 
the courtroom as they are very evidently jointly produced by many tellers. 
Hyden's and Hall, Sarangi and Slembrouck's interpretation of the role of 
storytelling by Social Workers, however impute sinister motives to these 
'institutional representatives' and the stories they tell. Hyden's data is the 
written reports produced in modem bureaucratic institutions by social 
workers and he makes very strong criticism of these as functioning to 'justify 
the actions and decisions of the authority and to contribute to the self- 
understanding of the profession and to the meaning of their work' 
(Gunnarson p. 10) which actions and decisions are said to be made by people 
who, 'invariably play the role of the good saviour - although they constantly 
and tragically fail in their mission' and often exclude other 'potential stories. ' 
These are very strong accusations indeed and may be contrasted to legal 
storytelling, which seems to me to be transparent and open to public 
criticism, and are continuously bcing contcsted by oppositionists. Howcvcr it 
has been claimed that legal stories are just as sinister as other 'organisational 
stories' in their ability to exclude others' stories (see for instance Delgado 
1980) who points out that 'Many, but by no means all, who have been telling 
legal stories are members of what could be loosely described as outgroups, 
groups whose marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose 
voice and perspective - whose consciousness - has been suppressed, 
devalued, and abnormalised ... The dominant group creates its own stories as 
well. The stories or the narratives told by the ingroup remind it of its identity 
in relation to the outgroups, and provides it with a form of shared reality in 
268 
which its superior position is seen as natural. ' (p. 241). It seems always the 
blight of service professions' discourses to come into violent conflict with 
the commonality of the people and for the critics to equally well to condemn 
them. But Like Atkinson and Drew (1979 p. vii) I 'do not however propose 
to take sides in any debate between the critics and supporters of our 
(adversarial) legal system. 
The substantive monologues of the trial in this courtroom involve the court 
personnel in addressing each other. Here only legal professionals hold the 
floor and speak to each other, for example, in the submissions stage when 
counsel address the magistrate and in the judgements when the magistrate 
addresses the court. The fact that in these parts of the proceedings there is no 
interpreting for the witnesses or litigants who do not speak the language of 
the court, underscores the belief here that it is the professionals and not the 
laymen who are involved. The narratological analyses of these proceedings 
serve to show the methods by which the professionals talk to each other in 
their efforts to sway opinion to their side. The main motif I have suggested of 
these proceedings is that of a battle (of words) between equals which 
underlies the adversary system ofjustice. Danet and Bogoch (1980) already 
referred to in this discussion, see this part of the proceedings in this light 
when they say that, 'to work properly, the adversary model ofjustice require 
attorneys representing each side to be highly combative and, moreover to be 
evenly matched in combativeness. '(p. 4 1) 
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In this discussion I have referred to and used various analytic tools of 
linguistics. I wish now to relate these models to each other and to the themes 
they have revealed in the course of analysis of the data, in order to answer 
the question 'What do Critical Discourse Analysis, Halliday's context of 
situation and its related representations in the linguistic system, and Sinclair 
and Coulthard's model of exchange structure have in common? ' The answer 
is that they are all seen to feed into a theory of tenor, that is, social 
relationships as manifested in language choice and language use as well as 
how language is used to maintain relationships of equality and inequality. 
That is, these methodologies enable us to clarify and discuss issues of social 
concem. 
The other methodology used in the study is that analysing bilingual 
discourse. Here the model used is Grosjean (1982) showing the factors that 
explain code switching. The code switching of different participants was 
analysed and the use of two languages in the processes which involve 
litigants directly - of Readings of Charge Sheets, Readings of facts and 
Examinations - were described under courtroom interpreting. A number of 
interpretations of code switching Nvere made including the administrative 
function of a magistrate in a multilingual context. The themes of 
empowerment which emerged from analysis of this aspect of language in the 
courtroom are discussed later in this chapter. 
10.2 Sociological interpretations: themes 
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This study has made a number of interpretations of the social meanings of 
various discourse patterns. These will now be taken up and discussed in this 
section as themes. 
One of the themes of this study is that of power in the relationships between 
court participants. But are there any mechanisms of empowerment at all in 
courtroom discourse? The fact that most scholars have not even suggested 
these means that they are not obvious and do not attract as much attention as 
relations observed in courtroom practices such as cross-examinations. It 
seems to me that a legal system, like for example, the adversary system, 
could not completely fail to cater for the maintenance of human dignity to 
the people it serves (unless the laws are themselves inhuman such as the 
former segregationist laws of The USA and South Africa). It may be true that 
some rules of evidence such as not allowing witnesses to tell their stories in 
the ways that they would in ordinary everyday discourse (for example to 
exprcss thcir own opinions about what thcy saw happcn as cyc witnesscs) 
and the tight control of the discourse by counsel in cross-examination are, 
ordinarily, objectionable. There is always room for debate in social discourse 
and while legal members know and understand the motivations of these 
rules, they do not take the trouble to explain the to others, if they do explain 
them in their jurisprudential literature. 
Empowerment in the legal system 
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As far as legal provision for human dignity is concerned we can quote one of 
the chapters of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of Botswana, which 
states that: 
No witness in any criminal proceedings shall, except as provided by this act 
or any other law, be compelled to answer any question which, if the answer 
to such a question would in accordance with the law of evidence which was 
in force on 3 1' December, 1987, have a tendency to expose him to any pains, 
penalty, or forfeiture or to criminal charge or to degrade his character. 
(Criminal Procedure and Evidence Chapter 08: 02 Section258) 
One would presume that if a particular defendant were literate in the law this 
is one clause that he/she could make recourse to in his/her engagement with 
cross-examining counsel. Otherwise it is the duty of the attorney at IaNv to 
point this out on behalf of the defendant or witness if the need arises. I have 
also observed in this courtroom, as has also observed in other courtrooms 
(Atkinson and Drew 1979) that witnesses do in fact have ways and means of 
resisting the control of cross-examining (chapter 7.6 in this thesis). 
In this courtroom one theme that has emerged is that of empowerment. 
There are three main instances of this empowerment. One is in the language 
relationships in the courtroom in which witnesses are allowed to speak in 
their mother tongues and be listened to without the need for interpretation for 
the court. I see this to be empowering in the sense of witnesses representing 
themselves without the potentially hazardous intervention of the interpreter 
as we have seen how the interpreter sometimes filters the courtroom reality 
and the external reality and interprets selectively. When the court listens to a 
witness first hand, elements of the situation such as the witness's sincerity 
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and other mechanisms of creation of credibility such as manner and attitude, 
are directly observed. 
The second instance of litigant empowerment contained in the bilingual 
nature of the courtroom is the way it deals with disadvantage through lack of 
linguistic competence either because the language used in the courtroom is 
not a mother-tongue of some of the litigants, or because the language of law 
and the court is an unfamiliar dialect to the layman who speaks roughly the 
same mother-tongue as the professionals in the courtroom. We have noted 
how in a multilingual setting, the choices of languages can have positive 
spin-off for the witnesses. The bilingual interaction in the Botswana 
courtroom is not in general terms unique. But the appearance the AI B2 code 
switching (where speaker A uses language I and speaker B responds in 
language 2) in formal settings such as the courtroom has not, to my 
awareness, been described elsewhere. In this context the possibility of a 
litigant using his or her own mother-tongue in response to a second language 
he or she understands seems an advantage to the litigant. In the description of 
alternation of languages in this courtroom I have indicated that in interpreted 
proceedings, the litigants have, seemingly randomly, required interpretation 
only at certain places in the same interaction with the same lawyer or 
prosecutor examining and not at others. The total effect of this seemingly 
chaotic use of languages is facilitation of communication rather than 
communication breakdown. It seems to me a positive aspect that is beneficial 
to the not so highly educated litigant. It is my opinion that if, as some 
respondents have stated, this is not satisfactory state of affairs in terms of not 
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being legal, then it is the legislation which must accommodate the pragmatic 
situation. This recommendation is not unheard of in law. This is the proper 
place for the operation of the law of administration that stipulates that if the 
law cannot curb, then lawlessness becomes the law. I am suggesting that this 
state of bilingualism in the magistrate's court in Botswana sbould be 
endorsed as the most effective way of carrying out an administration of 
justice that takes into account the needs of its clients. 
The third empowering feature of the trial is one that attaches to the 
administrative position of the magistrate. Empowerment of the litigant occurs 
when the magistrate takes the trouble to find out the status and situation of 
the accused person awaiting trial by asking the accused if he has anything to 
say to the court at two junctures in the trial process. One juncture where the 
accused person is so involved is in the preparatory stage of the proceedings 
i. e. at the mentions stage. At this stage the magistrates ask defendants 
whether they have anything to say. This opportunity to speak- has been used 
by defendants to state their complaints about their conditions in prison and 
other explanations of issues. The magistrate often assures the accused that his 
problems will be attended to. The same question is asked by the magistrate 
towards the end of the trial when the defendants are asked whether they have 
anything to say in mitigation before sentencing. The belief is that the 
mitigating circumstances of the defendant are taken into account in the 
magistrates' decisions. 
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In relation to the question of legal members power over laymen in the court 
I would argue that a legal system should put in place checks and balances to 
govern the activities of its members. I cannot say for certain, as I am not a 
lawyer, whether the rules of evidence, which govern what is and is not 
admissible as evidence also control lawyers strategies in court. It seems to 
me that the assertion by Candlin (1997 p. xii) that 'Of course and inherently 
so, the practices of the profession cannot be de-institutionalised, one always 
empowers or disempowers by what one does and how one acts, ' is 
particularly apt in this situation of relationships between professionals and 
layman clients. 
Another theme is that of conformity with the law as seen, for example, in 
the strict adherence of the prosecuting officers to the language clause of the 
Magistrate's Courts Act. From interviews with the police prosecutors, it 
became clear that they are very conscious of the fact that the language of the 
courts is English and they believe that languages brought into the court by 
litigants are only accommodated through their interpretation into English. In 
fact this perception is not in accord with the observed uses and interrelations 
of languages in this courtroom. We have seen code switching of the various 
types described under the bilingualism chapter in this study (Chapter 8) and 
the fact that the language of the litigants, if it is Setswana, is not normally 
interpreted into English for the court. The explanation for this conformity of 
the prosecutors, who are police officers, has been given, in this study, as the 
fact that as law enforcing agents, they are careful not to be seen to be 
contravening the law themselves and as has also been pointed out, there is an 
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observable tendency on the part of magistrates to enjoin the prosecutors to 
speak in English. It seems to me that prosecution is so pivotal to legal 
proceedings, (if there was no prosecution there would be no cases) that 
conformity with the law at this particular point of the proceedings gives a 
feel that all of the proceedings are in fact strictly conducted in English. 
Magistrates are not conscious of the fact that, in practice, Setswana is another 
language of the courtroom (in the sense that Setswana, is not translated into 
English for the court). 
A theme related to this one of conformity with the law is that of the enabling 
function of routine in everyday work situations. The work situation of the 
courtroom exhibits this tendency to routinisation of activity. When the 
routine is disturbed, as we saw in the case of the witness who said he did not 
know the accused person, (in the analysis of a direct examination by a 
prosecutor), it becomes very clear that sense making in everyday work 
depends on routinisation. The daily work- of the prosecutor, in mentions and 
direct examinations exhibit a high level of routinised language, for example, 
the self-introductions of the prosecutor, 'I appear for the state Your 
Worship, ' and the informing moves, 'The case is for mention, to set the date 
for trial' (routinely repeated at the beginning of each case). This element of 
routine language is also seen in the opening moves of direct examinations, 
'Do you know the accused personT Can you please tell this honourable court 
how you came to know the accused personT Routinised language is a 
greatly enabling part of the 'meaning potential' that is the language system. 
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It is this, which makes the prosecutor function comfortably in the English 
language he is obliged by the law to use in court. 
The themes of Co-operation and coercion are also strongly suggested by 
the data of this courtroom. As Atkinson and Drew (1975) point out, in 
examination there are two distinct dialogic models - co-operative and 
supportive in direct examination and combative and adversarial in cross- 
examination (p. 105). In the direct examination of own side's witnesses the 
prosecutor and the witness engage in a co-operative transaction of building 
up the story of their litigation in ways that give advantage to their side. Here 
there is equality between the prosecutor and the witness even though the 
prosecutor, who is a member of the "powerful legal profession, ' controls the 
discourse by way of taking the initiating moves. In cross-examination of the 
same prosecution witness we see a completely different kind of relationship, 
that of blatant control of the discourse and the linguistic moves of the witness 
by the attorney for the defense. The attorney for the defense does not only 
ask questions, he coerces the answers he requires of the witness, often by 
forceful repetitions of the same question. 
The theme of identity, through participant roles, comes out of the data in 
three places. There is the identity of the magistrate, the identity of the litigant 
and the identity of legal counsel and prosecutors. We saw in the bilingualism 
chapter of this thesis how the magistrate can take the liberty to put a human 
face on the law by speaking the language of the litigant, (but only briefly) as 
he soon reverts to English, the language of the court, in a way that distances 
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him from the non-English speaking litigant. When the magistrate makes it 
known to the litigant that he understands his language this serves to raise his 
social status -svithout in anyway reducing the status and authority of the 
magistrate. We have seen how the magistrate is still held in high esteem and 
his administrative decisions are deferred to by others in the courtroom. One 
recalcitrant defendant, accused of rape and assault, completely ignored (or 
was ignorant of) the rarefied atmosphere of the court. He complained 
incessantly and overlapped his speech with that of the magistrate. He went 
out of the courtroom, after the date of trial had been set, complaining 
volubly. I do not believe he will get a light sentence if found guilty as 
charged (unless his lawyer can plead insanity). 
Magistrates do often assert their authority over other officers like defence 
counsel and prosecutors. They can upbraid officers for lack of preparedness 
for their cases as we saw when he spoke in a friendly manner to the accused 
by switching to Setswana to tell him 'Ba re ba ne ba go akela, ' meaning 
'They (the prosecutor police) say they were lying about you. ' Another 
magistrate, (a woman) enjoined the prosecutor to 'make sure that your clients 
are properly dressed when they come to this court' and told another 
defendant to button-up his shirt. Magistrates give commands like 'report to 
this court on the 27h of September. ' 
The litigant's identity is also positively provided for in their use their mother 
tongues. When a litigant is listened to in the language he or she speaks 
without the requirement to interpret his or her speech into English, he or she 
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identifies better with the often very unfamiliar context of the whole 
courtroom - physical and social. 
As far as counsel are concerned, their identity is associated with power 
throughout the trial; whether it is in their relationship with the litigants in 
cross-examinations, or their relationship to each other and to their audience, 
the magistrate, in their closing speeches. We have seen how the power 
stances that counsel take in the courtroom are a part of their culture, which is 
built up for them in court practitioners manuals. In submissions we see open 
combat between opposing counsel in their attempts to damage each others 
cases and persuade the magistrates to see the cases their way. It is in this 
most characteristic of courtroom processes that we see the tug of war 
between people who are equal in combativeness. Their speeches are full of 
hyperbole, derision and sarcasm towards each other (described in this thesis 
at chapter 6.5.2.1: linguistic features of submissions). 
But it is the ways that this discourse community accommodates outsiders, 
that is, laymen in the courtroom, that has been discussed so much and with 
much criticism by the academics, themselves a discourse community. 
Perhaps the best explanation of this discoursal phenomenon is that given by 
O'Barr (1982 p. 401) when he explains the relationship of the legal profession 
to the layman as the client of the law. He stated: 
Given the importance of preserving modes of expression in systems which 
are based on precedence, one of the most important roles which the lawyer 
thus provides for his client is that of interpreter. He is the channel of access 
to the law; he is the 'bilingual' who can act as interpreter between the 
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language of his client and the language of the law. This happens in effect 
when the client approaches the lawyer. They begin talking about the problem 
which has brought them together: the next step in the legal process is for the 
lawyer to translate the problem originally expressed in everyday code into 
legal concepts and to attempt to interpret what is happening to the their 
client. 
Here the identities of the legal professional and the layman are shaped by 
knowledge distribution between them. When litigants enter the courtroom 
they are entering the world of professionals and the lawyers continue to 
represent the client in the 'arcane' (Maley 1994) world. 
103 Conclusion 
It seems to be the blight of all service professions that they will come into 
conflict with the everyday discursive practices of their clients. How this 
conflict is to be resolved is a matter for theorising. The highly polemical 
approach of CDA school such as the type described by Van Dijk earlier on in 
this discussion must, in this era of post-structuralism and the collapse of the 
communist block, take into account that no one really stands outside of some 
ideology or other and therefore needs the circumspection suggested by 
Witten (1993) who argues that 'the challenge of post -structuralism suggests 
that critical theory will survive in-a much attenuated state if indeed at all' and 
that 'others maintain that it is still possible to maintain some of the goals of 
critical theory scaled down to an appropriate scope. ' We need, I think, a 
comprehensive approach that will bring together the discourses or genres of 
professions, like law, medicine and governmental bureaucracy, to name a 
few, and sketch out their similarities and dissimilarities and then suggest the 
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way forward towards solving the social problems that arise from the conflict 
between specialist discourses and everyday discourse. 
10.4 Summary of the thesis 
Finally, in this discussion I want, in summary, to make some final comments 
on the research questions of this study. The body of this thesis answers the 
three research questions that guide this research into courtroom 
communication. The first question was 'How is the process of 
communication facilitated by the use of English in the law court? ' This 
question is answered by two methods of data collection being a questionnaire 
and interview study, and analysis and description of the transcripts of the 
proceedings showing what actually takes place in the courtroom. The 
questionnaire study addresses this question by asking the views of courtroom 
participant, lawyers and police prosecutors, their opinions about the use of 
languages in the courtroom. All policemen answered 'Yes' to the question 
'Are vernaculars of Botswana ever used in court? ' One respondent explained 
that they are only used if the person concerned cannot speak English, but 
they are interpreted into English. Analysis of courtroom proceedings 
contradicted this belief There is no interpretation from Setswana into 
English as the courtroom personnel understand Setswana and have not, 
during the period of data collection for this thesis, requested any 
interpretation of Setswana into English. The questionnaire study also 
revealed that presiding officers in court sometimes use Setswana, but that 
prosecutors never use any other language but English. This was bome out by 
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analysis of the proceedings of this court. However, it must be qualified that, 
by and large, magistrates use only English in carrying out their 
administrative duties. So it seems that English is facilitative of 
communication in the courtroom largely in the processes where the court is 
speaking to itself such as during trial preparations of the mentions and in 
lawyers' submissions and judgements and in the making of the records of 
proceedings by magistrates. But examinations and other processes that 
involve the litigant in the comprehension of the proceedings (such as 
listening to the readings of facts) and in talking (such as pleading to the 
charges), are carried out in two languages. 
The second question as to how the existence of other languages is addressed 
by the court, we have seen that they are allowed not only through 
interpretation but also in other more complex ways that are natural and not 
premeditated. Having brought this fact to the fore it remains to be seen how 
the law reacts to such a pattern of language use. 
71c final qucstion 'What social issucs undcrpin the uscs of languagc in the 
courtroom? ' has been seen to be answered by the analyses and the discussion 
chapter. We have looked at the use of language in the courtroom in 
examinations and seen how legal personnel use language in ways that are 
sometimes coercive of witnesses and sometimes co-operative, depending on 
the type of examination, whether it is direct examination of own witnesses or 
cross-examination witnesses of the opposing side and how they relate to each 
other (through language) as professionals. 
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Chapter 11: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
11.1 Achievements and limitations of the study 
Let me start this chapter by recounting what the study has been able to do 
and what it has not done. I have in this study used discourse analysis 
methodology and made interpretations of the data that these methods have 
made possible. If we start with the interpretations themselves, it is probably 
obvious that these have not managed to be based on a wide enough range of 
data i. e. data from different sources such as observations, questionnaires and 
interviews, allowing intricate triangulation. The richest source of data was 
the transcriptions of the proceedings of the court exemplifying all the 
processes describecL For the chapter on the bilingual nature of the courtroom 
(a label which may be contestable and which I have therefore taken pains to 
establish as a pragmatic fact of a court whose wider linguistic context is 
multilingual) has been also cross referenced with questionnaire data 
involving the opinions of participants about the uses of languages in this 
courtroom. Given the newness of the revelations of this study about 
bilingualism in the Botswana courtroom, there is need for study of more 
courtrooms to delimit the full nature of this aspect of the courtroom, for 
instance how widespread or general it is. I believe such a study would be 
useful for legislation regarding the language of the courtroom in Botswana, if 
notjust interesting as an academic exercise. 
Other interpretations are validated by corroboration with the literature such 
as the possible interpretations of the meaning of the Feedback move in 
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defense counsel examinations when it is absent from prosecution direct 
examinations. This has been used in the literature to support a theory of the 
coercive nature of courtroom questioning. I have used the IRF analysis to 
argue that there are different types of power relations in the courtroom. 
11.2 Some highlights of the study 
This study has highlighted a number of important points about 
communication in this courtroom. The first is the generic structure that the 
processes in this courtroom shares with similar genres in other parts of the 
world. The processes of examinations, submissions of counsel and judicial 
decisions orjudgements are described as common genres of the adversarial 
trial systems. As Niska (19950 points out, 'in highly ritualised legal 
proceedings, the discourse types are very standardized. She also cites 
Johnsson (1988 p. 30-3 1) as identifying the main parts of the proceedings of a 
criminal case as 1. the reading of the charge sheet, 2. the case for the 
prosecution, 3. the examination and cross-examinations and 4. the 
concluding speeches. She also, as I have quite independently done in this 
study, observes two types of processes as monologues and dialogues. I have 
in this study labelled the main parts of the trial, substantive genres, and the 
others that are found in this courtroom as its administrative genres. These are 
mentions and readings of facts. I have also pointed out that mentions in this 
courtroom are made as preparatory stages of the trial whereas in Britain, for 
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example, this processes is done in a separate court from the court doing the 
substantive processes of the trial. 
The second important point I have highlighted is that to do with layman 
understanding of the trail proceedings. This is an important element if we are 
concerned with the success of communication. Many researchers have made 
this point a part of their scholarly concern, whether they are studying 
courtroom communication in a monolingual context for example O'Barr 
(1980) or bilingual contexts Berk-Seligson (1989and Mead 1985). Niska, 
(1995) cites Johnsson (1988)'s very interesting example of litigants' 
comprehension of court proceedings. He said that in his interviews of 
defendants after trial, some stated that they had no difficulty in understanding 
the language of the court 'except when the jurists were talking to each other' 
(p. 31 1). They were referring here to the monological parts of the 
proceedings. Interestingly in my distinguishing between the administrative 
monologues of mentions and the substantive monologues of submissions and 
judgements, on the one hand, and dialogues involving defendants and 
witnesses on the other, I have pointed out that the monologues involve the 
court speaking amongst themselves and therefore there is no interpreting of 
these proceedings for the defendants and witnesses. Researchers like Berk- 
Seligson concerned with the plight of the non-English speaking defendants 
do not distinguish between processes that only the legal profession would 
fully comprehend, including their speeches to each other, and whether these 
too need to be interpreted to the litigants and how this would affect the 
proceedings. It has been pointed out that interpreting in the court context is 
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not very popular. So the question of interpreting even the monologues where 
the argument is between counsel themselves as in their submission, and the 
speeches are directed at the court, such as the reading of the judgement 
would, I presume, be even more problematic. 
Another point I have highlighted is the critical discourse analysis position. 
The last twenty years, since Di Pietro (1982), Linguistics and The 
Professions on to Gunnarson (1997) Yhe construction ofProfessional 
Discourse, have seen a proliferation of studies of the discourses of various 
professions. Many studies such as those focussing on Doctor/Patient 
interviews, the narratives of Psychotherapy and of Social Workers, 
courtroom discourse and the languages of bureaucracy, are very highly 
critical of the ways these service professions use languages in ways that 
mystify the general public whorn they serve. Some like Fairclough suggest 
the roots of these communication problems are the desire by the dominant 
classes to keep the masses in subjugation and to naturalise power 
asymmetries. I believe we need a theory of professional discourse that makes 
use of evidence from all these studies of the languages of the professions to 
build a framework for understanding problems of communication between 
the professions and the layman (discourse analysis and academic language 
included) to provide a forum for understanding other people's genres. 
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Apendices APPENDIX1 
DATA: Transcripts of court proceedings of the Gaborone magistrate's court 




Acc. = Accused 
Mag. = Magistrate 
Pros. = Prosecutor 
Def Couns. = Defence Counsel 
Int. Interpreter 
Wit. Witness. 
Translation form Setswana in to English made by the researcher will be 
enclosed in brackets. 
Case no. 106-08-99 
Ace: Ke kopa go ntsha submission fa pele ga lekgotla. 
Mag: Why do you want to submit today? 
Int: Ke eng o batla go submita gompieno e se letsatsi la tsheko? 
(Translation: Why do you want to submit today when its not the day of 
trial? ) 
Ace: Setswana: ke gore nne ke ithaya ke re ( ... 
inaudible) go ko tronkong 
kwa ke a sotlega gake robale sentle gape ke robatswa ke ke bewa fa gare ga 
batho ba ba lwalango mongwe o lwala hela malwetse a dintho o mongwe o 
bolawa, ke TB. ke robatswa ha gare ga batho ba ene re pitlagane. 
(Translation: Its because I thought (... inaudible) at the jail there I am 
suffering I don't sleep well and I sleep in between people who have deseases 
the other one suffers from diseases of sores and the other one suffers from 
TB. I am made to sleep in between these people and we are packed close 
together) 
Mag: (Setswana) Jaanong o batla go hudusetswa ko main prison? 
(Translation: So now you want to be transferred to main prison? ) 
Ace: Fa ele gore lekgotta le mpona molato. 
(Translation: If the court finds me guilty) 
Mag: (Setswana) Jaanong ko main prison gone ga go a pitlagana? 
(Translation: Is the main prison not crowded? ) 
Ace: ( silence) 
Mag: Report to this court in 21 days for final submissions. I will call upon 
the prosecutor to help solve your problems at prison. 
Pros: Your Worship I would love to have some submission if the accused 
person had indicated earlier. I would, therefore need time your worship to go 
through the evidence. We have two counts. The accused person is in fact 
facing two counts. 
Int: Setswana: A re otlaa tlhoka nako ya gore a ye go bala bosupi ke gone a 
tla itseng go submita. 
( Translation: He says he'll need time to go and examine the evidence it's 
then that he'll make his submission. ) 
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Wit: Setswana: Ntlhalosetsa gape. Ga ke a utlwa. 
(Translation: Please explain to me, I didn't catch what you said. ) 
Int: A re o batla nako gore a hiwe nako a kgone go bala bosupi. 
(Translation: He say he wants to be given time to enable him to study the 
evidence. 
Mag: Lets put it off to the thirteenth of August for final submission. 
Int: Setswana: Ema ka dinao. 0 tlaatla ka di 13'h o t1a go submita. Otlaa 
nama o le mo kgolegelong go fitlhella ka letsatsi leo. 
(Translation: Stand up. You'll come on the thirteenth to come and submit. 
You'll be remanded in prison until that date. ) 
Ace: Intshwarele Your Worship, jaanong ke tlaabo ke ntsha submission ka 
nako yajudgement? 
(Trnslation: Excuse me Your Worship, will I then make my submission at 
the same time as the judgement? ) 
Mag: The judgement will be given after the submission. ) 
Int: Ga twe katholo e tlaa tswa go sena go submitiwa. ) 
Case No. 2 06-08-99 
State versus S. N. 
Pros: Your Worship, I represent the state. The case is for mention to set a 
date for continuation of trial and if I were to suggest dates your worship, I 
would suggest the twentieth October, 23dand 24h November. I may have to 
go out during the month of September so I would not like to commit any date 
in September. 
Mag: ýafter a long pause looking at the calendar) This case is scheduled for 
the 24 of November at 8.30 in the morning. Make sure that you notify your 
lawyer. 
Int: Sctswana: Gatwe o tlaatla go seka ka di 24 tsa November. 0e go 
bolelela agente ya gago. 
Case No. 3.06-08-99 
State versus D. G. 
Pros: Your Worship I appear for the state eh your worship this case was 
supposed to be mentioned on the 3rd of August and I was told the accused 
could no avail himself because... (inaudible) So I apply for a warrant of his 
arrest. 
Mag: Where were you? 
Acc: I was there on the second of August... (inaudible ) (some confusion 
about dates) 
Mag: So how about.. (inaudible ) setting date for next appearance. Here are 
the dates. The case will be heard on the l0h, 17"' and 18'h of September. So 
make sure that you don't miss this one. 
Case No. 4 06-08-99 
State versus J. A. N. 
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Pros: Your worship I appear for the state. This case is coming for mention. 
The accused is remanded in custody and I apply that he remains in custody. I 
apply for another date of mention. 
Int: Are o kopa gore o name o ntse ole mo toronkong. 
Acc: ... (inaudible) speaks English. Mag: (inaudible) dates. 
Case No. 5.06-08-99 
State versus B. B. 
Pros: Your worship, I appear for the state. The case is for mention. May 
another date be set . Def. Courts: Your Worship I appear on behalf of the accused. 
Mag: 23d 24d' * Pros: Yes your worship. 
State versus N. S. 
Pros: The trial has been set for I Ith Nov 1999. The accused person is 
remanded in custody, your worship. 
Mag: We have received a letter from a woman who claims to be she your 
girl ftiend. 
Int: Setswnana: Gatwe go arnogetswe lekwalo ko mongweng a re ke 
nganyana yo o ratanang le ene. 
Acc: speaks Setswana... (inaudible) 
Pros: Your worship if it can be a conditional bail, the condition being that he 
reports to police station twice a week and to surrender his ... 
(inaudible) 
Mag: Where is his mother? 
Interpreter: Setswana: 0 kae ene mmaagwe ngwana? 
Mag: Are you prepared to sign bail for one thousand Pula to ensure that he 
attends the court on the 19'h 
Interpreter: Setswana. : Aotlaa mo saenela di pampiritsa madi aa lekanang 
one thousand Pula go itlama gore e tlaa re ka di 19 tsa November otla nna 
teng mo court. 
Mag: Stand up accused. 
Interpreter: Setswana. Emelela. 
Mag: You will be granted bail for one thousand Pula. You will report to the 
police twice a week on Tuesday and Friday at 7.30 a. m. Trial 18th November. 
Do you understand? 
Acc: Yes your worship. 
Case No. 6.06-08-00 
State versus T. S. 
Pros: The matter is for mention Your Worship and ... The matter 
is still 
under investigation It was transmitted to Seargent ... and the matter 
has been 
returned to the investigating officer for further investigation Your Worship. I 
apply that the accused remain in custody. 
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Interpreter: Setswana: Gatwe dipampiri tsa kgetsi di buseditswe ko ko go 
rarnapodisi dibusitswe ko, go baba tlhotlhomisang gore ba tswelle ba 
tlhotlhomise. 
Acc: Gake utlwe. 
(Translation: I can't hear. ) 
Int: repeats. 
Mag: Does the accused have a say? 
Interpreter: Setswana: Go na le se o batlang go se bua? 
Acc: In Setswana: Ke gore ke ne ke bathe charge sheet yaaka. Mapodisi ba 
ganne ka yone. Jaanong ke santse ke re ke batla charge sheei hela. 
(Translation: I had asked for my charge sheet, but the police have refused to 
give it to me. So still say I am asking for my charge sheet. ) 
Mag: Why did you refuse with the charge sheet? 
Pro: I didn't know that the accused had requested a charge sheet. 
Otherwise ... (inaudible) Mag: You don't have it here? 
Pros: I don't have it now, You're your Worship. 
Mag: 0 irang ka charge sheet? 
(Translation: What do you want to do with a charge sheet? ) 
Acc: Ke batla go kwalela ko High Court, ke kopa baili. 
(Translation: I want to write to the high Court to request bail) 
Mag: The police will furnish you with a charge sheet as you have requested 
and you will appear in court on the 20t of August. 
Interpreter: Setswana: Mapodisi ba tlaa go neela charge sheet. 0 tla tla mo 
lekgotleng ka di 20. 
Case No. 7.06-08-99 
State versus M. G. 
Pro: Your worship I appear for the state in this matter. The accused 
person ... (inaudible) 
Tape 2 06-08-99 
Case No. 8.06-08-99 
State versus C. M. 
Pros: Your worship, I appear for the state in this matter. The case is for 
mention and I apply for another date to be set. The accused is remanded in 
jail. 
Mag: How old is he? 
Pros: He is nineteen your worship. 
Mag: Why did you detain him? 
Pros: Eli well eh... your worship eh.. the evidence... in any case I don't have 
any objection to releasing him. The only reason which we remanded him was 
that by that time rape was ... 
(inaudible) We know where he stays. He can be 
granted bail. 
Mag: Alright. I will take you in my confidence and grant you bail of one 
thousand Pula. ... Int: Setswana: 0 tlaa saena dipampiri tsa madi aa kanaaka one thousand 
Pula. gore o letele tsheko o se mo kgolegelong. Otle go ipega ka di 7 tsaga 
September. 
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Field notes: How is the existence of other languages addressed by the 
English only courtroom? In fact the courtroom is not English only. It is very 
flexible as far as languages are concerned. The main languages being 
Setswana and English which alternate freely. To facilitate communication - 
Pattern = when litigants speak Setswana they are heard in Setswana. There is 
no interpretation for the court but the magistrate makes the record in English. 
Interpretation is made for the litigant who requires it even if he/she knows 
some English. Some litigants would start off speaking English and revert to 
Setswana. Some would respond to English in Setswana. Also, no noticeable 
waste in time due to interpretation as the pace of the proceeding is itself slow 
and ponderous with the counsel and prosecutor pausing for the magistrate to 
take the record. Prosecutors are generally more patient and allow the 
magistrate a good amount of time to record. 
How is communication facilitated by the use of English in court? 
English for the record and for the court speaking to itself as in Your Worship 
I appear for the state ... 
in lawyers addressing the magistrate in submissions 
and in j udgements. English is interpreted into Setswana in the reading of 
charge sheets. Note, in examination ... alternation 
between English and 
Setswana when the litigants are involve. 
Case No. 9.06-08-99 
State versus R. K. 
Pros: Your worship I appear for the state in this matter. This case is coming 
for mention. I apply for another date to be set. The accused is remanded in 
pnson. 
Mag: Is there anything you want to say accused? 
Report to the court at 8.30 in the morning of ... September 1999. 
Case No. 10.06-08-99 
State versus S. I, 
Pros: I appear for the state, your worship. It's a mention. May another date 
be set, your worship. 
Mag: You were supposed to report here on the 9th of July. 
Int: Setswana: Ka di 9 tsaga July o ne o le kae? 
Acc: Ke ne ka tsena ko Court 4 ... 
(inaudible. ) 
Mag: who told you that? 
Interpreter: Setswana: Ao ne oa tla gone mo court e wa tsena mo. 
Pro: Iwas the one who was supposed to tell him, your worship and you told 
me to tell him... (inaudible). 
Case No. 11.06-08-99 
State versus T. L. 
Pros: I appear for the state your worship. The accused person is not in 
attendance. During the last mention a warrant of his arrest was applied for. 
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May another date of mention be set, your worship because we are likely to 
arrest him. 
Case No. 12.06-08-99 
State versus M. M. 
I appear for the state your worship. It's a mention. May another date be set. 
Mag: Accused you have heard my explanation with regard to availability of 
judicial officers. 8t" September. 
State versus T. D. 
Pros: Your worship I appear for the state. Its still a mention. May another 
date be set. 
Mag: Stand up accused. Anything you want to say. 
Int: Setswana: Ema ka dinao. Go na, le sengwe se o batlang go se bua? 
Mag: Right. As I have been trying to explain that ... 
(inaudible) I hope the 
officer will be able to set a date of trial. Report on the 7 th of November. 
Interpreter. Setswana: Ke solofela gore gongwe ka di 7 tsaga November 
o5tlaatla o beelwa letsatsi la tsheko. 
Pros: 7th of November, You worship? 
Mag: 7th of September. 
Pros: Thank you your worship. 
Mag: I had said what? November? 
Pros Yes Your Worship. 
Case No. 13.06-08-99 
State versus M. M. 
Def Couns: If it pleases the court, I appear for the accused your worship. 
Pros: May I appear for the state your worship. (note: A terms of introduction 
modal question. And an 'if' clause. ) 
Case No. 14.06-08-99 
State versus P. M. 
Pros: I appear for the state your worship. The case is coming for mention, 
your worship and I apply for another date. (note: the first use of conjunction 
linking the various stages of the mention. ) 
Case No. 15.06-08-99 
State versus K. N. 
Pros: Your worship, I appear for the state. The case is coming for mention. 
The accused is remanded in custody and I apply for further detention and yet 
another date of mention. (note even more conjoining perhaps the case is one 




DMCT E. XAMINATIONS/EXAMINATIONS-IN-CHIEF 
Tape Number 8 
Case Number 23 15-08-99 State versus M. S. 
Direct Examination 
Pros: Do you know the accused person? 
Wit: E ffa ke a mo itse. 
(Yes sir, I know him) 
Pro: Could you please tell this honorable court how you came to know the 
accused? 
Wit: (speech missed out. ) 
Pros: Yes , could you please tell this honorable court where and where this 
accident took place? 
Wit: Accidente ee diragetse ka di 13 tsa Mmarch. 
( the accident happened on the 13'hof March) 
Pros: Where this accident happen? 
Wit: On... 
Pros: Could you please tell this court what happened? 
Wit: Nna erile fela ... ka bona koloi e tshweu... ha ke tshwanna go 
hapaana Ie 
yone ke tsamaya ka fa lebogong la left... 
(I saw a white car... when I was just going to pass by it... while I was 
driving on the left side of the road... 
Pros: Were you alone? 
Wit: Ke ne ke na le ffe M. M. 
(I was with Mr M. M. ) 
Pros: can you tell the court what could have caused the accident? 
Wit: accidente e kane e causitswa ke gore rre ... mme o ne a lebega a thetheekela a nole bojalwa. 
(the accident may have been coused by the accused because he was walking 
in a zig-zag manner of drunk person. 
Pros: Why do you say the accused person was drunk? 
Witness Ke ne ke utlwa bo nkga mo go ene. Gape one a nkatumetse thata. 
Nne ra nna ra buisanaka metsotsonyana mme fela mo ganong one a sa bue 
sentlefel jaaka, motho a tshwantse a bua. Ke be ke mmotsa gore ba a nang a 
na le bone ba kae. A ba a re 'ga ke itse. ' 
(I smelled it on him because he was very close to me. We talked for some 
minutes and he was speaking in a slurred speech manner. I asked him where 
the people he was with in his car were. He said 'I don't know) 
Pros: Did you report this accident to the police? 
Wit: E rra, rre, you ke ne ke na le ene o ne, a na le cellophone. 
(Yes sir. The gentleman I was with had a cellophone. ) 
Pros: Yes and did the police come to the scene? 
Wit: Ee a ne a tla gone foo. 
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(Yes they came immediately. ) 
Pros: And what did they do? 
Wit: Ba ne ba measura dikoloi 
(They took measurements of the cars) 
Pros: Yes and did the police..? (inaudible) 
Wit: (inaudible) 
Pros: And what happened at the police station? 
Ko police statione ba fitile ba tsaya statemente. Ba bo ba mpolelela gore ba 
nkhupisa tame. Ke be ke ba bolelela gore ga ke minde go hupa tame. 
(At the police station the took the statements and told me that they would put 
the dummy in my mouth. I told them that I didn't mind them putting the 
dummy in my mouth. ) 
Pros: Yes and did they conduct the test only on you? 
Wit: Ba ne ba testa mo go nna ba bo ba bitsa rre yole akere jaanong nna ke 
be ke tswela ko ntle. 
(They did the test on me and then called that man so I went outside. ) 
Pros: Yes and after they finished with the accused person then what 
happened? 
Wit: Ba ne ba, nthaya bare ke tsamaye. 
Pros: Where did the accused person go? 
Wit: Ga kea, mmona ko a ileng teng. 
(I did not see where he went to. ) 
Pros: Did you get the chance to see the accused the following day? 
Wit: E rra. 
(Yes, sir) 
Pros: How would you describe him? 
Wit: (can't describe him) 
Mag: Now would you ... 
(inaudible) 
Wit: Nnyaa ba ne ba re ga ba bone statement. 
(They said they could not find the statement. ) 
Field notes: skill of prosecutor - asking questions whose answer he could not 
anticipate. Note lexical insertion of English word into Setswana syntax. 
Tape Number 3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Case no. 18 
Police Wit: 1 swear that I will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth. 
Pros: Could you please tell this honourable court your particulars? 
Pol. Wit: ... 
(inaudible) 
Pros: Try to raise your voice 
Pol. Wit: 9948 Constable Motsurni. 
Pros: Your age? 
POIýWit: I an 26years old. 




Pros: Where are you stationed? 
Pol Wit: I 'm stationed at Urban Police. 
Pros: Do you know the accused person. 
Pol Wit: I know the accused person. 
Pros: how do you know the accused person. 
Pol Wit: ... (inaudible) At about half past one I was patrolling Pros: Were you alone? 
Pol Wit: I was with Sergeant Chama. 
Pros: Mobile or on foot? 
Pol Wit: I was driving following vehicle B639ACS That vehicle turned 
towards eh the dumping site I wondered why he should be driving towards 
the dumping site at that hour and I followed him and I flicked the head lamps 
to alert the driver. The vehicle pulled of the road. We got out of the vehicle 
and went over to the accused. Sergeant Chami talked to the accused. 
Pros: What was Chami discussing about with the accused? 
Pol Wit: I think he was demandind the driving licence> 
Pro: You didn't hear the conversation? 
Pol Wit: I only heard the part about the driving licence. 
Pros: So what was the response of the accused to sergeant Chami's demand 
for the driving licence? 
Pol Wit: the accused told sergeant Chami that he didn't have a drivers' 
licence. 
Pros: Was the accused drunk? 
Pol Wit: The accused was drunk (inaudible) and I heard from sergeant 
Chami that he suspected the accused of having been driving under the 
influence of alcohol and eh sergeant Chamim drove the accused's vehicle to 
the police station and I followed behind in the police vehicle. 
Pros: Where was the accused person by then? 
Pol Wit: The accused person was in the police vehilcle. 
Pros: Where was sergeant Chami driving the the accused person's vehicle to. 
Pol Wit: He drove to Borakanelo Police Station. 
Pros: And what happened? 
Pol Wit: At Borakanelo Police Station. Sgt. Chami asked the accused 
person to provide a sample of breath. 
Pros: Were you present by then? 
Pol Wit: iwas present. 
Pros: Then what happened? 
Pol Wit: The accused person provided the breath> 
Mag: He just asked him to provide the breath? 
Pol Wit: He had explained the accused's rights to him. 
Nlag: What did he say? 
Pol Wit: he told him that ( mixed up explanation, inaudible) the accused 
person provided a breath sample and later the print out was ... inaudible. Pros: Did he see the results? 
Pol Wit: the results were shown to the accused. 
Pros: What happened to the accused person afterwards? 
Pol Wit: the accused person was finger printed. 
2 nd pol Wit: I number 9475 Sergeant Charni. Do hereby swear that the 
evidence I shall give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing else but the 
truth so help me God> 
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Pros: Could you please tell this honourable court your full particulars? 
"nd Pol Wit: My name is Emmanuel Chami, house no. 25024 age 29. 
Pros: Stationed where? 
2 nd pol Wit: Stationed at Borakanelo Police Station> 
Pros: Which branch? 
2 nd Pol Wit: At the traffic branch. 
Pros: Do you know the accusedperson? 
2 nd pol Wit: Yes I know the accused person. 
Pros: Will you please tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused? 
2 nd pol Wit: I came to kow the accused person I met him along the Machel 
Road while he was driving past the robots. On the 140'of November 1998 1 
was on patrol along in a police motor vehicle which was driven by constable 
Tsholo> It happened that eh while were along this road, there was a Toyota 
Corolla inftont of us. 
Pros: At what time? 
2 nd pol Wit: It was around 0 1.15 hrs. 
Pros: Go On. 
2 nd Pol Wit: and when he came to the show ground this Toyota Corolla 
turned eh to the right towards the d* un1ping site. 
Pros: Do you know the registration number? 
2 nd po, Wit: Yes B693ACNL 
Mag: M? Wit: Yes your worship, M for Monkey. 
2'DPoI Wit: The driver of the Toyota Corollapulled off to the side of the 
road and I move out of the police vehicle and... 
Pro: How many occupants were in the Toyota Corolla? 
Wit: There were two occupants in the Toyota Corolla> 
Pros: Who was the driver then? 
Wit: The driver I later realised that he was Phineas Mbaiwa 
Pros: So after approaching the motor vehicle what did you do? 
Wit: I the greeted the driver and demanded a drivers' licence from him. And 
theh he replied that he doesn't have a drivers' I icence. And during that time I 
sensed a smell of alcohol from his mouth. 1 thenn told him to get out of his 
motor vehicle. Then I saw a Castle Largar on the platform of the left leg. I 
explained to him that to drive a motor vehicle without a drivers' I; icence is 
an offence and also that I was suspecting him to have been driving while he 
was drunk. I went further to explain to him eh his rights concerning the 
drunken driving issue. 
Pro: Which were the exact words you used concerning the drunken driving? 
Wit: I told him that hem has the right to provide a specimen of breath at a 
place I would take him to. Contineus in Tape number 4 
but if he refuses without any reasonable cause his refusal will be taken as 
supporting evidence for the prosecution and as a rebutting evidence against 
evidence given by him in court as his defence. He agreed to be breath tested. 
Pros: So after he agreed what did you do with the accused/ 
Wit: I then used the SD2 machine to test him. 
Pos: So what were the results of the testing the 6testing machine? 
Wit: It was 1.15 milligrams per litre of of breath. 
Pros: The after that? 
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Wit: The after that we went to the police station because it was in excess of 
the prescribed 0.0025 mg. Per liter of breath. 
Pros: How did you move from the scene to the police station, were you 
walking from the scene? 
Wit: We were driving. I was driving the accused's vehicle 
Pros: where was he? 
Wit: He was in the police vehicle. 
Pros: which police station were you driving to? 
Wit: I drove to Borakanelo Police Station. Getting to Borakanel Police 
Station what did you do? 
Wit: When I got to Borakanelo Police StationI went with the accused person 
into the testing room. 1 breath tested him using Lion Intoxilser 1400 and I 
issued him with the slip which was produced by the machine 
Pros: What -%vere the results from the intoxiliser? 
Wit: 0.779mg per litre. 
Mag: Zero point? 
Wit: 779mg per litre. 
Mag: Go on. 
Pros: How many copies were produced? 
Wit: Three copies were produced. 
Pros: What happened to them? 
Wit: The other one I gave to the accused himself, the other one was filed in 
the police docketand the other one... 
Pros: Did you ever show the results to the accused? 
Wit: Yes I did. 
Pros: Did he aknowledge the results? 
Wit: He acknowledged Your Worship and he even signed the slip. 
Pros: Was the machine serviceable? 
Wit: Yes it was serviceable Your Worship. Itwas calibrated in June 1998. 
Pros: Could you identify the machine which you used? 
Wit: Yes your worship, it has the serial number 14000456. 
Pros: So after you served the accused with the print out what did you then 
do? 
Wit: I warned and cautioned him of the charges of driving a motor vehicle 
while unfit to drive through drinks. That was count one and count two 
driving a motor vehicle without a drivers' licence. 
Tape Number 5 side A, case no 19 
Pol Wit: On the third day of October 1998 a road traffic accident was 
reported to me by ... (inaudible) It occurred along the Tlokweng/Zeerust 
road, near Oasis motel. 
Pros: What time was the accident reported to you? 
Pol Wit: The time was 19.30. 
Pros: What did you do after receiving the call? 
Pol Wit: Constable(inaudible) asked me to assist him since he suspected that 
one of the two drivers was drunk. 
Pros: When this accident was reported to you what did you do? 
Pol Wit: I went to the scene of the accident where I assisted to. 
(inaudible) 
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Pros: Do you still remember the registration numbers of the vehicles 
involved? 
Pol Wit: I still remember the registration of B662AAN and the other one A 
CNP 365 Pros: And what did you do at the scene? 
Pol Wit: Constable(inaudible) told me thay he had already tested the two 
drives and the drivers of the Nissan Sentra had exceeded the prescribed 
limit. I then drove to the police station 
Mag: let me get this clear-the constable had already breath tested the 
Wit: Yes your worship. 
Mag: And he called you come and assist? 
Wit: Yes your worship because... 
Mag: So you took him to the office/ 
Wit: I was accompanied by the accused person your worship. 
Pros: What about the other driver? 
Wit: The ather driver driving his car. 
Pros: What happened at the police station. 
Wit: On arrival your worship to the police stationj introduced the accused 
person to the intoxiliser machine. 1 told him that he has the right to 
Pros: Did you explain to the accused his rights? 
Wit: I told him that he has the right to refuse to be breath testedl explaine to 
him that his reusal to be breath tested would support state evidence. 
Pros: What happened the? 
Wit: He supplied the breath specimen. 
Pros: What was the reading of the breathaliser? 
Wit: 1.1 mg per litre of breath. 
Pros: Did you show him the result? 
Wit: I showed hi the result. 
Pros: And did he sign the slip? 
Wit: Yes your worship he did sign. 
Pros: Was the breathaliser calibrated? 
Wit: Yes your worship. 
Pros: Are you introducing this certificate as evidence? 
Wit: Yes Your worship. 
Def Couns: Your worship we can only admit the certificate 
when ... (inaudible) 
Tape No. 8 Case no. 23 15-08-90 
State versus M. S. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Pros: Do you know the accused? 
Interpeter: Gatwe ao itse mosekisiwa. 
Wit: E rra ke a moitse. 
(yes Sir, I know him. ) 
Pros: Could you please tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused person? 
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Pros: Yes, can you tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused. 
Int: 0 mo itsilejang? 
Ace: Inaudible. 
Pros: Wheredid you say the accident happened? 
Wit: Gone mo Broadhurst fa o hapaanya strata se se tswelang ko, 
( here in Broadhurst when you come to cross the street which goes out to... 
Pros: Could you tell this court what happened. 
Wit: Nna erileha ke tsamayamo striating hela ha ke lebile go emake bone 
koloi e ngwe e tshweue tswa ko pele game mme ebe e tswa mo teng ga tsela. 
Ha ke tshwantse ke go hapaana le yone ke tsamaya mo lebogong lame 
( Me while I was driving along the street just about to stop I saw a white car 
coming from the opposite direction and then it got out of the road. When I 
was just about to cross with it keeping to my side of the road ... Int: Ka nako, tse he 
(about what time? 
Ace: Ga ke gakologelwe gore nako, e kabo ene ele ka bo to eight and nine 
mine e tshwanetse e be ene ele nine. 
(I don't remember it must have been to eight or nine but it must have been 
nine. 
Pros: Yes to what direction was this motor vehicle which collided with you 
Wit: E ne e tswa.. (inaudible) 
(It was coming from ... ) Pros: Yes can you describe particulars of the motor vehicle.... (inaudible) 
Wit: (inaudible) 
Pros: Did you have the chance to see the registration number 
Wit: Ga ke ise ke nne le chance ya go leba the registration numbers ka nne 
ke chokegile. 
(I did not ge the chance to lok at the registration numbers because I was 
shocked. ) 
Pros: Yes, were you alone. 
Wit: Nne ke na le rre Marks Montshiwa. 
(I was with Mr Marks Montshiwa. ) 
Pros: Can you tell this court what could have caused that accident? 
Wit: Accident ee kabo e causitswe ke gore rre erile ha ... koloi e sena go... aba a t1a ko go nna a re ke wena othudisitseng ke be ke mo raya kc re nnyaa 
kc wena o, nthudileng. Mme o ne a lebega a thetheekela a nole bojalwa. 
( The accident may have caused by that this gentleman after the collision 
came to me and said its you who caused the collision and I said to him no its 
you who has hit me but he was staggering as if he was drunk no he was 
drunk not as if ) 
Pros: Why do you say the accused person was drunk? 
Wit: Nee bo, nkga mo go ene ebile nna a nkatumetse ha a nthaya are ke mo 
thudile. 
(I sensed the smell of alcohol on him and he was also close to me when he 
told me that I had hit him) 
Pros: Go on. 
Wit: Nne ra nna ra buisanya, ka metsotsonyana. Mme o ne a sa bue hela 
sentlejaaka motho tshwanetse gore a bue le yo mongwe. One a ... 
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(We continued to argue for some minutes but he wasn't just talking properly 
as a person should speak to another person. He was.. 
Pros: Yes did you report that accident? 
Wit: E rra. Rre you ke neng ke na le ene o ne a na le cellophone. 
Pros: Yes, and did the olice come to the scene of the accident? 
Wit: Ee, mapodisi a ne a tla 
Pros: And what did did they do? 
Wit: Ba ne ba measura dikoloi baq bo ba re tseela kwa police station. 
( They made some measurement s of the cars and took us to the police 
station) 
Pros: And what happened at the police station? 
Wit: Ko police statione ba feta ba tsaya statement be ba re ba mpolelela gore 
ba nkhupisa tame ke be ke ba bolelela gore ga ke mind(e) go hupa tame ka 
gore ga ke a nwa bojalwa. 
(At the police station they took the statement and then the told me that they 
would put the dummy into my mouth and I told them that I don't mind 
putting the dummy in my mouth because I haven't drunk any beer. 
Pros: Yes, did they conduct the test only on you? 
Wit: Ba tsere test(e) moo nna ba bo ba bitesa rre yole akerejaanong nna ke 
be ke tswela kontle. Ke ha ke tsamaya. 
( The, they took the test on me and then called that gentleman and then I 
wentout and went away. ) 
Pros: Yes, after they finished with the accused person wht what happened? 
Wit: Ba ne ba nthaya ba re ke tsamaye 
Pros: Where did the accused person go? 
Wit: Ga ke a mmona ko ayang teng ka gore phakela wa teng A nne ke.. ene 
o ne a seyo. 
(I did not see where he went because that morning when(inaudible) he was 
not there. ) 
Pros: Yes Did you have the chance to see the accused person the following 
day? 
Wit: E rra 
Pros: How would you describe the accused person did you have the 
chance... 
Wit: Ga ke a mmona. 
(I did not see him) 
TAPE NO. 9. DIRECT EXAMINATION OF 2ND WITNESS IN THE 
CASE NO. 23, STATE VERSUS M. S. 15-08-99 
Pros: Do you know the accused. 
Int: Gatwe ao itse mosekisiwa. 
Ace: Nnyaa. 
(No. ) 
Mag: Have you never seen him anywhere? 
Int: ga o iseko o mmone gope? 
Ace: No 
Int: Ke santlha o mmona? 
( Are you seeing him for the first time? ) 
Wit: Silence 
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Pros: Do you know why you have been brought to court? 
Int: A o, itse gore o tletse eng mo kgotleng? 
Wit: E rra ke a itse. 
(Yes sir I know. ) 
Pros: Can You tell the court why? 
Wit: ke tletse go fa bosupi. 
(I have come to give evidence. ) 
Mag: Can you tell the story. 
Wit: Inaudible and inarticulate) 
These two examinations were deleted by mistake twice and the third time the 
cassette tape broke. A great pity really as it included excellent interpretation 
for the accused. 
Pros: Can you tell the court your name number and rank? 
PW: I am number 3680 Constable ... (name) Pros: Do you know the accused person? 
PW: eI know the accused. 
Pros: Yes can you tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused person? 
PW: I came to know the accused person on the 15'hof March 1999 at about 
9.15pm when he was involved in a car accident. 
Pros: Where was this accident? 
PW: The accident was along Segoditshane Way near the traffic circle.. 
Pros: Yes, Can you tell this court the number of vehicles involved in the 
accident? 
PW: Yes there were two vehicles. 
Pros: Can you tell the court how the accident happened? 
PW: According to the statements I took, the driver of B786ACI was driving 
south and the accused was driving north. The lady says the accused got out 
of his lane and knocked her car. 
Pros: Did you find both drivers at the scene of the accident? 
PW- Yes I found both drivers at the scene of the accident. 
Pro;: And what happened? 
PW: On arrival to the scene I drew a sketch plan in the presence of both 
drivers and after I finished drawing the sketch plan I showed it to both 
drivers and the driver of B786ACI told me that she agreed with what I bad 
drawn then I told her to append her signiture on the sketch plan but the 
accused told me that he didn't agree with the sketch plan and he refused to 
sign. 
Pros: Did he tell you why he refused to sign? 
PW: He told me that he didn't agree with what I had drawn. 
Pros: According to your observation how was the accused? 
PW: The accused person was smelling alcohol. I then told both drivers that I 
am going to test them using the Lion Intoxiliser 1400. Then I took both 
drivers to the Broadhurst Police Station. Then I took the accused first. Before 
I tested him I told him that he is not obligeg to provide breath. But if he 
refused to procide a breath specimen it would be taken as evidence for the 
prosecution hat he was indeed driving under the influence of drinks. The 
accused agreed to provide breath and the result was 1.4mg per litre of 
breath. 
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Pros: Yes what machine were you using? 
PW: I used the Lion intoxiliser 1400 and the intoxiliser was bearing the 
serial number14000523. I then called the other driver. 
Pros: Did you have the chance to show the accused person the results 
PW: Yes I showed him the results. 
Pros: Did he show any signs of contesting the results? 
PW: No. 
Pros: Was he made aware that if he contested the results he could be blood 
tested? 
PW: I made him aware of the right. 
Pros: Was he given a copy of the results? 
PW: Yes and he also put his signature. 
Pros: Was he warned of any charges? 
PW: Yes I warned him of the charge of driving whilst under the influence of 
drinks. 
Pros: was the machine you use on that particular day in good working order? 
PW: Yes and I tested the other driver and the result was O. Omg per litre of 
breath. Before I tested her I made her aware of her rights. 
Pros: And what proof do you have that the machine was in good working 
order? 
PW: I have its certificate of calibration. 
Pros: Besides the calibration certificate , can you enlighten this court how the machine works? 
PW: If the machine doesn't work it would not give the results. 
Mag: And how long have you been using this machine? 
PW: A year and six months. 
Pros: Yes you said you made a sketch how would you identify the sketch 
plan? 
PW: I can identify it by my signature and the signature of the other driver 
and the road where the accident happened. 
Pros: Yes, have a look at this sketch plan and tell the court it's the same one 
you drew. 
PIV. - Yes. It is. 
Pros: Are you now producing it as part of the evidence? 
PW: Yes I would like to. 
Pros: How would you identify the print out from the machine you ude? 
I can identify it because it has my signature and the accused's signature and 
the serial number of the machine 14000525. 
Pros: Have a look at this print out and tell the court whther it is the same one 
PW: Yes it is the one. 
Pros: Do you now produce it as part of the evidence? 
PW: Yes I would like to> 
Pros: Do you produce the calibration crtificate as part of the evidence also? 
PW-. Yes. 
Pros: Was he made a"-are that he exceeded the prescribed limit of 0.3 mg 
per litre of breath? 
PW: Yes. 
Pros: Was he warned of any charges? 
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PW: He was warned of the charge of driving whilst unfit due to the 
influence of alcohol. 
Mag: Do you have any questions accused? 
ACCUSED CROSS EXAMINES THE WITNESS. 
Ace: A ware ke ganne go saena, statement? 
( Are you saying I refused to sign the statement? 
PW: Yes. 
Ace: Bosupi ja gago ke eng gore ke ganne. 0 bue boammaaruri. 
I What is your proof that I refused? You must tell the truth. ) 
Ace: 0 mpuduletse ga kae? 
(How many times did you make me blow into the machine? 
PW: Ga one. 
(Once) 
Ace: Ga one Ako o leke go bua boammaarure, o mpudeledisitse ga kana ke 
be ke go botsa gore a tota machine o wa gago, waa bekeka? 
( Once? Try and tell the truth you made me blow into the machine so many 
time and I even asked does this machine of yours really work? ) 
Case number 24. Tae 9 15-08-99 
Witness swom in. 
Pros: Yes, Can you tell this court your number rank and name? 
PW: I am number I 10 1 constable Ditshupo. 
Pros: Where are you stationed? 
PW: Broadhurst Police Station Traffic. 
Pros: Do you know the accused? 
PW: Yes. 
Pros: Tell this court how you came to know the accused. 
PW: I came to know the accused in June 1999 when we were on patrol on 
Nelson Mandela Road. 
Pros: What timewas it? 
PW: It was around 11.50pm. 
Pros: Yes, what attracted you to the accused's vehicle? 
PW: WE were proceeding in the same direction, his vehicle was going in a 
zigzag manner. He nearly drove into the traffic light pole. WE were surprised 
by his driving. Then we followed him I was accompanied by Sergeant 
Boitumelo who was driving. He tried to flick on the headlights to tell him to 
stop but he kept on driving. Later he stoped. We got out of our vehicle and 
went over to the accused's vehicle. Sergeant Boitumelo told the accused to 
get out of his vehicle who then introduced himself as Moreetsi Sebetlela. 
Then as Sergeant Boitumelo was talking to the accused I sensed a strong 
smell of alcohol in his breath, his eyes were red. Sergeant Boitumelo told 
him about his SD2 alcometer. He made him aware of his rights before he 
tested him. He told him that he was ot obliged to provide a specimen of breat 
but failure to provide preath is an offence unless there are valid reasons like 
health reasons. The accused consented to be tested. Then Sergeant Boitumelo 
told him that the prescribed limit is 0.35 mg per litre of breath and anything 
which exceeds that he would be further tested on another machine which 
releases a print out. His results were 0.80 mg per litre of breath. Then 
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Sergeant Boitumelo took him for further tests. It was the I stayed behind on 
patrol. 
Mag: Any questions accused? 
Ace: Nnyaa rra. 
(No sir. ) 
2nd Witness sworn in. 
Pros: Can you tell this honourable court your name? 
PW: I am number 7042 Sergeant Sesana, Boitumelo. 
Pros: How old are you? 
PW: I am 33 years old. 
Pros: Where do you work? 
I am stationed at Broadhusrt Police Station Trafic department. 
Pros: Do you know theaccused. th PW: Yes I know the accused person whe I came across him on the 18 of 
June 1999. He was driving a Toyota Hilux bearing the plate numbers 17554. 
It was at the traffic lights at Metro when the accused nearly drove into the 
robot light. It when I followed the accused flicking the headlights to stop 
him. I followed him for the distance of about 500 meters from the traffic 
lights. At last the accused stopped his vehicle by the side of the road. I Then 
requsted the accused to come out of his vehicle. He was staggering also he 
was smelling alcohol on his breath. I then took the alcometer from our 
vehicle and came to the accused. Where I told him that I am going to test him 
on the alcometer to see if he is drunk when driving. Before I tested him I told 
him he was not forced to give breath also I told him that his refusal will 
support my suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. The 
accused did not refuse to be tested and the results were over the prescribed 
limit of 0.35 ml alcohol per litre of breath. He was tested and the results were 
0.80ml per litre. I told the accused that he will be further tested on another 
machine call Lion Intxiliser 1400.1 then tok the accused to Old Naledi Police 
Station then V took the 1400 Intoxiliser and told the accused again that he is 
not forced to give a specimen of breath and that his refusal will again support 
my suspicion that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. I then tested 
the accused with the machine. The results were 1.16ml/litre of breath and that 
he was over the prescribed limit of 0.35. After the machine had given out the 
printout I showed it to him. The accused did't contest the results. He signed 
the print out and I signed it. 1 then warned the accused that he will face a 
charge of driving a vehicle whilst under the influence of alcohol. 
Pros: How would you identify the print out. 
PW: I can identify the print out by the serial number of the machine also by 
the name of the accused. 
Pros: Have a look at this print out and tell the court if it is the print out 
produced on that date. 
PW: This is the print out. 
Pros: Do you now tender it to this court as part of the evidence. 
PW: Yes. 
Tape number 10 case number 24 15-08-99 
Accused gives sworn evidence. 
Mag: Yes, you said you would give evidence under oath. 
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Int: 0 rile o tlaa ikana o rile o tlaa ha bosupi o ikanne? 
(You said you would give evidence under oath? ) 
Ace: E rra 
(yes sir) 
Int: Go siame ya ko ... (Okay. G to the witness stand. ) 
Int: 0 Moreetsi Sebetlela. 
Ace: Yes. 
Dingwaga tsa gago di kae? 
(Your age? 
Ace: 44. 
Int: Ee tswelela o re bolelele. 
(Okay. Go on and tell us. ) 
Ace: Ene yare ka di ga keitse gore ke di kae. 
(On the I don't know what date.. ) 
Ace: abe 
Int: 0 sekela melato e me bedi. Gona le wa di2tsaga rch 0 go tweng o ne wa 
thualana le mosadi yo o neng aa fa bosupi, le wa di 18 tsaga June o gotweng 
o ne wa rata go thula roboto. 
(You are facing to charges. There is the one for the 200' of Marh Where you 
are charged with colliding with the woman who has just been giving 




Int: Ee tswelela o re bolelle. 
(Yes, go on and tell us. ) 
Ace: Ene ya re ka di 20 ya re ke tla ke labile circle ee baCommunity Hall, 
Koloi engwe ya tswa ka ko pelega ke itse plate numbera ya teng mme yone 
ele tshweu. Yare e tswa mo circling... mme yare rentse re eme mo circling 
mapodisi a tla ba bo ba reisa ko police. Mme yare re tsena ko police ba 
nkhupisa tamernorago ga foo bampolelela gore ke nole. Mee nna ka ba raya 
kare ke itekanetste. Mme yare morago ga foo balatele di koloi tsa rona. E be 
ke e latela. Jannonong a nka tsena ka wa di 18? 
Mme yar ke tswa mo dirobotong ba nkemisa. Ba nthaya ba re ke fologe mo 
koloing ba nthaya bare ba belaela fix ke nole. Ke ha ba nkhupisa tame. 
Case no 2 EXAMINATION of prosecution witness Supplementary data 
Pros: I appear for the state Your Worship. 
Def Couns: I appear for the accused, Your Worship. 
Pros: Would you please tell this court your name? 
Int: Maina a gago ke mang? 
Wit: (inaudible) 
Pros: How old are you? 
Int: 0 na le dingwaga tse kae? 
Acc: Ha ke tswhara sentle ke 19. 
(If I am getting them correct its 19) 
Pros: Are you employed? 
Int: Aoa bereka? 
Pros: Where do you stay? 
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Int: 0 nna ko kae? 
(inaudible) 
Int: Ga o ut1wale. 
(you are not audible) 
Pros: Do you know one Thabang Thamage? 
Int: 0 itse Thabang Thamage? 
Pros: Please tell this court what happened to Thabang Thamage on the 23d 
of October 1998. 
Wit: Ene yare ka di 23 tsa ga October (long inaudible narration) 
Ke ne ka lemoga ha Thabang a seo ha morago ga rona. Ene yare re bona a 
seyo ra kgabaganya tsela. 
(On the 23d of October 1998(naudible narration) I realised that Thabang was 
not there behind us, so when we realised that he was'nt behind us we crossed 
the road. ) 
Wit: E be cle gore ha re setse re kgabaganya, go bo go tlhaga koloi ... Oust after we crossed the road, a car came by) 
Pros: Ke le setse le tlodile tsela. 
(Was it after you had crossed? 
Wit: Erra. 
(Yes sir. ) 
(Inaudible, witness describes the circumstances of the road accident in which 
Thabang the young boy whose sister the witness is, was killed) 
Tape 2 case no. 3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 10-01-2000 Supplementary 
data 
PW: I swear that the evidence I shall give before this court shall be the 
truththe whole truth and nothing else but the truth so help me God. 
Pros: Please can you introduce yourself to themcourt? 
PW: I am number 755 1, ... stationed at Broadhusrst... Pros: Yes do you know the accused? 
PW: Yes my lord. 
Pros: Yes, Can you tell this honourable court how you came to know the 
accused person? 
PW: Yes Your Worship. On the 24h day of September 1999,1 had a case at 
Gaborone West your Worship. I had to be there at 0830 hours. At around 
08 10 1 took a police vehicle and drove along Lemmenyane Drive. I was 
following a queue of motor vehicles from which some were joining Nelson 
Mandela Drive and some were joining and some were joining turning right 
and I was going to turn right. My vehicle was the third one from the accused 
s motor vehicle, which was infront. As soon as the accused's motor vehicle 
has passed along the bus stop turning west, his motor vehicle turned went 
extremely left off the road to the gravel side. It increased speed and hit a no 
stopping sign. lEs vehivle went on facing Taung BHC houses and later the 
driver the vehicle slowed down and returned back to the road to the tarred 
road. As he had joined the tarred road, I thought he would find a place to stop 
but unfortunately he just kept on driving. I wondered as to why the driver did 
not stop as he had knocked an official stop sign. But I increased speed to go 
and stop the accused. Before we could reach the railway line I managed to 
stop him and told him to get off the road I quickly went to the vehicle and I 
found that he was with one passenger who was by then asleep. I greetcd him 
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and I called him off the vehicle. I opened the vihicle door and in the driver's 
side and requested him to come out of the vehicle of which he did. I asked 
him whether he didn't see that he had knocked the no stopping sign. And he 
did not get off the roadi asked him why he didn't stop and he said he 
was(inaudible) and as he was talking to me answering my questions I 
detected a strong smell of alcohol from his breath. Having detected a stron 
smell of alcohol from his breath I asked him whether he had been drinking 
alcohol and he said he had some he took some drinks alcoholic drinks last 
time. I called him to the left side of the vehicle and and asked him to wait for 
me while I was checking hi door of his passenger. The passenger woke woke 
up and I asked him why he was asleep in a vehicle and he said he is tired. 1 
asked him whether he had seen the vehicle knocking the no stopping sign 
and didn't see anything he was asleep. I told him his driver had knocked a no 
stopping sign and he said 'whereT I pointed at the no stopping sign and he 
said he didn't see anything. I went back to the accused person and told him 
that I am suspecting him to have been driving whilst unfit to drive through 
drinks and ba said he only took alcohol last night. As I was still talking ti him 
Constable Solomon who is stationed at Urban Police Station came with a 
police vehicle, I stopped him so that I can use his police radio since my 
vehicle had no radio. I called Constable Motshosi who was on patrol that day 
to come and assist me since I had to be at court during that day. Constable 
Motshosi immediately arrived and after he had arrived I introduced him to 
the accused and explained to him what actually happened. Constable 
Motshosi came closer to the accused and asked him some few questions. 
Later he told him that he is also suspecting him to have been driving wbilst 
unfit through.... And that to pove our suspicion is only through the use of the 
breathaliser SD2 and the accused person said he did not want the test and 
Constable Motshosi said be hadn't yet finished to explain to him. He 
continued explaining to him that he is not forced to provide a specimen of 
breath but he can only provide breath through his will, failure to provide a 
specimen of breath without reasonable excuse would be a supportive 
evidence that he had been driving whilst unfit through drinks and that he 
could only refuse to provide a specimen of breath on medical grounds. He 
explained to the accused that the prescribed limit is 0.35 mg of alcohol in I 
litre of breath and thatif he exceeds the prescribed limit he would have to 
undergo another test by the use of the breathaliser and the accused continued 
to say he does not want to be tested and I told Constable Motshosi that since 
I had to be at court at 0830 1 told him to remain with the accused. When I 
came back from gaborone West and that was in the afternoon , Constable Motshosi told me that the accused had completetelt refused to provide a 
breath specime and he was charging him for driving a motor vehicle whisIst 
unfit to and with failure to provide a breath specimen. 
Pros: Yes can you tell this court the registration number of the accused 
person's motor vehicle. 




Def Couns: So did you explain to him that what is required is the amount of 
alcohol in a suspects breath at the time of driving? 
Wit: Yes your worship. 
Def. - Couns: Now you say the results obtained some 3 hours after driving is 
a true reflection of amount of alcohol in the suspect at the material time? 
(note the use ofjargon to buy time on the part of counsel) 
Wit: Your Worship it might have gone down. 
Def Couns: It might have gone up it might have gone down it doesn't matter 
What I am saying is will it be a true reflection of the amount of alcohol at the 
time of driving? 
Another police witness sworn in and examined by prosecutor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION Tape 5 side B 
Def Couns: At approximately what time? 
Pol Wit: Earlier on I said half one. 
Mag: And you can't approximate the time? 30 Minutes after the accident? 
Wit: Around that time. 
Def Couns: So that makes it around 10o'clock? 
Pol. Wit: Yes, somewhere there. 
Couns: At what time did you subject eh or what time did you er sub 
inspector Zambezi subjectedf the accused person to a breath test? 
Pol. Wit: After we arrived at the police station. 
Couns: What time 
Pol. Wit: I wasn't ... 
(inaudible) 
Couns: So I wouldn't be wrong to say it was around 10.30prn 
Pol. Wit: If that wasn't the time you'd be wrong. 
Couns: But that's the time that's written on this statement. 
Pol. Wit: Yes in fact that is the time. 
Couns: Which is a period of more than eh say three and a half hours. 
Pros: (inaudible) 
Couns: Simple as the accident occurred at seven and the breath test was 
made at eleven so that was three hours and thirty minutes. 
Pol. Wit: Yes your worship. 
Couns: So why did it take so long in subjecting the accused to the breath 
test? 
Pol. Wit: As I said earlier on, the accused was co-operating in the sense that 
he was taking long to understand all what I was saying to him. 
Couns: What do you mean by he took a ling time to understand? 
Pol. Wit: He did not understand how to blow into the breatherliser. the 
accused couldn't blow as instructed. 
Couns: Couldn't blow? 
Pol. Wit: He didn't provide the machine with enough breath. 
Couns: So he wasn't refusing to blow into the mouthpiece. 
Pol. Wit: I don't remember saying so. 
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( note police witness's clever hostile responsesto Counsel's questions) 
Case adjoumed to 32st August. 
Tape 6 Side A case no. 20 
Mag: Do you have anything to say accused? 
Am Sir? 
Interpreter: E tlaare ka di 9 tsa September o isiwe ko, ngakeng e, ya, go go 
tlhatlhoba. 
(on the 9h of September you will be taken to a doctor for examination) 
Ace: Ngakeng ya eng? 
(what doctor? ) 
Interpreter: Ngaka ya ba lwala t1haloganyo 
(a psychiatrist) 
Ace: E rra 
(yes Sir) 
Interpreter: Jaaning go kopiwa gore o tswelle ka, go emela tsheko o le mo 
kgolegelong. A go na le sengwe se o batlang go se bua? 
( So you are requested to keep awaiting trial in prison. Is there anythong you 
want to say? ) 
Ace: Nnaa, rra ga seo 
( No Sir. There is nothing) 
Mag: Tell him to come on the I I'h of March. 
Ace: ... (inaudible but was pleading sickness while in prison) Mag: And did you tell the prison officials? 
Ace: E rra ke ba boleletse. 
(Yes Sir, I told them) 
Mag: and did they not help you? 
Interprete: A gagona kafa ba go thusitseng ka teng? 
(Interpreter: Is there anyway they helped you? 
Ace: Nyaa , ga gona kafa ba nthusitsend ka, teng. (no there is no way they helped me. ) 
Mag: The prosecutor will tell them about you. 
The rest of the tape taken up by mentions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
(The accused cross examines this witness) 
Int: A go na le se o batlang go se botsa mosupi. 
(Is there anything you want to ask the witness? ) 
Ace: Nne ke botsa mme a erile hela ke, tswa ha circle(eng) ke, bo ke, tla ke 
lebagane le ene kanta ke ene erile a tswa mo circle(eng) ke be ke tla ke 
lebagane le ene kante ke ene erileatswa mo circle(eng) a ba a lebagana le 
koloi yaaka a ba a brika 
(I want to ask this lady whether as I got out of the circle I was on her side of 
the road facing her or was it her who was out of her side and faced my car 
and the she braked? ) 
320 
A QUARRELSOME CROSS EXAMINATION CONDUCTED IN 
SETSWANA, VERY RAPID SPEECH. 
Acc: Ke botsa gore a erile fa otswa mo circle(eng) ob, o labile ko.. kana wa 
tla o t1harnalletse ko go nna H 
Wit: Nyaaleke re re ne re setse re katogile circlA e rra, 
(Ace: I want to ask did you just getting out of the circle come straight for me 
Wit: No we had already passed the circle sir) 
Ace: Goraya gore ga o bue nete// 
Wit: Nne ke le kgakala le Itsogo lanjta ke dule hela mo circle(eng) ke bo ke 
tlhamalla. 
(Ace: That means you are not telling the truthfl Wit: I was just far away from 
the right side I just go out of the circle and drove straight on my side) 
Ace: A oare ha o nthula on o sa bue le cell? 
(Are you saying that when you hit me you were not speaking on your 
cellophone? ) 
Wit: Ee nne ke sa bue le cell) 
(No I was nto speaking on the cell, I had left my cell at my shop) 
Ace: 0 ne oe tlogetse ko dishopong? //ene e le ya ga Mr Marks Montshiwa. 
Mme o na//Rre yo ke ene o ne a tshotse cell)//Mme o ne a mme o ne a na le 
ene ke oheng? 
(Ace: You had left it at the shops? Wit: It was Mr Marks MI/ Acc: The 
woman, the wornan// Wit: Mr Marks had his cell//The woman you were with 
, who was she? Wit: No we were only two. 
Ace: Lo ne lo sena le mme ope? 
(You were not with any woman? ) 
Wit: Ee re ne re le babedi fela. Mme o ke mmeditseng morago le gone otlile 
mapodisi a sena go tla ke o ke ne ke kgweetsa koloi ya gagwe, o tsile 
moragorago hela re ne re setse re na le mapodisi nne ke sena le mme ope nne 
ke na le rre yo hela re le two. 
(No we were just two. The woman I called later and who came after the 
police had arrived is the one whose car I was driving, she came much much 
later I wasn't with any woman I was just with this gentleman) 
Ace: Mme bangame le fa le ka... o ne o tshotse cell o bua le cell ha o tswa 
mo teng ga circle o ne wa bula cell 
(but whatever you want to say you had a cellophone and you were talking 
into it. ) 
Wit: Nnyaa ga se boammaaruri, ke ne ke sa tshola cell, rre yo nne ke na le 
ene ke ene o ne a tshotse cell Ga keke ke bua mo celleng mo koloing ha ke 
kgweetsa rra. 
(No, it is not the truth, I wasn't carrying a cellphone it's the gentle man a 
was with who was carrying his cell, my cell was at my shop I never speak on 
a cell when I am driving a car. ) 
Ace: Kc gore mma o bue boammaaruri//Wit: Ke bua boammaaruri Acc: 0 
seka wa iphemela k-anna, oseka wa iphemela ka nna, o bue 
boammaruri//Wit: Nyaa gake iphemele ka wena ntate ke bua se se 
diragetseng 
321 
(Please madam you must tell the truth//Wit: I am telling the truth //Acc: don't 
don't hide your faults behind me//Wit: No I am not hiding my fault behind 
you sir I am stating what happened. 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED BY PROSECUTOR 
(Still in the case no. 24 Moreetsi Sebetlela) 
th Pros: Are you saying you were .... By the police on the 20 of March 
1999? 




Pros: Ah ah did they test you? 
Int: A bane ba go tlhatlhoba? 
Ace: Ee rra 
Pros: Did you habve the chance to see your results? 
Int: 0 ne wa bona gore selekany sa maduoa a go t1hatlhobiwa ke bokae 
Ace: Ee ba ne ba mpontsha. 
Pros: Yes, after the accident did they give leave vehicle at the scene or they 
took it to the police station? 
Int: ha le sena go nna le thulana koloi ya gago 
CROSS-EXAMINATION by defense counsel Supplementary data 
Def Couns: I am going to ask you a few questions so that what you have just 
said to the courtis the truth as far as you know. Now, you said Thabang was 
knocked at the zebra crossing did you say it? 
Wit: I don't understand the question. 
Def Couns: Was be knocked at the zebra crossing or not? 
Int: Ao utwile sentle? 0 ne a le fa zebra crossing? 
Wit: On a le (inaudible) 
DeE Couns: Was Thabang knocked at the zebra crossing or not? 
Wit: silence 
DeMouns: Yes or no, was was was he knoced at the zebra crossing or he 
was not knocked at the zebra crossing? 
Wit: I didn't see. 
Def. Couns: So when the car knocked him be was at the zebra crossing. So 
that if somebody could come and give evidencewbich saya that eh Thabang 
was not knocked at the zebra crossing but away from the zebra crossing that 
information would be incorrect? 
Int: Ha motho a kare ga aa thulelwa mo zebra crossing ao tlaa ba a bolella 
ruri kana nyaa? 
Def Couns: Now, you said it was around nine o'clock at night 
Wit: Go ne go na le dilighte go ne (inaudible) 
(the street lights were on. ) 
Def Couns: But you just told this court that it was around nine o'clock. 
Int: A kere mme o ntse obua gore e ne ele ka bo nine? 
Wit: e ne e le ka bo five. 
Def Couns: So it was not nine o'clock. 
Int: ene e se nine? 
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Def Couns: So you don't know what time it was? 
Wit: inaudible 
Def Couns: Do you know what time it was? 
Wit: Nne ke sa tsaya nako nne ke tsaya gore nako ya 
(I didn't have a watch I just thought the time might be ... Def Couns: Was it dark? This accident happened during the night or the 
day? 
Wit: E ne e le bosigo. 
(It was at night) 
Def Couns: So was it dark? 
Wit: Nne gole nne gole dilighte nne di tshubile 
(the street lights were on. ) 
Def Couns: It was clear? 
Wit: silence 
Def Couns: So you said when you came to the zebra crossing there were 
some other people who were with you. 
Wit: Ee 
(Yes) 
Def Couns: Now did you cross with those people? 
Wit: inaudible 
Def Couns: But did you cross with those people? 
Wit: silence 
Def Couns: Now you said that eh the cars were the car the cars were 
stationary, the cars from the south were stationary. Is that correct? 
Wit: Ee. 
Def Couns: And even after you after you crossed they were still stationary. 
Wit: Ee (yes) 
Def Couns: And when Thabang crossed tried to cross the zebra crossing, 
they were still stationary. How far was Thabang behind you? 
Wit: Nars nna a resetse morago ga rona. 
(He was behind us) 
Def Couns: Because you seewhat you are suggesting to this court is this you 
are putting a scenario in which Thabang was behind but you came to the 
zebra crossing you couldn't wait for Thabang so Thabang was so close but 
you couldn'twait for him the cars were stationary you crossed the road and 
you walked for two metres whilst Thabang was still behind. So how far 
exactly how far was Thabang behind? 
Wit: 0 ne a le 1.5 mtertes 
(He was about 1.5 metres behind) 
Def Couns: So in other words Thabang was with you because he was 1.5 do 
you know how far 1.5 metres is? Direct this court how far 1.5 metres is. 
Wit: demonstrates 
Def Couns: So in other words Thabang was with you. 
Wit: Nne re nne re k-gaoganye 
(We were separated) 
Int: 0 na a na le Iona? 
(was he with you? ) 
Wit: 0 ne al ko botsheo. 
(He was on the other side) 
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Def Couns: Now earlier on you stated to this court that you crossed with the 
people you were with, Nthabiseng, you crossed the road and Thabang 
remained behind. How do you explain that with the 1.5metres? 
Wit: Ke raya gore nna ale ko morago ga rona. 
(I mean he was behind us) 
Def Couns: So are you trying to suggest to this court that you crossed the 
zebra crossing and Thabang as you were crossing the zebra crossing he was 
a, lso crossing or you are trying to suggest to this court that you crossed the 
zebra crossing and Thabang came behind you after you had crossed? Which 
one is which one is which is which you crossed first and Thabang tried to 
cross or when you were crossing both of you were crossing tha zebra 
crossing and Thabang was still 1.5 metres 
(The witness interrupts but inaudible) 
Def Couns: Now you stated to this court earlier on thatthat after you had 
crossed the road you walked for two metres away from the zebra crossing 
and then when you were two metres aaway from the zebra crossing you swa 
an ambulence coming now at this point where was Thabang? 
Wit: Thabang o ne ao ne a re setse morago. 
Def Couns: Exactly was he was he at the edge of the road about to cross to 
your side or he was still on the middle of the road? 
Wit: 0 ne a kgabanya 
Def Couns: Where was he? 
Int: Ao ne tswetse ko ntle ga tsela kampo a le ko bohelongja tsela kante a le 
ha gare? 
Wit: 0 ne ale mo gare ga tsela mme (inaudible) # 
Def Cons: Where exactly was he on the road was he eh on the other side 
towards the edge or was he in the middle or was he on the egde of the road. 
you said he was on 1.5 behind you where exactly was he on the road. 
Wit: 0 ne a le motseleng 
Def Couns: You said Thabang was 1.5 metres awy from you ansd you even 
gave the court the direction now you also gave evidence to this court that you 
crossed the road and then you walked for two metres and that is when you 
saw an ambulance, you get the sequence? You crossed the road, Thabang 
was 1.5 metres behind you walked for two metres and that's when you saw 
the ambulance, is that what you said to the court earlier on? 
Int: Oa re Thabang o ne a le setse morago ka 1.5 metres 
Wit: Ee 
(Yes. ) 
Def Couns: How far was the ambulance when you saw him? 
Wit: Nne e se kgakala e ne e le guafi hela. 
He wasn't far it was just near. ) 
Def Couns: So you only saw the ambulance when it was close to you? 
Wit: Ee. 
(Yes) 
Def Couns: Was the ambulance coming from behind or it was coming facing 
you? 
Int: E ne e tswa ko, morago kana e ne e lebaganye le Iona> 
Wit: E ne e lebaganye le rona. 
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(It was facing us. ) 
Def Couns: And Thabang was behind you. Which side were you facing? 
Were you looking at the zebra crossing or you were facing the road. 
Wit: We were facing this side the north side. 
Def Couns: You were facing the north side and the zebra crossing was 
behind. 
Wit: Yes. 
Def Couns: So will I be correct if I say that you were facing where you were 
going will I be correct? 
Int: Nne le lebeletse ko le yang teng? 
Wit: nne, re lebeltse 
(We were facing// 
Def Couns: I put it to you thatyou did not see what happened behind. 
Int: Ga oa bona se se neng se diragala ko morago ga Iona? 
Def Couns: because you were facing where you were going. 
Wit: Ke ne ke lebeletse ko ke yang teng mme erile ha e mo thula nne re 
salebelela ka matlho 
(We were facing where we were going but when it hit him we were not 
looking. ) 
Def Couns: So will I be correct if I say that you did not see what happened 
at the zebra crossing and at the scene of the impact because you were facing 
-where you were going will I be correct. 
Wit: Ke ne ke lebile teng. 
(INN-as looking there) 
Def Co u ns: (Emphatic) Will I be correct? You have just stated to this court 
that you were facing where you were going and as such I am putting it to you 
that you couldn'see what was happening behind will I be correct? 
Wit: Ka re ga ke a bona koloi ha e mo thulake utlwile erile ha e setse e mo 
thula ha e thunya, ke gone ha ke labella ke be ke hitlhela gore o setse a le mo 
koloing. 
(I said I did not see the car when it hit him when it hit him when it banges it 
was when I looked and I found that ir had hit him. ) 
Def Couns: I'm not I'm not asking you about (inaudible) Will I be correct if 
I say you did not see up until the impact you did not see what happened. Will 
I be correct? Yes Or No? 
Wit: Ke ne leka go se tlhalosa 
(I was trying to explain ... ) Def Couns: Did you wait for Thabang? Did you really wait for Thabang or 
you are lying to this court? Does it make sense to you? You were with a child 
a minor child you crossed the road and walked fot two metres when the child 
had not evev even crossed at that point. When you first saw the ambulance 
the child had not crossed. 
Wit: Tries a long explanation, which is ignored when the counsel is 
inexhorably insisting on his own version of the story 
Tape no. 3 Case number 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2000-01-12 
Def Couns: Now you have described to this court eloquently as to how the 
accident happened would I be right if I say that when the car moved out of 
the road you couldn't clearly see as to what the cause was. 
PW: I couldn't see clearly what was there. 
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Def Couns: Yes because there was another car infront of you. 
PW: Yes I couldn't clearly see what caused the driver... 
Def Couns: Now, for how long were you following the accused? 
PW: I followed the vehicle which was following the accused as I indicated 
along Lernmenyane road. 
Def Couns: Yes, for how long. 
PW: It was a queue of motor vehicles//Def Couns: How long were you 
following the accused person. 
PW: I wouldn't exactly tell you for bow long because//Def Couns: Was it for 
two minutes? a minute five minutes threeH What I described to this court 
earlier on//Def Couns: I'm asking you eh Mr Sengwaketse for how long 
were you following the accused person. 
PW: What I'm saying is I can't because there were some other vehicles 
which turned left. 
Def Couns: You don't know how long you were following the accused. 
PW: I only saw the vehicle when it was turning to the right. 
Def Couns: That's when you saw the vehicle it was infront of you. 
PW: Yes 
Def Couns: So you might have been following it... 
Def Couns: Now, all the way up to when the cars infront of you... did you 
see any other, anything that is unusal in the traffic? 
PW: No. 
Def Couns: You didn't. So the only unusual thing that you saw in the traffic 
was the hitting of the no stopping sign? 
PW: Yes 
Def Couns: Was there any disturbance from the other traffic? Now about 
the no stopping sign did he run over it? Literally run over it? 
PW: I... he hit it on the side. 
Def Couns: Oh he hit it on the side. He didn't run over it. Anybody injured? 
PW: Therewas nobody. 
Def Couns: Now, when he swerved out of the road as you eloquently 
described eh when his vehicle went out of the road, hit the no stop signand 
faced Taung BHC houses and later came into joined the road and started 
accelerating were you in front or still behind? 
PW: I was had kept on the side. 
Def Couns: Okay. There was no other car 
PW: There were some cars... 
Def Couns: You said you didn't have any ... there was no disturbance of traffic at that point? 
PW: As soon as I stopped ... (inaudible) Def Couns: So hejoined the road without causing anydisturbance or any 
hazard. 
PW: There wasn't any Vehicle coming. 
Def Couns: So he joined the road without causing any hazard. 
PW: Yes. 
Long repetitive stretch of q&a, then 
PW: What I'm here for is to tell the court the truth. The vehicle got out of 
the road hit the sign turned 
Def Couns: I'm not interested in the turning... Now, you gave the evidence 
about one of the observations you made that gave you the suspicion that he 
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was drunk. You said you saw when you looked at him as he was talking to 
you you saw ph blood spots in his eyes, his eyes were red. 
PW: Yes. 
Def Couns: I put it to you that his eyes have those blood shot that you have 
been talking about. Can you dipute that? 
PW: Yes 
Def Couns: It was your first time to see him. 
PW: That was my first time to see the accused. 
Def Couns: Yes. Yo u didn't know him. 
PW: I didn't know him. (in a despairing tone of voice) 
Def: Couns: You wouldn't say that those blood shots are his normal 
appearance. 
PW: No. 
Def Couns: Now if somebody according to you if somebody has the blood 
shots in the eyes he's drunk? 
PW: silence 
Def Couns: He's drunk. 
PW: No. 
Def Couns: If I say to you blood shots in the eyes can be caused by other 
factors except alcohol would you dispute that? Alcohol is not the only thing 
which can cause bloodshots would you dispute that? 
PW: Yes I wouold dispute that. 
Def Couns: Why? 
PW: silince 
Def Couns: Take a closer look at the accused person. Are his eyes red 
PW: Yes they are. 
Def Couns: They are. Does this suggest that he is drunk? 
PW: No. 
Def Couns: Now, you you talked about the accused person refusing to give 
his breath specimen. Did you have a breathaliser then when you asked for his 
specimen. 
PW: I asked H Def Couns: When you asked him did you ever ask him to give 
a specimen? 
Def Couns: You never. So he never refused as far as you are concerned, you, 
Mr ... he never refused to give you his breath specimen. PW: Yes. 
Def Couns: Because you never asked him. ... But you you have just were just giving us evidence about What you heard Montshosi saying or you heard 
one of the officers saying that the accused had refused when you came back 
from court you heard that he refused to take a breathaliser test is that correct? 
PW: Yes. 
Def Couns: Do you know by any chance as to where ... were the machines there at Broadhurst? 
PW: (inaudible) 
Def Couns: So you don't know what happened during.. since you were in 
court? 
PW: Yes. 
Def Couns: So you can't attest to anything that happened in you absence? 
PW: No 
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Def Couns: So if I put it to you that eh he went they took him to Broadhurst 
Police Station Can you dispute it. 
PW: I wouldn't dispute it. 
Def Couns: If I put it to you that the fact that he has not taken the test was 
because there were no machines at the Broadhurst Police Station would you 
dispute it? 
PW: No I wouldn't. 
Def Couns: You Wouldn't. Do you remember exactly what constable 
Montshosi said? 
PW: Everything that he said? 
PW: silence he told the accused his rights. 
Def Couns: What did he say? 
Retracing the whole ground covered by the examination in chief and bringin 
the 'eloquent' narration into doubt. 
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APPENDIX 4 
DEFENSE COUNSEL SUBMISSION 
Tape No. 7 Case No. 21 DEFENSE COUNSEL SUBMISSION 
State versus Doctor Tshetlhane. 
Couns: Your worship we take this opportunity to advice the court that the 
defense is not calling any witnesses and I will accordingly proceed to close 
this case. 
Pros: Your Worship pleasing we would like to proceed with final 
submissions in respect with this matter. 
Notes Negotiation moves. 
Mag: Now do we not begin with the prosecution? 
Counsel : As your worship pleases. 
Pros: I refer to my last final submission, Your worship. 
Mag: Proceed. 
Counsel: Your Worship eh the state in this matter had filed a charge of 
driving a motor vehicle whilst unfit against the accused person. On the 
fateful day being the 2401 of January 1998 before noon when the defense 
wondered, why as stated, the two witness PW I and PW 2 for the state had 
mounted a roadblock had changed ... 
(inaudible) This would appear to have 
been a routine inspection of drivers and their respective motor vehicles. It 
appears that there was no particular or specific reason to have stopped the 
accused as he was not alleged to have contravened any of the traffic 
regulations Your worship it appears according to their evidence the motor 
vehicle was checked and the nature of the evidence in support the state has 
been improper has been (inaudible) is that the smell of alcohol was detected 
from his breath and he was instructed accordingly to be breath tested. His 
readings are stated Your Worship to be was that in terms of the Sd2 his 
reading was 0.50 mg per a litre of breath and that in terms of the printout 
which, Aras derived from the lion intoxiliser 1400 his reading was 0.461 mg 
per a litre of breath and it appears that (... inaudible) 
Your Worship we submit with respect that pursuant to the objection, the 
evidence of the calibration of the machine was thought to be... in the form of 
the certificate of calibration. However Your Worship, we'd like to submit 
that the effect of the successful objection to the production of the certificate 
is to cast serious doubt on the result of the printout because the particular 
certificate was meant to say that the machine was properly calibrated and I'd 
like to submit with respect Your Worship that in the absence of that 
certificate in the circumstances of the present case there is no other evidence 
or sufficient evidence upon which this honourable court can be called upon 
to pronounce positively the results of.... With respect Your Worship, the 
person who was supposed to produce the certificate ... (inaudible) nor the 
person who calibrated the machine let alone to say he doesn't know the 
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-workings of the intoxiliser. The long and short of this submission Your 
Worship with respect is to say that this person is not an expert in the 
workings of this machine. Therefore his evidence as to what the condition of 
the machine must be taken with a pinch of salt. This becomes even more 
apparent when one looks at the manner in which the reported answers to the 
questions which he has been asked in cross examination as to how he could 
say to the court that machine was functioning properly. In his response Your 
Worship to cross examination he said that when he switched on the machine 
it said diagnostics OK that can be read by any layman ... (inaudible) I formed 
the impression well that when he was further asked Your Worship what 
diagnostics actually means he confessed to the court that he doesn't know 
exactly what it means. Now Your Worship, with respect the question is now 
to what extent can we rely on his knowledge of the workings of the machine. 
The question posed again is to what extent can we rely on his knowledge 
when he owns up to the court that certain feature of the machine which was 
displayed he does not understand. I submit to this court, Your Worship that 
the admission he does not understand what the word diagnostics mean telling 
a ... (inaudible) With respect Your Worship the witness 
is not trained to use 
the machine. He probably was just shown in three minutes that when you 
operate the machine this is what you do. If that be the case any layman is in a 
position to operate the machine. Certainly not. Can we then rely on his 
evidence when he comes to court? This officer who sought to tender the 
certificate was not in a position to tell the court about the margin of error of 
this machine. That being the case, Your Worship, we submit with respect, 
that it means two things. First, the extent of his knowledge as far as this 
machine is concerned is dismally limited. The second point, Your Worship, 
is that he does not know the margin of error. He was not in a position to 
make an allowance of that margin of effor when he tested the accused. Your 
Worship, I submit with respect all these salient points would put into 
question the results. We submit with respect the following points are are 
worthy of note in determining the ... Firstly, the Sd2 showed a reading of 0.50 mg per litre. That reading Your Worship with respect was different from 
the reading of the Lion intoxiliser intoxiliser. Your Worship with respect the 
honourable court has not been favoured with an explanation of for the 
discrepancy. It is therefore is left to travel on a speculative road to the 
causeof the discrepancy. When he was asked as to whether the Sd2 had been 
calibrated and working properly he said he had never seen the certificate of 
calibration. He could not testify before the court the proper functioning of the 
machine. No provision for the margin of effor made by the operator at the 
material time. Let me summarise Your Worship, by making reference to the 
case of Keebine and the state.. It being a case cited in the 1988 Botswana law 
report at page 102, judgement of the honourable judge the late ... inaudible). This statement is apposite to this case when he was dealing, Your Worship, 
with issues like traffic. 
'It is known for them to behave erratically which is not surprising in view of 
tye fact that they are mechanically operated. It must be a matter of common 
knowledge that mechanically or electronically operated devices can fail or 
malfunction for a variety of reasons known or unknown to the user. It is 
therefore dangerous for anyjudgement to conclude that any mechanically 
330 
operated ... will always operate to their... all the time. And it 
is even more 
dangerous to make an assumption ajudicial precedent. Especially those 
involving the liberty of... ' 
Your Worship I submit with respect that this statement is apposite to the 
current case and that much as it is related to traffic it relates also to the 
electronic device... 
DEFENSE COUNSEL SUBMISSION 2000-01-27 
Your Worship ehm the case my learned colleague the prosecutor refers to is 
one in which there was clearly an abuse of process and it is noted in the 
judgenment thereof of Nuny Jay that there was a substancial departure in the 
fundamental character of the cause to trial. Your Worship, in the case before 
us at present the accused person is a lay person and is not aware of the 
technicalities pertaining to and arising from the conducting of his own 
defence as such he has sought legal counsel. It is pertinent to note that only 
one witness is being called by the prosecution. It is his testimony only this 
court is to consider. However Your Worship there are vital elements of the 
offence in question which require an insight of cross-examination to ensure 
that the ends ofjustice are met in a free fair and equitable manner. This can 
only be done on the recall of the state witness. It is for the court to decide and 
invoke its descretion as to whether or not the recall of the witness would 
meet the ends ofjustice or fi-ustrate the ends ofjustice. I am humbly 
submitting, Your Worship, that this is a proper case for the recall of PW I 
and that this can only go to meet the ends ofjustice Thank you Your 
Worship. 
The witness was recalled. But the magistrate's brief speech was inaudible. - 
SUBMISSION BY PROSECUTOR. 
Case number 24 
Tape number 10 
Mag: Yes. 
Pros: Your Worship I wish to submit that the state has proved its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. Your Worship, there is no doubt that the accused 
was involved in an accident on the 2e of March and there is no doubt that 
that the police attended the accident upon which the accused was subjected to 
the alcohol test. There is no doubt that the results were in excess of the 
prescribed limit. On the second count, Your Worship, there is no doubt that 
the accused person drove the motor vehicle BX975544 There is no doubt 
that he was again subjected to the alcohol test. and his results still beyond the 
prescribed limit. There is no doubt that the machine used was in working 
order and there is no doubt that the accused person was warned of his rights. 
With that your warship, we submit that the evidence adduced was sufficient 
enough to render reasonable to convict that the accused person be convicted 
as charged. 
Mag: Anything to say accused? 
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Acc: in setswana) There is nothing to say except to ask for forgiveness from 
the court. 
Mag: Judgement on the 20t" of August. You will remain in bail. 
PROSECUTION SUBMISSION Tape no. 9 27-01-2000 
The date of mention was set for the 5h of January this year. Then on the 5h 
of January the matter was mentioned and another date was set for the 10 th of 
January this year due to the fact that Your Worship was not in and on the day 
which is the I Oll of January the accused did no appear a warrant was issued 
for his arrest, on the II a'he was mentioned before Your Worship and on that 
particular day a date of trial was set for today in the moming, Your Worship 
so the trial commenced as scheduled. Your Worship after the trial 
commenced prosecution indicated its intention to proceed even the accused 
was asked if he was still maintaining a plea of not guilty. So during the 
course of the trial when the accused was asked to comment on the exhibits it 
was when he indicated that he have got a defense counsel now one might ask 
himself or herself as to why did the accused only indicate that he has a 
defense counsel at this stage of the case even the defense counsel here 
indicates he was only instructed this afternoon so one might think the 
accused is trying to evade the ends ofjustice. Your Worship with the court's 
permission I would like to refer Your Worship to a case of Moffat Kelebonye 
Sekalale 1997 to 1993 Rbm r79 that is it indicates that it is undoubtedly true 
that under section 197 of.. a witness who has given evidence may be recalled 
and re-examined by the court; this is a desretionary power which may not be 
used in such a manner as to perpertrate a radical departure from the 
established form of a criminal trial. It continues the' the case of Dora Harris 
suggest that the the court's descretion should not be excercised where the 
prosection could have no right so to do. Now I'm referring this court to this 
case due to the fact that eh as a prosecutor on behalf of the state, I feel it 
would not be justice for me to recall my witness and if this court permits 
with this information I apply that my witnesses should not be recalled to 




Tape No. Case. No 22 15-08-99 
State versus C. A. 
Couns: I appear for the accused, Your Worship. The accused person says he 
has some problems in getting transport from Mapharangwane, 
Pro: I appear for the state Your Worship. The case is forjudgement. 
Mag: The accused person is said to have on the 2nd of April 1999, along the 
road from Fmncistowm at Mmamashia, been involved in a road accident... 
The alcohol concentration in his breath measured 3.1 mg per litre of breath. 
And on a second count the accused on the 2nd of April this year about 11.30 
am came driving a Toyota Cressida registered B... failed to stop at a 
police roadblock at Mmamashia. Among the off icers manning the roadblock 
was .... He was the one talking to the accused to ask 
him for a road licence 
sensed a strong smell of alcohol in his breath. He told the accused of his 
suspicion that he may have been driving whilst unfit due to consumption of 
alcohol. ... The machine print out (inaudibly) He however was not sure 
whether the machine was in very good working order.... The accused was 
tested using the alcometre. The readings were above the prescribed limit. The 
accused admits having been advised of his rights when he was tested. The 
only issue seems to relate to the reliability of the machine. The certificate of 
calibration -A-as rejected by this court on the basis that it was hearsay. 
However, in the case of Dennis Pilane ... I 
do not see how this cannot be 
hearsay. On the other hand I do not believe the statement by defense counsel 
that the machinemas... to be hearsay. I believe that the witness had firsthand 
information and can testify. The same applies ,I 
believe, to to the question of 
whether the machine could have been working wel if whoever is... need 
not be a technician. Anybody who has some knowledge accumulated over 
some period of weeks of using the machine cant ell whether it is in working 
order. The off icer therefore acquired the expertise. ... Therefore there 
is an 
element of doubt as to whether there was... The second test was a reliable 
one. I therefore find that the state has failed to state its case beyond 
reasonable doubt. Therefore the accused is acquitted and discharged. 
NOTES see green note book of readings at the back) this is for pages 19- 
22. Moreetsi Sebetlela. 
Tape number 16 JUDGEMENT 
The witness said in his evidence that the ... 
(inaudible) and he flicked his 
lights signalling it to stop. However that vehicle did not stop. Sergeant PW 2 
Sergeant.. they chased and caught up with the offending vehicle at another 
set of traffic lights. PW2 ordered the driver of the vehicle to go back to 
where the two officers first saw him. At which place the driver was cautioned 
and then charged by PW3 sub-inspector Machona. At the close of the state 
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case after his rights and options were clearly and carefully explained to the 
accused person they elected to have it closed and called no other witness. 
With regard to count one the accused person said that when he entered 
Lobatse Road, the lights were green. With regard to count two the accused 
says that he did infact see PW I but he unfortunately there was no way he 
could stop as he was on a high way and it was a no stopping zone. Now of 
the three prosecution witnesses PW I said Sergeant Makhobo who testified to 
the accused a vehicle the lights ... When he was asked how he was able to 
say that the accused drove against the lights he said that he was in the line of 
vision of the traffic light along the Lobatse road and that hose lights were 
green and that then he took it that those regulating the traffic the must have 
been red in other words he deduced from the colour of the lights along Old 
Lobatse Road that the colour lamps regulating the ... must be road. However I 
must say that the traffic authorities both in Botswana and other jurisdictions 
that one is not ... Inaudible) He says and I quote 'If the prosecution in which the accused did not intend to stop at a traffic light the cop is not entitled to 
assume that when the light in the face of the robot facing one direction is 
green the light indication of the robot at right angle to the former is red. For 
authority of this point in this jurisdiction one would be advised to look at the 
case of (inaudible) of the Botswana Law Report 1988 at page one hundred 
and two. It is therefore clear on the prosecution cannot ... (inaudible). With regard to count two.. PW I says her signalled to the accused to stop but the 
accused did not failed to stop. However the accused admits that he in fact 
saw PWI and did notice that he was waiving him to stop. He himself admits 
that he did not comply with the officers direction. He offers his justification 
for the failer to comply as that there was no suitable stop as he was driving 
on a high way. In my view however the reason give by the accused person 
for non compliance with the officer's direction is not in fact does not reflect 
the charge against him. If I may quote from Cooper again, but this time at 
page 471 he says and I quote' The driver of a vehicle on a ... road must stop 
at the side on direction given by a police officer in uniform. ' In my view a 
police officer signal takes precedence over all other road signs ... (inaudible) such a motorist must ignore the road signs and comply with the police 
officer's signal. Similarly therefore , where a motorist such as the accused has be commanded by a police officer in uniform to stop he must stop 
irrespective of whether the high way or whether there is no stopping or no 
parking. In conclusion and out of the boundaries of both I will say that the 
accused is found not guilty in regard to count one and is acquitted and 
discharged but is found guilty on count two and is convicted thereof. 
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APPENDIX 6 
READING OF FACTS 
Case no. 27 tape no 1126-08-99 
State versus KM. ( housebreaking. ) 
Pros: I am ready with the facts Your Worship. 
The accused is as named in the charge sheet. He is charged with two counts 
of breaking and stealing in the house. The complainant Helen Seikanyang 
resides at house number 20439 Phase Two, Gaborone. On the evening of the 
17'hshe accomanied her younger sister to their home in Kanye. They came 
back on the 18 July 1999 in the evening. On arrival she noticed that the 
kitchen lock had been broken. She then suspected that someone may have 
broken into their house in her absence. She then started her observations 
within the house. She realised that her property already exhibited in the 
charge sheet, had been stolen. She went to report the matter to the Gaborone 
West Police Station who investigated. On the 13'a'Of August the investigsting 
officer Inspector Kudumane was given those properties and the accused by 
Sergeant Modupe. When the accused was confronted with the allegation he 
admitted that he broke into the lady's house and stole the property. He was 
then charged as charged and we tender the goods as evidence. 
Mag: Is that true accused? On the 130' of July you went to Gaborone West? 
You broke the kitchen lock and entered the house with the intention to steal? 
READINGS OF FACTS 
Tape Number 2 
Case No 16.06-08-99 
State versus B. P. 
Pros: Your worship I am Inspector Montshiwa appearing for the state in this 
matter. The matter has been set for facts reading today. 
Mag: You will remember that on the second of this month, you pleaded 
guilty to several counts.... 
Int: Setswana: 0 gakologelwa gore erile ka di 2 tsa kgwedi yone ena o ne wa 
ipona molato mo melatong ele mokawanyana ya tsela. 
Mag: driving a car dangerously, 
Int: 0 ipone molato mo go kgweetseng koloi ka mokgwa oo diphatsa. 
Nlag: secondly, driving without a drivers licence. 
Int: Wa bobedi wa go kgweetsa o sena setlankana. 
Mag: thirdly driving without due care as well as driving without a valid 
drivers licence. 
Int: Le wa go kgweetsa o sena kelelelo. 
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Mag: You remenber you pleaded guilty to the charges? Do you still plead 
guilty to the charges? 
Int: 0 gakologelwa gore one wa ipona molato? 
Ace: Yes. 
Int: Le tsatsi leno ontse o ipona molato? 
Ace: Yes. 
Alag: Alright, listen then very carefully to the reading of the facts of the 
case. 
Int: 0 reetse ka kelelelo. 
Pros: The accused person is a citizen of Botswana, residing at house number 
23901 Phase 4, Gaborone West. 
Interpretation: Gatwe o monni wa lefatshe ]a Botswana onna ko ntlung ya 
nomoro ya 23091 Phase 4 Gaborone West. 
Pros: On the thirteenth day of November 1998 at around 8.00 hours, 
No. 11055 Constable Sechoni, received a report to the effect that there was a 
accident involving two motor vehicles. 
Interpretation: Ka di thirteen tsaga November 1998 ka bo eight, Constable 
Sechoni one a begelwa gore gona le kotsi ee amang dikoloi tse pedi. 
Pros: Constable Sechoni then proceeded to the scene of the accident which 
was Gaborone -Tlokweng road near Game Discount shopping centre. 
Interpretation: ene rre Sechoni a ba a ya ko, kotsing ee diragetseng teng ko 
tseleng ya Gaborone /Tlokweng go bapa le dishopo tsa Gaimi. 
Pros: On his arrival Constable Sechoni found that those motro vehicle were 
B43ADK Maribe Many.. Kgomotso of House No. 23796 Gaborone W4st 
Phase 4. 
Interpretation: ngwe ya dikoloi tseo ele ya B 342ADK, ele ya ga Maribe 
Kgomotso. 
Pros : This motor vehicle was from the west to the east and B428 AAI which 
was driven by Kawali Richard of Nkaikela ward in Tlokweng village and the 
said motor vehicle was from the east to the west. 
Iterpretaion: gatwe dikoloi tseo enngwe ene ele ya B428AAI, ya ga Kawale 
Richard, wa Nkaikela ko Tlokweng di ne di hapaana. 
Pros: In his investigation Constable Sechoni found that the accident was 
caused by the accused person who was driving a public service motor vehicle 
B567Aan. 
Interpretaion: Sechoni o tswa go t1hothomisa. a ba a bona gorekotsi e 
bakilwe ke wena one o kgweetsa koloi ya B567AANye e rwalang sechaba. 
Pros: The said public service motor vehicle was driving from the westward 
direction to the eastern direction, being followed by B428AAI and followed 
by other motor vehicles which were from the east and many other motor 
vehiclesd behind B248AAI. 
Interpretation: Gatwe yone koloi ye e rwalang sechaba e ene e salane 
morago le ya B428AAI ee e neng e setswe marago ke tse dingwe. 
Pro: B324AEK was the one in front of the other motor vehicle which were 
driving from the opposite direction. The accused person when he reached the 
bus stop in front of Game, saw people standing there but being on the 
southern side of the said road. 
Interpretation: Gatwe ya B342AAK ke yone ene ele fapele ga tse dine di 
tswa ka fa lebogong le le lengwe mme fa o tsena fa go emang di bus gone fa 
Game, obo o bona batho ba eme motseleng go bapa le tsela yone eo 
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Pros: As he saw those people, the accused without any waming, and on the 
road with a solid barrier line, and a painted island, which did not permit him 
to turn to the right, or cross the solid line, made aU turn when the oncoming 
traff ic was too near. 
Interpretaion: Gatwe wena erile o bona batho bone bao o bo o sa fe 
babangwe ba bangwe ba go ba tsibosa gore oa coma obo o coma hela ka 
tsela ee diphatsa, mo tseleng eeleng gore ena le gona le moradi o mosweu 
oosa letleleleng gore motho o ka coma teng. 
Pros: As a result of his dangerous way manner of driving, to other persons 
the driver of B342AEK who was being followed by other vehicles swerved 
his motor vehicle to the right as on the left there were people who were 
standing at the bus stop. 
Interpretation: Gatwe mokgweetsi wa koloi ya B428AAK yo oneng a 
setswe morago ke dikoloi tse dingwe on a siela ka ha letsogong la moja ka 
gore ko go la molema on a one o tshaba batho ba ba neng ba eme fa stopong. 
Pros: And as a result collided with B428AAI which were following 
B567AAN as there was no way in which the driver of B567AAN could do to 
run away from being knocked by B532AEK and he was forced torn apply 
sudden brakes by the dangerous manner of driving which which was 
displayed by the accused. 
Interpretation: Gatwe a ba a thulana le koloi ya B428AAI eene e setswe 
morago ke ya B567AAN ka gore gone go sena kafa mokgweetsi was 
B428AAI ak sielang teng atshaba go thulwa ke wa B342ADK. ke gore one a 
patelediwa ke go kgweetsa ga gago mo go diphatsa gore a brike ka bonako. 
Pros: After the two motor vehicles collided, the accused just drove away 
without even giving any help to the occupants of the two motor vehicles. 
Interpretation: Erile di sena go thulana gatwe wena obo o, tswa o tsamaya o 
sa ba thuse. 
Pros: The accused was arrested on the 260' day of November 199 8 at the taxi 
rank No longer driving ther motor vehicle which he was driving the motor 
vehicle which he was driving at the time of the accident. 
Int: Gatwe o tswherwe ka di 26 tsaga November 98 Osatlhople o kgeetsa 
koloi e oneng oe kgweetsa ka letsatsi la kotsi. 
Pros: After his arrest a statement was recorded from him by constable 
Sechoni and he demanded his driving licence and he the accused person 
seemed to be not a holder of a driving licence. 
Int: Constable Sechoni yo oneng a go tshwara a ba a tsaya a ya go kwala 
polelo mo go wena. A be a batla setlankana sa go kgweetsa mogo wena abo o 
re gaseyo. 
Pros: Constable Sechoni then warned and cautioned him for the charges of 
driving a motor vehicle which is a public service motor vehicle in a 
dangerous manner to other persons and of driving a motor vehicle without a 
driving licecnce. 
Int: a ba a go lebisa melato ya go kgweetsa koloi ee rwalang sechaba ka tsela 
ee diphatsa le go kgweetsa o sena setlankana. 
Pros: After that the accused person was nowhere to seen. 
Int: Go tswa foo o, bo o satlhowe o bon, %va. 
Pros: On the 25h of January 1999, the accused was driving a public service 
vehicle registration number B847AAB at old Gaborone taxi rank along 
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mmaraka road. And when he got at the pedestrian crossing he found a 
pedestrian already at the zebra crossing. 
Int: ka di 25 tsaga January 1999, one o kgweetysa koloi ee rwalang sechaba 
ya di nnomoro tsa B847AAB ko go emang di taxi. obo o, itlhela motsamaya 
ka dinao a tlola tsela. 
Pros: The accused failed to stop to give the pedestrian chance to cross. 
Int: 0 bo o palelwa ke go ema go fa motsamaya ka dinao yoo sebaka sa go 
tlola. 
Pros: The name of that pedestrian was Leina Popi. 
Int: Leiria la motsamaya ka dinao yoo ene ele Liena Popi> 
Pros: The accident was attended to by no. 669 Constable Ditshupo who was 
a sergeant by then. In his investigations he found out thacthe accused person 
had no valid drivers licence 
Int: Rre Ditshupoaitlhela ele gore ga o na setlankana sa go kgweetsa 
Pros: In this matter that accused was using the name Emmanuel Makgetsi. 
Int: Ga twe one o ipitsa Emmanuel Makgetsi. 
Pros: he was tbenwamed and cautioned for driving a public service vehicle 
without due care and attention and without a driving licence. 
Int: 
Pros: AS time Avent on police officers noticed that the accused person was 
the same person who was driving B567Aan on the thirteenth day of 
November 1998 and was the one who caused the said accident. 
Sergeant Ditsghupo then warned and cautioned him for the charges as now 
charged. 
Mag: Have you heard the facts of the case? 
Int: Ao ut1wile mabaka a molato? 
Mag: Are they true? 
Int: Ke boammaaruri? 
Mag: And more specifically, isw it correct that on the 13 th of November 
1998 you drove a motor vihecle registered B567AAN in a dangerous 
manner? 
Int: 
Mag: And is it correct that on that particular day you did not have a valid 
drivers licence? And is it correct that on the 26 th of January this year you 
drove B847AAB carelessly? Is there anything you want to say before the 
judgement? 
Acc: Mo melatong yotlhe e ke e lebisitsweng nne ke kopa maitshwarelo. 
Alag: Why, why do people drive without drivers' licences? (in a plaintive 
tone of voice) 
Int: Ke eng o, no o, kg-, veetsa o sena licence? 
Alag: Yourjudgernent will be delivered on the Ie of August and you will 
await it in prison. 
Tape number 12 Case Number 31 State versus KB. 
READING OF FACTS 
Mag: You will recall that on the 10th of August you pleaded guilty to driving 
a public service motor vehicle without due care and attention in count one 
and driving a public service motor vehicle without a public service lecence? 
Acc: Ee rra. 
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(Yes sir( 
Mag: Now lets get t to the circumstances under which the offences were 
committed. Now listen carefully to the reading of the facts because at the end 
you will be asked if you agree. 
Interpretation. 
Ace: Ee rra. 
(Yes Sir. ) 
Pros: The facts of the case state versus Keebine Boikanyo. The accused is 
charged with two counts of driving a public service motor vehicle without 
due care and attention and driving a public service motor vehicle without a 
public service motor vehicle licence. On the 4h of August 1999 the accused 
was driving a public service vehicle bearing the numbers B774ACF along 
the Mogoditshane Road. The accused person was carrying passengers. A 
road traffic accident accurred immediately in front of the accused person's 
vehicle when a two trucks collided. The accused person who was driving 
close to the trucks swerved his motor vehicle to the left side and hit a pole 
alongside the road. The police were called to the scene of the accident. Some 
measurements and drawings were made. Police investigations revealed that 
the accused person failed to keep a reasonable distance between his motor 
vehicle and the other truck which was ahead of him and when he avoiding 
the truck he swerved to the left and hit the pole. No passengers were injured 
during the accident, hence the charge of driving a public service vehicle 
without due care. The second count a public service motor vehicle licebce 
was demande from the accused person on that particular day. He failed to 
produce the licence because he is not a holder of such a licence. He was 
accordingly warned and cautioned about the charges. 
Mag:... count number one.. and I would find him not guilty by his 
plea. Count number one. 1 
Mag: Is correct that on the 4h of August you were dring the vehicle 
numbered B744ACI a public service and is it correct that on that day you 
were involved in an accident and is it correct as on that day you were not a 
holder of a licence to drive a public service vehicle 
Pros: Your worship I would request the in relation to count two another date 
of mention be set so as to asses the evidence so that we could come up with a 
better. 
READING OF FACrS 
Tape Number 12 03-09-99 State versus S. M. 
Pros: Your Worship I appear for the state the matter is for facts reading. 
Mag: Proceed. 
Pros: On the 28ffi day of ... 99 the accused 
drove a vehicle with the 
registration number B772AATon the Tlokweng road near Zamalek was 
stopped at a roadblock which wasmounted for the purpose of checking 
drivers licences. The driver introduced herself as S. M. of ward ... 
in 
Tlokweng. During the conversation with sergeant ... 
he sensed a smell of 
alcohol on her breath and he warned her about his suspicion that the accused 
was driving under the influence of alcohol. The accused was then transmitted 
to Naledi Police Station where shewas tested with the use of the Lion 
Intoxiliser 1400. The results produced by the machine showed that the 
alcohol content of her breath measured o. 614m I in one litre of breath, 
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thereby exceeding the prescribed limit of 0.35. The accused was warned for a 
charge as in the charge sheet. The printout from the machine was shown to 
the accused person. 
Mag: What's her status? 
Pros: She is a first offender Your Worship. Mag: Anything to say in 
mitigation accused? 
Acc: I have no parents and am the sole supporter of my brothers and sisters. 
Mag: The legislation provides for a maximum of PlOOO or twelve months in 
prison and withdrawal of drivers licence for two years. 
READING OF FACTS (from supplementary data) 
Pros: State versus K G. The accused person whose name is named in the 
charge sheet//Int: 0 utlwa sekgoa (Do you understand English? ) 
Pros: On the 23d day of may 1998 the police received information from 
reliable sources that the accused person was possessing a pistol-like object. 
They therefore traced the accused person. The accused person was 
subsequently arrested at plot number 9873 in Jinja location. On search a 
9mm barrel pistol was retrieved from him. The same pistol was later sent to 
the Botswana Defence Force for inspection and identification. After the 
inspection the pistol found to be a fire arm. Investigations later revealed that 
the accused person did not posses a licence for that pistol. The 9mm. barel 
pistol is produced befor court as an exhibition. Count two after the arrest of 
the accused person on the 23d day of May 1998 it was found that the 9mm 
barrel pistol was loaded with four rounds of ammunition. The ammunitions 
were also taken to the Botswana Defence Force and the armament technician 
produced an affidafit on how he conducted the inspection. The accused 
person did not have a licence to posses such ammunition. He was later 
cautioned for the charges as they appear on the charge sheet. 
Tape no. 7 case no. 5 Rainga interpretation. 
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APPENDIX 7 
READING OF CHARGE SHEET 
Tape number 12 Case number 29 03-09-99 
State versus L. Al. 
Pros: I appear for the state Your Worship. Our investigations are complete.. 
Mag: Lets have the accused plead to the charge. 
Int: Stand up accused. What language do you speak? 
Acc: English 
Int: You are L. M. You stay at house number 1888 Mochoba 12 Gweru 
Zimbabwe. You are unemployed. You are charged with the offence of giving 
false information to a person employed in the public service contrary to 
section 13 1A of the penal code. It is alleged that on the 19 th day of Coctober 
1998 at the Ramotswa National Registration Office in the South East 
Administration District, you gave false information to the Registrar of the 
National Registration that you were a Motswana born. in Matsilobjoe village 
on the 21t day of November 1972, knowing that such information was false 
and intending thereby to cause the Registrar to issue you with a Botswana 
National Identity card an act the registrar would not have done if he was 
aware of the true state of facts. 
Do you understand? 
Acc: Yes' 
Int: Do you plead guilty or not guilty? 
Acc: Not guilty. 
Pros: We are not ready with the facts Your Worship. I apply for a warrant of 
arrest. 
Case number 30 Tape number 12 03-09 99 
State versus R. B., 0. S., S. S. and 1,. M.. 
Pros: (Attorney General's Chambers State lawyer) I appear for the state 
Your Worship. Your Worship is aware that Mr Makgabenyana was 
prosecuting this case and he has since left the employ of The Attorney 
General's Chambers and A I've been asked to take over the matter. Now I 
need to meet with the investigating officer who has long retired from the 
public service. So IA ask for time that I could A liase with ... I only got 
this matter on Tuesday this week and I've been on leave so I'm asking for 
the time to afford me to link up and discuss this matter. It is as good as 
asking a truck driver to pilot an aircraft Your Worship and if he don't know 
where the bearings are he cause problems. So I am only asking for time to 
see, what a can do and of course I also need as well apply for permission to 
go through the court record its self. I'm informed according to the handover 
note that the investigating officer was still being cross-examined. I don't 
know what questions he was being asked eh I believe our Worship 
appreciates the circumstance therefore I am asking for adjournment to a 
future date. 
Mag: Well there is no doubt that the case has been gragging on and on. 
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Ace: Ke tswa kgakala ke ntse ke kopa gore kgang ee dropiwe. I remember 
Your Worship, when we were asked to It appears the prosecution has no 
case ... then we wer called again to be here on Saturday and when we got here there, %-a snobody. Your Worship I do feel angry because... 
Pros: May I respond Your Worship to the concerns of the accused, well I 
can assure the accused persons that I Nvill ensure they are prosecuted swiftly 
and properly. I am in the process of going through the case itself and I do 
understand what's involved. All I am saying is that I haven't met the 
investigating officer. I will meet him and this time there'll be a lot of 
keenness in their prosecution and they can rest assured that they will be 
prosecuted to the full strength of the law. There's just no doubt about that. It 
looks like there has been some breakdown in communication, its all systems 
gone bad. Thank you Your Worship. 
Mgg: 12111 OF October 
Pros: Your Worship that will be complied with. But I wonder if the court 
would assist me with a charge sheet. 
Mag: You will be given the charge sheet. 
Pros: Thank you Your Worship. 
Supplementary Data January 2000 
Tape no. I case no. 1,2000-03-10 
READING OF CHARGE SHEET 
Int: 0 K. D. 0 ngwaga di 33 .0 nna ko house number 915 8 ko Jinja, Gaborone. 0 bereka ko Roads. 0 lebisitswe molato wa go utswa ka dikgoka. 
Nne yare nako nngwe ka ene yare ka di 30 tsa October 1999 ko house 
number 9994 ko Jinja mo Gaborone, wa utswa ka dikgoka madi a 600 Pula 
mo go Martin Ikalafeng, wa mo itaya mo letlhaeng ka difeisi. Oa 
t1haloganya? 
Ace: Ee. 
Int: 0 ipona molato kana ga o ipone molato? 
Ace: Ke ipona molato. 
Int: You are K D. You ae 33 years old. You stay at house number 9158 at 
Jinja in Gaborone. You work at Roads. You are facing a charge of stealing 
with force. On the 30'h October 1999 at house number 9994 at Jinja you stole 
forcefully the some of P600 from Martin Ikalafeng. You hit him with your 
fists in the face. Do you understand? 
Ace: I do. 
Int: Do you plead guilty or not? 
Ace: I plead guilty) 
Pros: Your Worship ehwe have completed investigations. We intend to call 
4 witnesses in this matter. May the case be set for trial? 
Tape no. 6 2000-01-18 Case no. 4 CHARGE SHEET 
Pros: Your Worship I appear for the state. The matter is scheduled for trial 
today and before we prceed Your Worship I would like apply to make an 
amendment to the charge sheet. Your Worship originally ... was charged 
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under section 95 subsection 5 of the ... Act. I'm therefore making an 
application that he should be charged as under section 9subsection 4 of the 
Arms and Ammunition Act and to make the statement of the offence to read 
possession of arms for count one and possession of ammunition for count 
two. As a result I would like the accused to be arraigned. 
Int: Emang ka dinao 
(All Stand up) 
Int: Mosekisiwa wa ntlha maina a gago ke K. G. o ngwaga di 22 o nna ko 
house number 8689 ... ga o bereke. Mosekisiwa wa bobedi maina a gago ke Talibona Makobo o ngwaga, di 20 o nna ko Sebina mo kgotleng ya Makobo 
ga o bereke molato wa ntlha o lebisitswe molato wa go itlhelwa ka sebetsa. 
Ene yare ka di 23 tsaga May 1998 ko plot number 9873 ko Jinja mo 
kgaolong ya Gaborone o hitlhelwa ka tlhobolo eseng ka fa molaong ya nine 
millimetre barel 2. loa t1haloganya? - 
(First accused your names are K. G. you are 22 years old you live at House 
Number 8689.. you are unemployed. Second accused your names are 
Talibona Makobo you are 20 years old you live in Sebina at Makobo ward 
you are unemployed. In the first count you are charged with unlawful 
possession of arms. On the 23d of May 1998 at house number 9873 at Jinja 
in the Gabirone district, you were found carrying a gun unlawfully, a nine 
millimetre barrel 2.. Do you both understand? 
All Accusedpersons: Ee 
(Yes) 
Int: Mosekisiwa oa ntlha oa t1haloganya? 
(Acccused number one do you understand? 
Accl: Yes. 
Int: 0 ipona molato kana ga oipone molato? 
Accl: Ee. 
(Yes) 
Int: 0 ipona molato. 
(You plead guilty) 
Int: 0a t1halogany mosekisiwa wa bobedi? 
(Do you understand accused number two? ) 
Acc2: Yes. 
Int: 0 ipona molato kana ga o ipone molato? 
Do you plead guilty or not guilty? ) 
Ace2: Ga ke ipone molato 
(Not guilty) 
Int: Molato wa, bobedi le lebisitswe molato wa go hit1helwa, ka marumo. Ene 
yare ka di23 tsaga May 1998 gaufi kgotsa ko plot number 9873 ko Jinja mo 
kgaolong ya Gaborone eseng ka fa molaong la hitlhelwa ka marumo a 9mm 
ale 19. Oa t1haloganya, mosekisiwa oa ntlha? 
(Second count you are charged with unlawful possession of ammunition. 
On the 23dof May 1998 at house number 9873 at Jinja you were found 
carrying 19 rounds of ammunition. Do you understand accused number one? 
Acel: Ee. 
(Yes) 
Int: Do You plead guilty or not guilty? 
Accl: Ga ke ipone molato. 
(Not Guilty) 
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Int: Oa t1haloganya mosekisiwa was bobedt? 
(Do you understand accused number two? 
Aec2: yes 
Int: 0 ipona molato kana gao ipone molato? 
(Do you pleid guilty or not guilty? ) 
Acc2: Ga ke ipone molato. 
(Not guilty) 
Pros: A point of correction Your Worship, four rounds of ammunition. 
Mag: Yes. 
Int: (makes the correction) 
Pros: Your Worship, I'm not ready with the facts. I would therefore make an 
application for postponement of this matter. 
Case no 6 CHARGE SHEET 
Int: Le lebisitswe molato wa go utswa le le badiri oo kgatlhanong le temana 
yo bo 271 o balega, le temana ya bo 277 ya penal code. Ene yare magareng 
ga November 1999 la April 1995 ko Old Naledi Industrial mo kgaolong ya 
bosekisi mo Gaborone 
Mag: Le le badirifl Int: lele badiri mo Furniture Mart le bereka le le 
maleibara //Alag: Le dira mmogo ka maikaelelo// Int: le dira mmogo ka 
maikaelelo a le mangwefela le ne la utswa Gold star video machine le 
Panasonic video machine// Mag: Gold Star video machine di le tharo//Int: E 
mma. Goldstar Video machine tse tharo, le panasonic tsep Panasonic video 
machine tse pedi le Samsung video machine tse totlhe di neja 10585 Pula 61 
Thebe e le tsa Furniture Mart. Le t1halogantse molato o le o libisitseng. Ao 
ipona molato kana ga o ipone molato? 
(You are facing charges of theft by employees against Section 271 read with 
section 277 of the penal code. Between the months of November 1999 and 
April 1995 at Old Naledi Industrial Site, in the district of Gaborone//Ntag: 
Being employees//Int: being employees of of Furniture Mart working as 
labourers//Nfag: acting together in concert/Ant: acting together in concert, 
stole Gold Star video machine//Mag: Three Gold Star video machine/Ant: 
Yes Ma'm three Gold Star video machines and two Panasonic video 
machines le Samsung video machine all valued at P10585 and 61 Thebe 
belonging to Furniture Mart. Have you understood the charges. Do you plead 
guilty or not guilty? 
Int: Ka ga oa ipona molato basekisi ba tlaatla ka basupi ba le nine. 
(Because you have pleaded not guilty the prosecution will call nine 
witnesses) 
Pros: Your Worship eh I'm not ready with the facts but I still have arranged 




ut to lawyers and Police Prosecutors 
1. How often do you represent people who do not speak English? 
2. During court sessions, do you ever use a language other than English in 
addressing witnesses and defendants? 
3. If you have answered No to question one plaese explain why. 
4. If you have answered yes, pelease explain why and under what 
circumstances. 
5. How do you respond to interpreting in court if it does not represent your 
point exactly? 
6. What do you think of the rule that English should be the language of the law 
in Botswana. 
